Greetings,
Discussions so far have tended to locate the MoQ firmly into the naturalistic camp of ethics. Most
often in the form of some variation of evolutionary ethics. Short of merely saying that everything
is good, which neatly side-steps the problem but does little to illuminate it, can anyone out there
suggest why the naturalistic fallacy is not applicable in this case. Or, alternatively, does anyone
want to argue that the MoQ isn't naturalistic?
Those taking the latter option would presumably have to take a similar position to G.E Moore
(assuming we see the MoQ as cognitive) and claim that, (to misquote), "Quality is Quality and there
is an end to the matter." If this is the case how can we engage in moral discourse if we can't break
Quality down further. If intuition is our only guide than how can we argue about our respective
value judgements with any hope of resolution?
Could the MoQ be naturalistic on one level and non-naturalistic on another? Is there another angle
on this that I've missed?
Any takers?
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@shellier.freeserve.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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