From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Fri Dec 17 2004 - 03:01:14 GMT
Hi Sam,
On 17 Dec 2004 at 0:23, Sam Norton wrote:
Your point is that, to paraphrase, if we gave the non-combatants on
the opposing side the same value that we gave to loved ones on our
own side, then the actions taken would change. The moral calculus of
justification would be reset, so that what had been seen as
'acceptable', was now seen as unacceptable.
msh says:
Right.
sam:
So, to get to a concrete historical example, the decision to drop the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima was immoral because, even if we ignore (for
the sake of argument) the great power issues like wanting to
demonstrate US power to the Soviets, and accept the explanation that
it was to save the lives of US servicemen by shortening the war, it
proceeded on the basis that US servicemens lives were more considered
of more value than (eg) the lives of women and children living in
Hiroshima.
msh says:
Right.
sam:
Assuming the overall cause of the war to be just, the just
way to undertake that war would have been to proceed with the
military invasion of Japan, at a (presumed) higher cost of US
servicemens lives, but a (presumed) lower cost of Japanese non-
combatant lives. Is that a fair characterisation?
msh says:
Yep.
sam:
Now, I'd like to explore where your boundaries lie here. Let's
consider a hypothetical target - a Nazi munitions factory in a German
city in 1942. Firstly, would you accept this as a legitimate military
target? (ie it's used for the war effort, even if the workers
aren't killing people directly - and therefore, would you accept that
the workers count as 'combatants'?)
msh says:
Yes. In my suggested moral calculus, anyone who willing and
knowingly contributes to an immoral war effort is a de facto
combatant, and may be treated as such. To illustrate, and at the
risk of increasing my exposure, I would say that the 9/11 attack on
the Pentagon was in some ways morally defensible, while the WTC
attacks were not, at least not to the same clear extent.
sam:
Secondly, in that factory, there are people who work there, but who
are not producing munitions, eg secretaries or caretakers. Do these
count as non-combatants?
msh says:
No, if they are knowingly and willingly contributing to the Nazi war
effort, in ANY capacity, even mowing the lawn of a munitions factory,
then they are de facto combatants and therefore, are legitimate
targets.
sam:
If so, does the fact that they will inevitably be killed by a bombing
attack on that factory render the action as a whole immoral in your
view?
msh says:
No. See above.
sam:
Thirdly, near the factory are residential areas. Because the
targeting is not absolutely accurate some houses get bombed, and
people wholly unconnected with the factory, including women and
children, get killed. This is foreseeable, given the 'state of the
art' at the time the decision is made to bomb the factory. Does this
render the action as a whole immoral?
msh says:
Using my suggested moral calculus, this question can be answered by
doing the hypothetical MY innocents for THEIR innocents substitution.
If the men who order the bombing, as well as the men who actually
drop the bombs, would be willing to so order and act EVEN IF their
own families will be among the innocents killed, then I would say
that bombing the munitions factory is morally justified and achieving
a legitimate military goal. Otherwise, an alternate plan for
destroying the factory must come into play, such as dropping in
special forces to sabotage the plant, or simply sending in ground
troops.
sam:
I've been trying to work out if your point is a different argument to
the one saying about non-combatant immunity, ie that those who aren't
involved in the fighting should be given privileged status and
protected, which I agree with. Is it a different point, in your view?
msh says:
Not sure I'm understanding what you are asking. My position is that
ALL non-combatants are of equal value. And that this fact can and
should be used in determining the legitimacy of any military activity
whatsoever.
sam:
If it's the same point, then we can get stuck in to a debate about
acceptable boundaries to military action. If it's a different point
then I'm still getting my head around it and I'll need to think about
it some more.
msh says:
Well, let's see what you say in response to the points I've made so
far in this post.
sam:
Let's come at this from a different direction, by drawing up four
categories: Category A: a just cause, pursued justly Category B: a
just cause, pursued unjustly Category C: an unjust cause, pursued
justly Category D: an unjust cause, pursued unjustly
An example of category A might be the Battle of Britain, ie the air
war in 1940. The fighting was conducted almost exclusively by
servicemen and was crucial for resisting an invasion of the UK by
Nazi Germany.
msh says:
Ok. Got it, and agree.
sam:
An example of Category B might be something like Hiroshima,
or the allied bombing campaigns in WW2 more generally, in so far as
they were indiscriminate between military targets and civilian
population.
msh says:
Ok. Got it, and agree.
sam:
An example of Category C might be the German invasion of
France in 1940, which was a war of aggression, but one that was
pursued with no especial atrocities.
msh says:
Here I would quibble. I would say any action furthering an unjust
cause is itself unjust, atrocities or no. But I understand what you
are saying.
sam:
An example of Category D might be the German invasion of the Soviet
Union in 1941, which was not only a war of aggression, but was also
pursued from the beginning with violence towards the Slav population,
eg in the Ukraine.
msh says:
Got it, and agree.
sam:
What I am unclear about is whether we are arguing A vs C or B vs D,
on this specific question. (In other words, I take your view of the
Iraq invasion to be D, but when talking about the missile attack on
Baghdad, I am unclear about whether you are arguing that this is an
action which is unjust because the war as a whole is unjust, or
whether it is unjust because it was not aimed at a legitimate
military target, for the sake of argument the overall cause being
assumed to be just).
msh says:
I see. No, in my view, the missile attack on Baghdad was both
immoral and illegal, regardless of whether or not the invasion of
Iraq itself was morally and legally justified. I believe I've
successfully argued that the invasion was in violation of
International Law, and was therefore illegal. I also believe the
invasion was immoral, and will so argue, using my moral calculus.
sam:
It does seem to me that, from what you've said so far, you'll say
that the foreseeable killing of innocents in the 1942 German city
renders that bombing attack immoral, because if we put US
congressmen's families in those factory housing estates then the
action would (probably) not be taken. Is that correct?
msh says:
Yes.
sam:
If so, then I've got some further ways to explore this thread, but
that's enough for now.
msh says:
Fair enough. Thanks for taking time with this. Even though, on the
surface, it's just us working it out between ourselves, I think what
we are discussing is really about discovering the common ground of
humanity.
Best,
Mark Steven Heyman (msh)
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