and don't forget to be gentle
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icq 6598359
----- Original Message -----
From: <RISKYBIZ9@aol.com>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Samstag, 11. September 1999 20:35
Subject: MD Johns Organismic MOQ
> ROGER ZEROES IN ON SOME FUNDAMENTAL
> MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE MOQ WITHIN JOHN'S
> ORGANISMIC METAPHYSICS
>
> John,
> I really did enjoy the work and quality of your recent forum contribution.
> You clearly delineate the MOQ and your assumptions and critiques thereof
and
> you clearly offer some alternatives. Please allow me to state where I
differ
> in interpretation and prescription.
>
> If anybody else wants to jump in, feel free to offer critiques of my
> position. John will probably be gone for another few days.
>
> JOHN:
> "Quality is the primary empirical reality of the world" (Lila Ch 5) While
> this seems to be essentially an assertion, the word empirical implies that
it
> is to be supported by my experience. Pirsig's example of the hot stove
> demonstrates an organismic reaction to quality, in the case of this
example a
> low quality experience. What needs to be added to the core statement to
> remove any possible ambiguity, then, is something of the nature of
"Organisms
> experience quality (both positive and negative) as the primary empirical
> reality of their world." As an organism, I can then test this statement
> against my experience, and hopefully this 'reality' would also be
supported
> by Poincare's small child. It seems to me that some form of statement of
this
> type is essential for the MOQ, yet by refining it as I have, it is saying
> rather less than the original bold assertion. Yet critically, what it now
is
> saying is testable, whereas the more abstract statement from Pirsig is
not.
>
> ROGER:
> Empiricism is basically a system of knowledge that stresses experience.
> Quality is direct experience. Therefore "Quality is the primary empirical
> reality of the world" is logically consistent within the metaphysics. To
> quote W. James: "...there is only one primal stuff or material in our
world,
> a stuff which everything is composed , and if we call that stuff PURE
> EXPERIENCE, then knowing can easily be explained ....."
>
> Pirsig has chosen to call James' stuff VALUE or QUALITY. But they are
> talking about the same stuff, and it is the primal or primary empirical
> reality.
>
> JOHN:
> "Quality is morality" "They're identical" "The world is primarily a moral
> order" (Lila Ch 7). The problem here is how to understand the terms
morality
> and value (another term Pirsig equates with Quality), especially as they
are
> applied to inorganic substance, or to artistic and intellectual
judgements.
> With reference to organisms, we could rephrase this to read something like
> "Organisms experience quality as having either a positive or negative
> valence, insofar as the experience alerts the organism to potential help
or
> harm in its environment."
> To say bluntly that "Quality is morality" seems a nonsense to me, at least
in
> the generally understood meanings of these terms..
> Pirsig is not unaware of this criticism. Indeed in Lila, Ch 12, he says
"...
> value. The word is too vague... Therefore to say that the world is nothing
> but value is just confusing, not clarifying." He then goes on to sort
values
> according to the level of evolution they represent. "The value that holds
a
> glass of water together is an inorganic pattern of value..." and so on. In
my
> view he has not improved the situation. Just what an 'inorganic pattern of
> value' might mean eludes me. Cut out the word value altogether in this
> context and it reads better. The above could be rephrased as "What holds a
> glass of water together is an inorganic pattern." It may be a bit trivial,
> but adding in value doesn't improve that. The whole effort seems driven by
a
> desire to have 'value' as a universal term, while then admitting that the
> values of each level "are completely different from each other."
>
> ROGER:
> What you see as a weakness, I see as brilliance. Pirsig builds a monism
that
> explains reality and knowledge from James' pure experience. When you say
> "What holds a glass of water together is an inorganic pattern." You have
left
> out the key term. A rock and a glass are inorganic patterns composed out
of
> the relationship of value. These values are called the strong force, the
> weak, electromagnetism and gravity. None of these have any meaning other
> than as terms of relative value. Quantum reality is basically value
> interaction.
>
> JOHN:
> He concludes this unsatisfactory explanation with the following important
> statement "These patterns have nothing in common except the historic
> evolutionary process that created all of them. But that process is a
process
> of value evolution. Therefore the name 'static pattern of values' aplies
to
> all. That's one puzzle cleared up." (Lila Ch 12)
>
> Not so fast. While evolution is an important component of Pirsig's
thought,
> he has not justified the core statement that the evolutionary process "is
a
> process of value evolution". What he has done is examine the 'survival of
the
> fittest' strand in evolutionary thought and he makes quite a good case for
> fitness being a 'value' term. But again, this works at the biological
level
> of the organism, or the species; possibly even at the cellular level. It
> takes a giant leap of faith to apply this with any coherence to inorganic
> patterns, and yet this is precisely what is required. What we have is a
form
> of words which papers over the huge gaps between patterns with nothing in
> common by assuming a universal process of 'value evolution'.
