From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Wed Apr 06 2005 - 14:04:44 BST
Hi Steve,
Just wanted to say that your comments in the epigrams thread were really
good, particularly this:
> I just don't see any difference functionally between Q and DQ. To talk
> about experience prior to parsing we can only talk about the Whole
> (undifferentiated Reality). <snip> Whether we talk about the ten
> thousand things or not the Tao
> remains the Tao. DQ is a necessary fiction to allow our mind to parse,
> and
> still maintain undifferentiated Quality as reality, that's all IMO.
As it happens, there have been a few discussions on the relation between DQ
and Quality in MF. You might like to have a look at the archives for March
and April 2004, in the thread 'metaphysics and the mystical reality'. I
think there is a real ambiguity in Pirsig's language, and it vitiates his
understanding of mysticism. Below my signature is my post from early on in
the thread, which, despite being vigorously disagreed with in certain
quarters, I still think states the case.
Cheers
Sam
"The intelligent man who is proud of his intelligence is like the condemned
man who is proud of his large cell." Simone Weil
(From the MF debate in March/April 2004):
Hi all,
The question we have to consider this month is: "Does Pirsig's work help us
sort out the
distinctions between metaphysics and the mystical reality?". DMB has opened
it with something of a
challenge: "I don't expect to see any persuasive cases made for answering
the question with a 'no'
and I doubt if there is anyone left who seriously doubts the mystical nature
of Pirsig's
metaphysics." Being in a curmudgeonly mood I'm going to have a crack at
confounding DMB's
expectations.
The essence of my objection lies in the following two quotations (helpfully
provided by DMB in the
MD forum):
Quotation 1:
"Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that there
is a knower and known,
but a metaphysics can be none of these things. A metaphysics must be
divisible, definable, and
knowable, or there isn't any metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially
a kind of dialectical
definition and since Quality is essentially outside definition, this means
that a 'MoQ' is
essentially a contradiction in terms." (Lila chapter 5)
Quotation 2:
"The MOQ associates religious mysticism with Dynamic Quality but it would
certainly be a mistake to
think that the MOQ endorses the static beliefs of any particular religious
sect. Phaedrus thought
sectarian religion was a static social fallout of DQ and that while some
sects had fallen less than
others, none of them told the whole truth." (Lila chapter 30)
My problem can be expressed in the following way. Assume that "the mystical
reality" is ultimately
indefinable. In the first of these quotations Pirsig identifies the
indefinable with Quality as
such, in the second he identifies it with Dynamic Quality.
When Pirsig talks about Quality and the SQ/DQ division I think he talks
sense. When he talks about
DQ as religious mysticism I think he talks nonsense.
To bring this out I would say two things.
The first is a conceptual point. If Static Quality and Dynamic Quality are
the subdivisions of
Quality then Dynamic Quality cannot be the mystical reality, for the
mystical reality must be the
highest term in the metaphysics (else you no longer have One, you have
Many).
The second is more pragmatic. Take the development of a particular person's
understanding towards
higher Quality. Such a person will, inevitably, learn things new to
themselves which are not new to
others. So what is DQ to one person is SQ to another. Religious traditions
recognise this by saying
that God (Quality) is present throughout the development. Pirsig's writing
on mysticism seems to
imply that Quality can only be present with those like the brujo who are at
the cutting edge of
their society's experience. I think this undermines his understanding in all
sorts of ways, and lies
behind the following quotation:
Pirsig:
"Phaedrus saw nothing wrong with this ritualistic religion as long as the
rituals are seen as merely
a static portrayal of Dynamic Quality, a sign-post which allows socially
pattern-dominated people to
see Dynamic Quality. The danger has always been that the rituals, the static
patterns, are mistaken
for what they merely represent and are allowed to destroy the Dynamic
Quality they were originally
intended to preserve."
To my mind, this quotation encapsulates what is both good and bad in
Pirsig's writing. He concedes
that static patterns can enable the apprehension of Quality; but he also
reifies Dynamic Quality as
what the rituals 'were originally intended to preserve' - which I think is a
mistake. The rituals
are static representations of Quality as such, not Dynamic Quality. So a
religious (mystical) path
can validly include the static patterns that particular religious traditions
have accumulated - as
Pirsig himself concedes elsewhere.
In other words, I think it is an error to identify DQ with the mystical
reality, and I think that
because Pirsig makes this error he is inconsistent with his own metaphysics.
Consequently I think
that Pirsig's work does NOT help us sort out the distinctions between
metaphysics and the mystical
reality.
~~~~
Rick (valence) summarised my point nicely like this: According to Robert
Pirsig, mysticism should be identified with (a.) Quality (the undivided
whole) alone, (b.) dynamic quality (a subset of Quality which excludes
static patterns) alone, (c.) both, (d.) neither. --- your choice?
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Apr 06 2005 - 14:43:28 BST