drose and folks-
Hey again!
On 6/13/99 at 6:13 PM -0500, drose wrote:
> This is three for today. Hooboy.
Well, this is four for me. I might have one around midnight again to handle
the other free will posts, but it certainly won't be until the 14th by my
clock...<G>.
> I think we're closing in on our difference of opinion, Mark. This has
> been a fine way to pass a rainy Sunday here in Indiana.
It's been fine here, too...and it's raining at that.
> If you go on to Chapter 13, pp 182-183 (teal) you will see that the "Law
> of Nature" moral code, which describes phenomena such as atoms, is but
> one of four macro-codes, if you will. The intellectual moral code, that
> which governs society, is still and only the province of sentience.
Agreed, by definition. The intellectual moral code does require sentience.
I maintain though that all of the moral codes require choice and that, in
terms of the MoQ, sentience is therefore no longer required for choice. I
think morality itself implies choice...nothing can choose the "better" one
unless it gets to choose.
>> What this comes down to is the fact that, moral decisions are not
>> necessary reasoned or rational. Therefore, moral decisions do not
>> require sentience.
> Depending, of course, on which level the moral decision is being made.
Yes, the intellectual/social code will always require sentience when making
a moral decision, the others do not.
> Semantics is probably our main problem. We've already established that
> we agree on conclusions.
Pretty much so, yes.
> The power, or capacity, to choose among alternatives or to act in
> certain situations independently of natural, social, or divine
> restraints.
Okay.
My definition is (in one of many possible phrasings used recently) the
choice of a more dynamic outcome over a more static. This fits in with your
intellectual/social, but it also fits in and works in all of the codes,
including biological/inorganic.
Since Pirsig doesn't really differentiate the mechanics of the moral codes
(they are built from the same ground-stuff, smallest unit, etc), I don't
think we can say that free will applies only to the intellectual/social
code except in a classical, SOM sense.
> By that definition, the cat could not act in any way other
> than to try to get off of that hot stove. A human can decide to put up
> with that hot stove (as in the case of torture) if the moral imperative
> is strong enough. History is replete with such cases.
Well, I don't know that I believe that. I think that if the cat had to
cross the stove to get to tasty plate of anchovies, it would decide to move
really fast in that direction. In your human example, he also jumps the
first time the stove surprises him...he can decide to go back...and I think
that cat could too if enough incentive was there.
In other words, if the moral imperative of hunger (biological) were there,
the cat could choose to go across the hot stove (inorganic).
To be clear on something, you are not saying that humans always choose what
they evaluate as the most moral are you? I don't think you are, but
something in that last paragraph troubled me...<G>.
> I try not to redefine standard philosophical terms if I can avoid it. In
> this case I'm on admittedly shaky ground to start with since free will
> and determinism are both dismissed as irrelevant by Pirsig.
In the MoQ, I think we are left with either abandoning "free will" and
"determinism" or redefining them so that they can be used in a way that a)
does not completely contradict Pirsig's redefinition of choice (he did that
one in the sections quoted and elsewhere in Lila) and b) does not
completely contradict what people most often mean by free will in SOM terms.
I think that my redefinition of free will/determinism as a continuum that
is analogous with dynamic/static does that. The common usage is that of
intellect over social or social/biological and that usage is still valid
within the expansion. In addition, SOM problems with the inorganic not
being completely deterministic (quantum theory) seem to be eliminated.
> In the case of the intellectual-over-society moral code, free will is a
> useful term to differentiate between a reasoned choice and an
> unreasoned one.
I think it is still useful in the same way within the expansion when you
limit yourself to talking about humans. They can show free will be acting
with their intellect over society.
> Maybe we're both right.
That's my thought. You were mainly speaking of the "classical"
intellect/social and I was trying to redefine/expand the term so that it
worked there and in every other MoQ moral code. That is probably why we
remained virtually consistent in our conclusions.
Cheers,
Mark
________________________________________________________________________
Mark Brooks <mark@epiphanous.org> <http://www.epiphanous.org/>
How do you know who wrote this? <http://www.epiphanous.org/mark/pgp/>
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