From: David Morey (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sat Aug 14 2004 - 21:21:50 BST
Hi Ham
what is a 'thing', what is an 'event', what is the difference,
how do you tell the difference between a 'thing' and an
'event' when you are experiencing them? What is the opposite
of conscious, how do we know there is anything that is not
conscious? If essence is close to Quality for you how
does essence relate to dynamic and static quality?
You say: Experience IS that which is divisible, definable, and knowable!
Yes and no, we certainly cannot start to have an epistemological
relationship within experience until we divide it up, usually
into SOM. Subject-object dualism has this use, one problem
with SOM apart from it often breaking down into either idealism
or materialism (i.e one half of the divide or the other) is that it ignores
the fact that to have a divide you must originally begin with a whole or
One that you divide. Quality is what Pirsig uses as a name for the
unknowable
undivided One. He then goes on to suggest that a SQ/DQ division of quality
will teach us many things that SOM does not, it is a better division he
suggests,
and most of us here agree with this value of MOQ over SOM for future
intellectual progress. You seem to be approaching some similar issues, but
I currently suspect that there are aspects of SOM restricting the progress
of your own thesis.
Is suggestion that Quality has a source not a leap into the dark?
Quality, for me, is just there. It pours forth, I know of no source,
or from where it comes, and by some strange process -the evolution
of consciousness, via the differentiation of experience, it becomes
knowable and we/I can make out the SQ patterns that provides
some kind of understanding of the amazing process of the pouring
forth of experience.
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: <hampday@earthlink.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, August 14, 2004 8:47 AM
Subject: Re: MD Metaphysics of Value
>
> Ham's response to Platt Holden, Thursday, August 12
> Subject: Re: MD Metaphysics of Value
>
>
> Platt wrote:
> >
> > Before proceeding further with your philosophy I'd like to get your
> > response to some things I find questionable in your assertions below.
> >
> > You wrote:
> > > Platt, I don't think it is possible to expunge "duality" from the
> > > experienced world, and I don't believe the Professor has done it.
> >
> > Like Pirsig, I believe it is possible to expunge duality from the
> > experienced world so long as one doesn't find it necessary to
> > intellectualize that experience. What comes immediately to mind is the
> > aesthetic experience which is complete nondual as it is experienced.
Only
> > in describing the experience does duality become necessary.
>
> Platt, let me try to translate this Pirsigian epistemology in essentialist
> terms.
> That way, I'll understand it better, and you can tell me what's wrong with
> it.
>
> First of all, I define "experience" as "conscious sensibility of a thing
or
> event";
> it involves the cerebro-nervous system and implies a subject/object
duality.
> This may be as simple as feeling an itch on my arm, in which case the
> sensation
> is proprioceptive and the object is my physical body. Or it may be
complex,
> like watching the Olympic games, in which case the object is complex and
> multifold. But in either case there must be a sensible subject and a
> referent
> object. Now, knowing what the object of sensation is (intellection)
> involves
> the brain. I define this process as "cognizance", which is the image of
the
> object or event as perceived in time and space. Since we can't have
> knowledge
> without cognizance, it is always necessary to "intellectualize our
> experience" in order to be cognizant of it. Note that, so far, we're
> dealing
> with a sensible subject relating to an object for cognizant experience
> of empirical reality. If there were nothing else to be accounted for in
> human experience, I would have to conclude that the nature of experience
> is dualistic. But you say that we can eliminate the duality by not
> intellectualizing
> the experience, citing "the esthetic experience" as an example. Here's
> where
> we part company -- but not entirely!
>
> What Pirsig calls "esthetic experience" I call "psycho-emotional
> sensibility",
> and have defined as Value. Value may be considered "experiential" in
> that it may be "felt" like an itch; but it is typically "desideristic",
that
> is,
> sensed as an affirmative response to something wanted. (This gets
touchy --
> and feely!) In my ontology hypothesis, I attribute Value to the Essence
> negated in creation which is "affirmed" through the secondary negation
(of.
> beingness) by the individuated subject. For present purposes, let's just
> say that Value is the "esthetic appreciation" of what is presented to
> awareness.
> The question is, does Value [Pirsig's Quality] depend on a subject/object
> dualism? I've reviewed Pirsig's ZMM where he says "no". I've also
reviewed
> my own hypothesis and am inclined to answer "yes" and "no". (How's
> that for honesty?)
>
> You continue ...
>
> > Pirsig agrees:
> >
> > "Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that
> > there is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these
> > things. A metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or
there
> > isn't any metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind of
> > dialectical definition and since Quality is essentially outside
> > definition, this means that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a
> > contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity." (Lila, 5)
>
> What Pirsig is trying to describe here is what I call call Essence.
Essence
> is the
> uncreated, undifferentiated and absolute Source that most people would
call
> God. (Sorry, Platt.) Value is man's realization of Essence, and is both
> dualistic (empirical) and monistic (subjective). A metaphysics of God
may
> be a "logical absurdity". A metaphysics of Quality [Value] which
> encompasses
> the experiential and esthetic awareness of Essence is quite valid. And
it's
> exactly what I have postulated in my thesis!
>
> > He goes on, as you know, to equate experience with Quality, finding it
> > "indivisible, undefinable and unknowable.".
>
> Wrong. Experience IS that which is divisible, definable, and knowable!
>
> You then quote me again ...
>
> > > He has stated (probably in the Magritte paper) that Quality is the
> primary
> > > "empirical reality" of the world. I'm saying that Value is the essence
> of "man's
> > > reality", which is the same thing. Note, however, that neither of us
has
> said that
> > > "empirical reality" or "man's reality" is the Ultimate Reality.
>
> I stand by my statement.
>
> > In the MOQ there are no differences in the following: Experience,
Quality,
> > Value, Reality.
>
> That's a generalization I can't accept Does it make sense to you, Platt?
>
> > But there is a distinction between those synonyms and
> > "man's reality." As soon as you introduce "man" you introduce the
duality
> > of man and not man. Pirsig's reality of Quality comes prior to that
> > duality. Also, Pirsig has said that Quality is the ultimate reality:
>
> It's pretty tough to exclude man when he is the subject of everything
> experienced.
> Again, he's defining God. Man's reality is a dualism. But it has an a
> prori source.
> If Pirsig would accept Essence as the source of Quality, he'd have a
> complete
> hypothesis. It would be called the Philosophy of Essence or, perhaps
even,
> Essentialism.
>
> Platt, this has been a lengthy exercise, but it's given me the opportunity
> to learn,
> and hopefully demonstrate, not only the major difference in our
philosophies
> but how close we really are.
>
> Thanks for the workout. I await your critique.
>
> Essentially,
> Ham
>
>
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