Hi Magnus and Squad
> No bad feelings from Sweden, promise.
Phew! :)
> I've been thinking a lot about this and have
> more or less settled with a model of the levels. I guess I've been using you to
> get feedback. I didn't, and don't, think you'd mind.
You're right - I don't. I've been doing pretty much the same thing. Just trying to
work things out.
> Fudge mode on:
>
> A universe, or reality (I really think they are synonymous), is only as large as
> you can perceive. The universe of the cow in Bo's "The Quality Event" is just as
> completeas ours, but not as large. Since we can perceive the reality of the
> viruses, they arepart of our universe. But they can't, or at least they don't
> necessarily, perceiveour reality, so their universe begins with ones, zeros and
> the MLIR as the base inorganic level.
>
> Fudge mode off:
I suppose that if it is the case that they are at a higher level, then the way that
they perceive our reality would be inaccessible to us.
> > Inductivism is where you predict the future for ALL cases based on past
> > <SNIP>
> Perhaps I was unfair but I thought the computer virus was the counter-example
> that triggered L5.
But wouldn't the example of the virus, in the way I introduced it, be deductive
rather than inductive.
> But the levels is a generalized description and as such, it can be used
> deductively. Granted, it's roots are inductive but now we can use it in the
> other direction.
I agree with this. I think inductivism is fine for trivial belief systems such as
astrology or phrenology, but for something more substantial - like a metaphysics -
something more rigoorous is essential.
> Ok, I'll rephrase "because they are enough" to "to avoid redundancy".
> Redundancy causes, or at least makes contradictions possible. You said that
> "The ones and zeroes and the MLIR are an ANALOGUE of the inorganic level
> and the 'laws' of physics". I don't think it's merely an analogue, I think that if you
> generalize them into metaphysical levels they become identical and redundant.
That sounds more reasonable. One thing that does intrigue me though is the
ability of parallel evolutionary systems to co-exist. This may, in part, be what
prompted me start this discussion. Difficulties of co-existence and antagonism
are very similar to the moral conflicts between levels. What you say above
prompts me to think that this would lead to the necessity of incorporating parallel
moral equivalence. Maybe there is some form of co-operative relationship between
equivalent levels of parallel systems. There is also the difficulty of recognition and
acceptance of one system by another.
> Here's another proposed MoQ axiom:
> Patterns of a lower level can't tell manipulations by a higher level apart
> from DQ.
> (It's not really fudging, we've talked about it before but I believe you're
> not convinced.)
Not entirely. How would this work between parallel evolutionary systems.
> This means that since we're very well aware of the computer viruses and the
> Internet and we're only 4 level beings, they can't be L5.
We're aware of some aspects of of viruses and the Internet (and potential AL's
and AI's) but I'm still not entirely convinced that we are necessarily aware of ALL
aspects. Again, there is an amount of inductivism in your statement.
> > Everything covered by the term Object. There is a different relationship
> > between patterns of value of more advanced forms.
>
> Now I'm curious! I'm extremely catholic about the dependency and will begin
> fudging as never before if you find counter-examples.
Apologies! I wasn't very clear. What I meant was that at the 'object' level inorganic
patterns of value are more easily discernible, physically, than at the 'subject' level.
You can poke something at an inorganic or organic level but not at a social or
intellectual level (by social level I don't mean collections of cells, but a religion or
a university).
> > As a metaphysics is a philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution
> > and structure of reality if you fail to take account of the physics - including it's
> > shortcomings and inadequacies - when discussing the metaphysics then the
> > two quickly come to bear no relationship to each other. They are too tightly
> > linked for either to ignore the other.
>
> Yes. Constructing a metaphysics is an iterative process, first you use induction
> to make a general metaphysics. Then you test this metaphysics on reality
> deductively.
I agree. But any return to inductivism, as part of the MoQ, should be vigorously
checked.
> > > I accept the SOTAQI idea so far as to acknowledge that SO thinking values
> > > the same things as intellectual patterns. That doesn't mean that SO
> > > thinking is aware of that fact, it thinks it is objective.
> >
> > Sorry. That still isn't very clear. Does this mean that Q-Intellect values
> > objectivity?
>
> No, it means that Q-Intellect and SO thinking values Quality. Q-Intellect
> is aware of that, SO thinking isn't.
With good reason. SO thinking has all but defined value out of it's reality except in
a basically instrumental/functional sense. SO thinking tends to see value as a
product rather than a producer.
Horse
"Making history, it turned out, was quite easy.
It was what got written down.
It was as simple as that!"
Sir Sam Vimes.
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