RE: MD The individual in the MOQ

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue Aug 03 2004 - 13:40:21 BST

  • Next message: johnny moral: "Re: [Spam] Re: MD the metaphysics of free enterprise"

    Hi Paul,

    > Platt said:
    > Nothing contains patterns? Then what are the levels all about?
    >
    > Paul:
    > Value contains patterns.

    Agree. Quality or Value contains levels of static value patterns plus
    Dynamic Quality. Substitute "An individual human being" for Quality or
    Value and the same description applies.

    > The levels are an intellectual device to categorise different types of
    > value.

    Agree. The levels are an intellectual device, created by (in) Pirsig's
    mind, to categorize different types of value.
     
    > Platt said:
    > Also, are you suggesting by your word "analogous" that the mind *is* the
    > memes, nothing *contains* memes?
    >
    > Paul:
    > I think memes are "contained" in language, habit and ritual.

    I take this to mean that memes are not found in the intellectual level --
    the level of mind -- but rather in the social level.
     
    > Platt said:
    > Finally, how does "symbolic manipulation" fit in to your mind=patterns
    > definition?
    >
    > Paul:
    > Mind is symbol manipulation.

    Sounds SOM to me. A subject (mind) manipulating objects (symbols).

    > Platt said:
    > Values may have Lila, but Lila is an individual:
    >
    > "There is Lila, this single private person who slept beside him now, who
    > was born and now lived and tossed in her dreams and will soon enough die
    > and then there is someone else -call her lila-who is immortal, who inhabits
    > Lila for a while and then moves on. The sleeping Lila he had just met
    > tonight. But the waking Lila, who never sleeps, had been watching him and
    > he had been watching her for a long time." (Lila, 1)
    >
    > Paul:
    > I think Pirsig is using "single private person" as an expression to
    > refer to, primarily, the biological organism that lives, sleeps and will
    > die.

    > I am not denying that "individual" is a useful term for a collection of
    > static patterns existing together over time. I am denying that, in the MOQ,
    > "individuals" have a discrete metaphysical significance that is somehow
    > essential in enabling a distinct level of static quality to latch. I don't
    > find this anywhere in Pirsig's work.

    I do. "A tribe can change its values only person by person and someone has
    to be first." (Lila, 9) That's a description of the latching process at
    the social level, dependent on individuals, "person by person." It's also
    the latching process at intellectual or mind level. It's what is happening
    in this forum. We're latching the mind pattern of the MOQ, person by
    person.

    > The physical, individual biological
    > brain, a society that has created and maintained symbolic language and
    > Dynamic Quality are what is required for intellectual patterns to latch.

    Agree. You've described an individual human being with the ability to
    respond to DQ.
     
    > Platt said:
    > I do not identify the individual "I" with intellect alone or make it the
    > "central reality." I do give the "I" or individual dominance over social
    > patterns of conformity and the status quo.
    >
    > Paul:
    > It is only an individual's *intellect* which should dominate social
    > patterns. We are going round in circles.

    All individuals have "intellect." (But, not all individuals are
    intellectuals as Pirsig made clear in his letter to you.) My point is that
    it is more moral for individuals (value patterns with inquiring minds) to
    dominate mindless social patterns of conformity than for society to
    dominate individuals. (Does Galileo ring a bell?)

    > Platt said:
    > I also deny an existence of self that is independent of inorganic,
    > biological, social or intellectual patterns. But each human being is a
    > "self" that contains these patterns.
    >
    > Paul:
    > Then tell us what this self is, other than static patterns.

    Static patterns, including the intellectual pattern of mind, plus an
    ability to respond to DQ.

    > Platt said:
    > Otherwise, an observation such as the following makes no sense:
    >
    > "The reason there is a difference between individual evaluations of
    > quality is that although Dynamic Quality is a constant, these static
    > patterns are different for everyone because each person has a different
    > static pattern of life history. Both the Dynamic Quality and the static
    > patterns influence his final judgment. That is why there is some uniformity
    > among individual value judgments but not complete uniformity." (SODV)
    >
    > Paul:
    > I would rephrase this as "these static patterns are different for
    > everyone because each "person" [*is*] a different [set of evolving]
    > static pattern[s]."

    Agree. One of those evolving patterns is an individual's mind.

    > Platt said:
    > If the individual is an empty concept, then Pirsig ought to take back
    > this sentence:
    >
    > "Lila individually, herself, is in an evolutionary battle against the
    > static patterns of her own life." (Lila, 29)
    >
    > Paul:
    > Firstly, note that the word individually is not at all related to one
    > level here. In the same paragraph, Lila is described as a "complex
    > ecology of patterns moving towards Dynamic Quality."
    >
    > Secondly, I think Pirsig denies the existence of an essential
    > "autonomous individual," but does not deny that static patterns can be said
    > to compose individuals. In the same way, the MOQ denies objects as
    > things-in-themselves but does not deny that static patterns can be usefully
    > called things like trees, or rocks.
    >
    > As such, the static patterns from all levels involved in an
    > "evolutionary battle" can be said to occur individually without
    > contradiction to the denial of an autonomous self. That is, this
    > evolutionary battle does not occur because of individuals, rather that
    > individuals occur because of evolutionary battles.

    Strikes me as circular, a distinction without a difference.

    > Platt said:
    > I love being in philosophical quandaries. One of my favorites, thanks to
    > Ken Wilber:
    >
    > "If sensations are something I have, I have a self. But, who is the I
    > that has a self?. Another self. And who has the sensation of another
    > self? A third self. How many selves must I postulate?"
    >
    > Paul:
    > This is a SOM deduction - sensations are assumed to be the object of a
    > pre-existing subject. Not so.

    Do you consider sensations to be free-floating biological level patterns
    without a source?
     
    > Platt said:
    > Or, try this one: Dynamic Quality that created patterns is by patterns
    > created.
    >
    > Paul:
    > I think the quandary here is that you are confusing an experience with a
    > phrase and using "Dynamic Quality" to refer to both.

    "Dynamic Quality" is a phrase. So is "created patterns" and "by patterns
    created." So I fail to see your point. What am I missing?
     
    Best,
    Platt

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Tue Aug 03 2004 - 13:52:23 BST