>
> ROGER:
> I agree that inorganic patterns are not explained well by value evolution.
> Value or pattern emergence perhaps, but not value evolution. Evolution
can
> occur though when chemicals form a feedback loop that allows the chemical
> pattern to respond in such a way that its organization is conserved.
Current
> models of life are built on just such a spontaneous pattern of inorganic
> pattern evolution. The universal process of value evolution works fine for
me.
>
> JOHN:
> "A thing that has no value does not exist" or "The Value has created the
> thing" (Lila Ch 8). This is an important insight, but difficult to test in
> terms of experience as by definition what is without value will not be
> experienced. Again there is a way of understanding such assertions from
the
> perspective of organisms, but by doing so the sweep of the original
> statements is greatly reduced. The organismic statement would run somewhat
as
> follows "Organisms encounter the world through experiences of positive and
> negative value, and what does not have value for them is not experienced,
> hence is not encountered."
>
> ROGER:
> "A thing that has no value does not exist" is locally consistent within
the
> basic assumptions of empiricism. On the other hand, your "Organisms
encounter
> the world through experiences of positive and negative value, and what
does
> not have value for them is not experienced, hence is not encountered" is
pure
> SOM. It starts with an objective organism and (seems to me) then
references
> encounters with other objects. You have followed Robert's path and used
> misunderstandings of the MOQ to recreate the world of Aristotle and
Descartes.
>
> JOHN:
> When Pirsig says "a thing that has no value does not exist", he is
> overstating his case.
>
> ROGER:
> Again, this is about as good of an assumption I can imagine. It is pure
> empiricism. A lack of value means a lack of interaction and relation.
And
> reality is defined by interaction and relation.
>
> JOHN:
> At a fundamental level all language can be seen as carrying static value.
> Most words only form from experiences of value. According to his logic, if
> there was no value for me in a word, it would not become part of my
> vocabulary. However some words seem clearly functional without value - the
> word the will do as an example. The fills a grammatical role in language,
but
> as a word it is empty of content and equally empty of value.
>
> ROGER:
> You just agreed its value is grammatical. Why is content the only judge of
> value? This is a very materialist argument.
>
> JOHN:
> You might argue it has a grammatical or syntactical value, but this is to
> apply a different standard. The value Pirsig implies is the primary value
> arising out of dynamic experience.
>
> ROGER:
> I do so argue! Grammar and language are shared systems of agreements to
> coordinate our experiences. No word has inherent content other than what
we
> have arbitrarily agreed.
>
> JOHN:
> To now move in the reverse direction, is it not at least possible that
there
> may be some 'things' which we do experience as existing, but function like
> the word 'the' as a component of our ordering of experience, without
value?
> If so, it seems a fundamental statement of Pirsig's metaphysics is flawed.
To
> me it seems the word "the" is itself sufficient refutation. It may well be
> that a whole class of mathematical and logical terms, for example, are of
> this type. Or can you explain for me how I might distinguish the values of
> seventeen and eighteen respectively?
>
> ROGER:
> Seventeen only exists in relation to the other numbers that we have agreed
> within our culture. In the same sense, physics has found that the basic
> forces that compose 'matter' are similarly only interrelationships. What
you
> see as some kind of flaw is what I see as the strength of the MOQ.
>
> JOHN:
> So while most experience for most organisms includes positive or negative
> value, and without this value nothing will be experienced, in human beings
> with a capacity for language and logic there appear to be words and ideas
> which are experiencable but function to facilitate other processes and are
> themselves value free.
>
> ROGER:
> Huh? Their function shows their value. Pirsig never stated that only one
> type of value pattern is real. They are all real.
>
> JOHN:
> "Dynamic quality is the pre-intellectual cutting edge of reality." "Static
> quality ... always contains a component of memory." Pirsig saw this
division
> into dynamic and static as fundamental to his metaphysics, yet it lacks
> clarity. In this polarity he seems to be addressing the question of how
> dynamic experiences of quality are preserved or integrated into the
ongoing
> lives of organisms.
