From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Thu Jan 09 2003 - 14:32:24 GMT
Hi Matt:
> The types of quotes I'm think of are like these:
>
> "In general, given a choice of two courses to follow and all other things
> being equal, that choice which is more Dynamic, that is, at a higher level
> of evolution, is more moral." (Ch 13, beginning)
>
> "All life is a migration of static patterns of quality toward Dynamic
> Quality." (Ch. 11)
>
> They're littered everywhere when Pirsig talks about the morality, like the
> choice of the Hippies (Ch. 24) and insanity/mysticism (Ch. 30).
Thanks for digging out some quotes to support your view. I now have a
better appreciation of your point about DQ being more equal than SQ
and tend to agree with it, though not "absolutely." :-).
> Platt said:
> The results from DQ cannot be predicted. But, if you deny the existence of
> DQ, you might as well toss the MoQ into the intellectual trash heap.
>
> Matt:
> That's fine, because, naturally, I don't deny the existence of DQ. Dynamic
> Quality is a metaphor. As a metaphor, it is unintelligible. As soon as it
> becomes intelligible, it becomes a dead metaphor, which is the same thing
> as a literal word a.k.a. a static pattern. Metaphors are what expand our
> knowledge, they are what expand our logical space so that we can think of
> other races and women as being equal to the white race and men. In the old
> static patterns, it was logically impossible for women to be equal to men.
> To say that they were was unintelligible, by definition false. To insist
> that they were was a metaphor. It wasn't until we expanded to logical
> space to make that equalization intelligible that the metaphor died and
> became easy to logically understand.
>
> DQ as metaphor, however, is much more than a metaphor. It is the
> compliment made to other metaphors when they succeed in expanding logical
> space to make things better. Dynamic Quality is the ultimate compliment.
> So, when you say, "The results from DQ cannot be predicted," I would think
> it better to say, "The results of metaphors cannot be predicted." That's
> why we can't call them DQ until much later.
Sorry Matt. I have no idea what you're talking about.
> As for "cruelty," you said:
> Like so many words in the liberal lexicon, "cruelty" is another ingredient
> in Pirsig's "soup of sentiments" that you're "supposed to cheer for, like
> "justice" and "compassion." Is abortion cruel? Is encouraging bastardy
> cruel? Is moral ruthlessness cruel? Consider the following:
>
> "Intellectuals must find biological behavior no matter what its ethnic
> connection and limit or destroy biological patterns with complete moral
> ruthlessness, the way a doctor destroys germs . . ." (24)
>
> What about the value in certain circumstances of Hamlet's insistence, "I
> must be cruel, only to be kind."? Apparently Pirsig would agree--hardly a
> contemporary liberal attitude. Like words in all slogans, "cruel" needs
> elaboration to have intellectual meaning.
>
> Matt:
> Well, I tend to agree that "cruelty" is part of that "soup of sentiments."
> However, I think that soup of sentiments is absolutely necessary for moral
> progress. I don't follow Pirsig in thinking that we need to make our
> morals "rational" in the old meaning of rational.
What is the "new" meaning of rational?
> In my reading of Pirsig,
> it seems Pirsig is looking for the perfect, knock-down argument against the
> Nazi's on why they should be considered the 20th Century's example of
> Ultimate Evil. Well, I don't know how that argument would work against an
> actual Nazi. It may work against people like us, but then, we already
> agree with you. The problem is that Nazis don't share enough of our
> beliefs, enough _premises_, for a logical argument to work. We show them
> Pirsig's argument and they go, "Vell, dat's okay vit us, because ve tink
> dat de Aryan race is de most Dynamic." And that's if they buy into enough
> of the terminology. If they don't, it makes the argument even less
> persuasive.
Do you think Pirsig's logical argument would have worked against
Communists who killed more innocents than the Nazis? After all,
Marxism appeals above all else to rationality, as the number of
intellectuals duped in the 30's shows. (Please add Communists to your
list of 20th century examples of Ultimate Evil.)
> So all we have left is that sloppy "soup of sentiments" with which to
> converse about. We attempt to show the Nazi some of the inhumanity that he
> is causing in the hopes that it touches his heart strings. That's the only
> way to reach a convinced, and philosophically adept, Nazi.
Good luck.
> So, sure, "cruelty" needs to be more elaborated to have a more plausible
> intellectual meaning, some meaning as a word in the premise in an argument.
> But my use of "cruelty" wasn't meant to be used in a logical argument, it
> was meant to pull at your heart strings.
Emotional appeals rely on biological level responses, not the best
guides to direct public or private policy. Often, good intentions based on
what one's "heart strings" lead to disastrous consequences, just as
rational decisions based on mistaken premises can.
If you deny the rational morality that Pirsig advocates, you deny the
validity of the MoQ. That's fine. But that leaves me to wonder what, if
anything, you do find valid in the MoQ? Something must have appealed
to you besides Pirsig tugging at your heart strings to bring you here.
Platt
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