From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Wed Aug 18 2004 - 15:52:40 BST
Hi Paul,
> Platt said:
> The question still hanging out there is, "Awareness by whom?"
> Paul:
> We are now both begging the question. The question of "awareness by
> whom" arises only when awareness is assumed to fundamentally belong to a
> subject.
Yes. That's the assumption most people have when they use the word
"experience."
> Platt said:
> In this case, the answer to who is experiencing low value is the stove
> sitter.
> Paul:
> Read the last statement again. "The value comes first, then...such
> things as stove.." You are simply defending the SOM view that there is a
> subject and a stove and when they come together there is an experience. It
> sounds right because it is how you have come to think and it is how our
> language is constructed. The language can remain the same as long as we
> understand that it is not philosophically correct.
I think you have a problem when you try to set forth a philosophy that
doesn't use our language as constructed. To say the "language can remain
as long as we understand that it is not philosophically correct" puts an
unnecessary burden on the reader. Better I think to use language that is
both lexicographically and philosophically correct.
> Pirsig from LILA'S CHILD:
> "When the term "experience" is used one automatically enters the
> subject-object way of thinking that there is an object that is
> experienced and a subject that experiences it. All sorts of tangles
> begin.."
Yes indeed. Not to mention the tangles involved in constantly shifting
from common meanings to "philosophical" meanings.
> Pirsig from LILA'S CHILD:
> "I think the trouble is with the word, "experience." It can be used in at
> least three ways. It can be used as a relationship between an object and
> another object (as in Los Angeles experiencing earthquakes.) It is more
> commonly used as a subject-object relationship. This relationship is
> usually considered the basis of philosophic empiricism and experimental
> scientific knowledge. In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is
> between a preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no
> pre-existing subject or object."
Pirsig associates "trouble" with the word "experience." That's what I'm
trying to get across. The MOQ is hard enough to explain without having to
rely on "troubling" words.
> Platt said:
> Ah, now we get to the nub. "Atoms experience." Seems Dan Glover, who
> knows the MOQ as well as anybody, disagrees.
> Paul:
> It seems Robert Pirsig, who knows the MOQ as well as anybody, disagrees.
> Pirsig From LILA'S CHILD:
> "Inorganic objects experience events but do not react to them
> biologically, socially, or intellectually. They react to these
> experiences inorganically, according to the laws of physics."
There's that strange use of the word "experience" again.
> Platt said:
> Way back in the early days of MOQ discuss we had a lengthy debate about the
> issue, "Are atoms aware?" As I recall the general agreement was that
> the proposition had to be accepted if the MOQ was to logically hold
> water.
> This seems to be your position today. But you can see the problem: try to
> convince someone that atoms are sentient in any way whatsoever, even if
> just a wee bit. Most people will think your crazy. I hate to see the MOQ
> flounder on the proposition that atoms possess some sort of inner
> sensibility.
> Paul:
> I'm not trying to convince anybody that atoms are sentient, that implies
> that preference is a form of sentience. I would instead say that, in the
> MOQ, sentience is a form of preference.
That's the sort of foggy explanation that makes it hard to explain the
MOQ. It's like that topsy-turvy business about "Quality has Lila."
> Platt said:
> Ultimate reality can be known by a person through personal experience. That
> "person" keeps hanging around no matter how hard we try to ignore him,
> except presumably when it comes to atoms.
> Paul:
> I'm not trying to ignore this "person," I'm trying to be careful about
> confusing common sense assumptions/everyday language with this metaphysics.
> The two need to be related, as occurs in ZMM and LILA, but when they are
> unwittingly tangled, I think we lose the value of both.
I agree.
> Regarding the presupposition of people in the quotes, LILA is largely a
> practical application of the MOQ to provide an alternative interpretation
> of human history and knowledge. Besides which, I'm not saying that people
> don't exist or experience, I *am* saying that a subject is not the starting
> point of experience.
Yes, the MOQ says experience is the starting point, prior to subjects or
objects. Unfortunately, experience as commonly defined presupposes what
the MOQ denies. Pirsig would have us ignore that -- which is OK I guess
except it makes explaining his philosophy to others difficult. Similarly,
Pirsig would have us shift from materialism to idealism "as it becomes
valuable to do so." That's a hard sell. It suggests that values are
relative, a place where PIrsig of all people doesn't want us to go. When a
philosopher appears to waffle on some some basic concepts and word
meanings, there's trouble in River City.
In any case, you've clarified the issues for me Paul, for which much
thanks. Perhaps the MOQ starting point might be better expressed as
"quality events," whether experienced or not. Pirsig suggests as much in
his SODV paper.
Best,
Platt
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