To make a long story short:
1. You mix a suggested anthropocentric point of view with the ephistemal
question of what we can [as human know.
2. You put a [human] organism in the center of your metaphysical theory, in
this you cease to talk about MoQ.
3. To claim that X is so or X is not so is not the same action. So by
claiming that you cannot see quality experience in the inorganic layer
[assertions about Quality infusing or directing inorganic patterns], this
doesn't have to be justified, but it is a standing theory BECAUSE IT WASN'T
REFUTED YET. The claim is not that it is so, but that there are no evidence
of it not to be so.
4. You ignore the simple question of: What is a human being according to
[your version of] MoQ?
and don't forget to be gentle
Avid
icq 6598359
----- Original Message -----
From: John Beasley <beasley@qld.cc>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Freitag, 17. September 1999 07:47
Subject: MD Organismic MOQ
> Platt, Roger, Dan, Struan, Avid and others,
>
> Having returned from wilderness, good company, great weather and
aggressive mites, I am
> somewhat overwhelmed by the discussion that has been going on relating to
an organismic
> MOQ (or at least the volume of it).
>
> I want to concentrate on Platt's critique of my Strand 1, as I was
immediately struck by the
> potency and relevance of his main point. He said "Limiting or reducing the
meaning of
> "empirical" to what is accessible to the biological senses cuts out direct
awareness of the
> social, intellectual and mystic (artistic, spiritual) levels. Yet all of
these are empirical in the
>
> sense that they are immediately apprehended by human awareness to one
degree or
> another." I have to agree. Indeed, in my post addressed to Struan a week
or two ago I made
> something of a similar point, though more vaguely, and I have since made
some rather
> limited attempts to address the MOQ from the human, rather than from the
organismic
> perspective, but these are not yet ready for publication.
>
> Before addressing your main point, Platt, I notice you place artistic and
spiritual quality under
> the 'mystic' umbrella, and if I read you correctly, are including the
'mystic' level as an addition
>
> to Pirsig's four levels. (I know he does suggest a "code of art" as a
possibility in Lila - but
> fails to flesh it out, and equates it with dynamic quality itself.) I am
wary of these sorts of
> groupings, and while I am unhappy with the restrictiveness of the
intellectual level, I am also
> uncomfortable with including artistic quality as part of some 'mystic'
level. I believe there is
> still a lot of work to do in understanding the new reality that is
emerging within human
> societies that is able to critique society itself and points to 'higher'
values, though I suspect
> self aware creativity will be one central theme, and language another.
>
> But to return to your main point... What I said makes sense if the
organism (including any
> stray dog or cat) is the focus, as it was in my article. I recognise now
that this was perhaps a
> misplaced focus, but I was attempting, in Avid's words, to 'start from the
middle', though not
> "looking at the structure from a human point of view" as Darwin did, but
rather from the point
> of view of the organism. All the froth in this discussion about organisms
being 'subjects' or
> 'objects' is in my view rather irrelevant, confusing the irreducible SOM
content of language
> with the message being conveyed; looking at the finger rather than the
moon.
>
> Your point, though, is that once we include the dynamic awareness of
social, intellectual,
> artistic and mystic experience available to humans, we must endorse
Pirsig's assertion that
> "Quality is the primary empirical reality of the world." This being the
world experienced by
> humans, of course. In my article I have tended to muddle the organismic
and the human at
> times, and this requires attention. The example of the hot stove could
apply to both, though,
> and I agree with Avid when he says that this 'negative' example may be
significant having
> regard to Popper's understanding of scientific proof/disproof. What is not
justified, though,
> are assertions about Quality infusing or directing inorganic patterns. In
my view we do not
> have experience at any level that can justify such statements. We do have
intellectual
> constructs (science, physics, etc) which purport to explain the behaviour
of the inorganic
> realm, but in reality there are a host of competing theories, each with
some supporting
> 'evidence', but none proveable. It is fashionable to asume a match between
quality and our
> current understanding of fundamental physics which in my view is quite
tenuous. If by Pirsig's
> statement you mean "Quality is the primary empirical reality of the world
as experienced by
> us" then I guess I agree, but I doubt that this is what Pirsig means.
>
> Pirsig says there is an "inorganic-chaotic" code of morals (Lila Ch 24),
and he says "weak
> Dynamic forces at a subatomic level discover stratagems for overcoming
huge static
> inorganic forces ... by selecting superatomic mechanisms" and so on (in Ch
11), in what I can
> only interpret as an attempt to shape a complete metaphysics, but how this
could be
> validated, or even just what it means, I do not know. I am not an
Idealist, if by that is meant
> nothing exists outside our ideas, but I think it is fair to say that what
exists outside our
> experience is at best conjecture based upon both experience and our mental
operations
> upon our static residue of that experience. Pirsig goes much further than
this.
>
> The other point I would reassert here is that the quality of the
biological level is different from
>
> the quality of the social and intellectual realms, not so much in the
immediacy of the actual
> experience, but in the filters and limits which apply to the 'higher
realms', the lower survival
> values of some of these forms of quality, and the isolating effect of the
specialization that
> occurs in the intellectual and artistic realms. If you are correct, as I
suspect, in your critique,
>
> then this assertion of mine becomes much more significant to the overall
argument. I am
> beginning to suspect that the intellect is directly responsible for the
"secret loneliness" that
> Pirsig laments (at the end of Ch22) and not science as he implies. In this
regard I certainly
> agree we need a level above that of the intellectual if we are not to be
left in despair, though
> I am not sure how to define this - perhaps mystic is the best available
term, though I hope
> not.
>
> Roger, I agree with your statement that "I see value in having the wisdom
of a sage and the
> wonder of a new born child." However, I will take issue with a couple of
other points of yours.
> When James calls pure experience 'stuff', I believe he has deliberately
chosen a very neutral
> word. When Pirsig uses words like quality or value to describe that stuff,
his choice of words
> is far from neutral. That is why it is fair enough to critique his key
terms, even if he tries to
> embargo this (by asserting Quality cannot be defined).
>
> When you say my statement that "organisms encounter the world through
experiences of
> positive and negative value, and what does not have value for them is not
experienced,
> hence is not encountered", "is pure SOM", I can only say the perception is
yours. The words
> 'organism' and 'world' can of course be seen as objects or subjects, but
that is the nature of
> nouns in language, as I explained in the introduction to my article. The
key words are
> 'encounter' and 'experience'; both, in my view, consistent with the MOQ.
>
> The biggest problem for your position is that you say "The direct
experience is DQ", without
> being able to clarify how anything else could exist. Is a memory
experienced? If not, how do
> you explain it? If it is experienced, must it be only static? Some of my
most dynamic
> experiences have occurred in dreams. Does that mean dreams are more real
than
> memories? I am not sure I have expressed myself well, here. Do you get my
drift?
>
> Avid, I find your writing annoying and largely incomprehensible, though
when I do
> understand you I often agree with you. You have misquoted me, though. In
your post
> describing the song on the radio you say "what you call 'the DQ
containment of the song'".
> (The quotes were yours.) I am sure I have never used this term. What's
more, it is
> incomprehensible to me. If you want to argue with me, fine, but please
don't put words in my
> mouth.
>
> I must close and catch up on some sleep.
>
> John B
>
>
>
> MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html
> MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
>
MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html
MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:03:11 BST