From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Sat Mar 12 2005 - 19:06:46 GMT
Hi Anthony,
Thanks for a fuller meal :o) Re the earlier conversation in MD I was under
the impression that I was still waiting for a reply from Paul, but that
probably means that I missed one of his posts. I'll check the archives.
However, we have enough to be going on with.
> According to your essay, Schleiermacher is making the case that mysticism
> can bridge the gap between phenomena (the everyday world that is
> perceived)
> and the Divine found in the noumenal.
That's not quite right, so far as I understand it (and I'm only just
beginning to study Schleiermacher, so I could well be wrong). The 'divine'
for Schleiermacher comes before the splitting up into phenomena and noumena;
it is pre-intellectual, and those categories are intellectual applications.
Despite all that you and Paul and DMB have said I am unable to see the
difference between this and how Pirsig describes DQ, but perhaps I am just a
bear of little brain. In your lecture you quote Northrop quoting James, with
reference to the 'undifferentiated aesthetic continuum' and so on. This
seems to me to confirm that there is a direct link from James to Pirsig (not
an identity, I accept your point that James is still a bit SOMish, and that
Pirsig takes things further) and that they are talking about the same thing,
that DQ IS "pure experience", modified and adapted and improved, but
fundamentally and structurally still what James was talking about - and what
Schleiermacher was talking about, I think.
> Schleiermacher's pattern of thinking is following the tradition of Western
> religion in locating the Divine with the inferred unseen factor in the
> nature of things. As explained by Northrop ("Logic of the Sciences &
> Humanities", 1947, p.376-77):
>
> "The divine object in the West is an unseen God the Father. ...<snip>
If Northrop is the guide for what the 'tradition of Western religion' is,
then no wonder there is confusion. Let's just say that if what he said is
true, then the Incarnation makes no sense (because a human being is clearly
a visible object). So what Northrop is saying is that the tradition of
Western religion is one that denies the incarnation..... (Perhaps he was
just referring to modern American Protestantism, where the point may have
some force). In any case, his assertion bears no relation to the major part
of the Western religious tradition and, as it stands, is simply false.
There seems very little available about Northrop on the internet, and I am
reluctant to invest in purchasing his book (not least because I have a large
pile of other books still to get through). But I know Matt has been working
his way through him, and will make some points about him soon.
I had said;
>>In particular, what do you make of this point from Nicholas Lash (which I
>>quoted before):
>>
>>"However hostile to Cartesian dualism [[SOM]] we suppose ourselves to be,
>>it is not possible to escape its clutches while continuing to treat the
>>distinction between mind and matter as empirical, as being (that is to
>>say)
>>a distinction between two different kinds of 'thing' or substance...
>
> See my PhD thesis, Chapter 3 for why I think we can escape SOM on a
> genuine
> metaphysical basis rather than fudge or avoid the issue as most
> Western-orientated philosophers have tended to do recently.
It's your chapter 3 that I'm wanting to focus in on. My point is a simple
one: if mind and matter are seen as the same sort of thing (ontologically)
then Descartes is still the dominant influence. At least, that is what I
take from the studies I have made on the matter, and what I take
Wittgenstein to have established, and what Lash is referring to. Hence I was
quoting your thesis (p168), where you explicitly state that they ARE
ontologically identical. (I'm focussing in on this not to split hairs but
because this seems to be the hinge point that is at issue. It's not Pirsig's
'mysticism' - whether that is Eastern or Western or whatever - but his
metaphysics which is causing difficulties for me. That metaphysics seems, to
me, to still accept Cartesian presuppositions in the way described by Lash,
and your thesis usefully highlighted one part of it.)
One aspect of this would be worth clarifying. You say a few times "Pirsig
introduces a new metaphysical system based essentially on Mahayana Buddhism"
and similar expressions, which seems to imply that the problems now
identified with the Jamesian approach have no purchase on systems based on
Easter thought. Yet Pirsig also says that his view incorporates elements
from James, Northrop etc. and he states quite explicitly "The Metaphysics of
Quality is a continuation of the mainstream of twentieth-century American
philosophy". What I want to know is whether all criticisms of that
mainstream can be sidestepped by a claim that Buddhist thought is immune
from contamination. What is the relative status of these two elements? In
other words, if I am making criticisms of the Jamesian strand, how
dispensable is that strand to the MoQ as such? Or, put differently again, if
(big if) I can show that Pirsig's use of, or inheritance from, the Jamesian
strand doesn't work out, is the MoQ still distinguishable from Buddhism?
That'll do for now.
Cheers
Sam
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