>
> ROGER:
> I agree with this last statement.
>
> JOHN:
> Both the wording above, with its references to 'pre-intellectual' and
> 'memory', and the examples used to flesh out this distinction (the tune on
> the radio, the heart attack victim) are closely tied to higher organisms.
To
> explicate this, I would suggest something like "Organisms encounter
dynamic
> quality in direct experience, both positive and negative, and have the
> ability to retain traces of this quality experience through memory, which
is
> static."
>
> ROGER:
> The direct experience is DQ. And the experience creates the organism and
the
> environment, not the other way around.
>
> JOHN:
> But as the example of the tune on the radio makes clear, there is in fact
no
> sharp division beween dynamic and static, but rather a continuum. The
dynamic
> element is still present to some extent even as the song is becoming
defined
> as 'good' in a static sense. It may still be possible to catch a small
> element of the dynamic surprise after dozens of playings.
>
> ROGER:
> Again, DE is DQ. It is always dynamic. We have learned to filter and
veil
> experience. To pattern it and use this trick to run on autopilot. This
is
> basically a very effective and successful process. However, we can tend
to
> overdo it. We begin to live in our patterns and filter out the greater
world
> of experience.
>
> The song has already been experienced, so we don't need or want to attend
to
> it any more. But as you mention, if you really listen, there is much
dynamic
> experience still to be discovered. Pirsig values sq, but always reminds
us
> to go back to the source and to constantly seek new, superior experiences
and
> patterns.
>
> JOHN:
> We have already found difficulty with the assumption that the the
different
> kinds of values associated with each level are part of some "process of
value
> evolution". However the question of the existence of the four systems or
> levels remains an open one. The proposition is at least plausible, and it
> seems to me that the test of experience does tend to confirm it. That is,
I,
> as an organism that functions within all four levels, frequently
experience
> conflicts which may be seen to arise from the mutual antagonisms of the
> different systems, and these conflicts frequently appear intractable
(there
> appear to be no win/win solutions).
> But even if this is so, it does not necessarily follow that the four
systems
> are rigidly hierarchic. Is it always the case that social values, for
> example, over-ride biological values? Or is it rather that biological
values
> form part of the field in which social values arise, and the biological
> values are encountered as constraints, limiting and shaping the options
> available to the emerging social value system? In this more subtle
statement,
> there may be direct conflict between biological and social values, but
there
> is likely to be quite a bit of mutual adjustment as well. Indeed, this
seems
> likely, given that the complete overturn of biological values by the
social
> is likely to result in the elimination of the organism. Jonestown is an
> example of such a situation, where the society became self destructive,
but
> obviously such social systems destroy their own bases for survival. So
> although there may be some basis for asserting that since systems arising
in
> the higher levels manage lower level systems, they therefore dominate the
> lower level systems, such domination need not be totally oppositional. Nor
> will every emerging social value be equally above the lower level
biological
> values. It is to be expected that the lower level values will form an
> important part of the environment which will select which higher level
> emergents will survive. It may well be that the lower level values will at
> times appropriately overturn some higher level emergents.
>
> ROGER:
> I tend to agree with most of your points on the moral hierarchy. The
> hierarchy is an Aristotelian ordering system of value, but harmfull if
taken
> as literally as RMP suggests in places. I also strongly agree with your
> stressing the harmony as well as the conflict between levels.
>
> JOHN:
> I have in another article ("Quality and Intelligence", available in the LS
> Forum) argued that there are varieties of quality associated with the
> biological, social and intellectual levels, and that the mystic puts his
> trust in quality at the biological level. This is in organismic terms the
> most immediate form of experience, unmediated by intelligence or social
> factors, and linked very closely to survival. Recognition of the the
quality
> of a work of art, in contrast, is heavily dependant upon personal and
> cultural training which can be extremely elitist, and generally has much
less
> survival value. It seems clear to me that Pirsig approaches this issue a
> number of times but is so keen to maintain the elemental purity of Quality
as
> the basis of his metaphysics that he invariably turns off at a tangent and
> evades the issue. It is one of the major flaws in his thought; and the
purity
> of the final metaphysics is phony because he has avoided the range of
> meanings of quality that he has tried to subsume in an overly simple
formula.
>
> ROGER:
> You confuse the pure DQ of an infant with the much broader range of
> experience of a mystic. The difference is in depth and breadth of
> conciousness.
>
> But then again, I could be wrong.
>
> Roger
>
>
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