From: Erin (macavity11@yahoo.com)
Date: Wed May 18 2005 - 21:19:03 BST
I was looking for info on the web of usefulness and art because I am not clear at how they go together. I came across this dicussion board that was talking it here is one comment:
"What I consider beautiful are things such as wonderful music, paintings, and sculpture. I also think that nature is beautiful. I think that these works of art and nature are beautiful because they can cause emotions to come forth. They can be pleasing to the eye or to the other senses. To the Greeks none of this would be considered beautiful. They would not agree with me because they consider beautiful to be something that serves a purpose. I do, however, think that their statues are beautiful. These were pieces of art to them because they served the purpose to honor their gods. I do not really agree with the Greek concept of art. I think that art should be something that envigorates emotions or ideas, not just because something is useful or not. The Greeks believed their columns and buildings beautiful, however I only agree with them slightly. Most of their work is plain, but yet most of it is beautiful to me too. I do not believe that something is beautiful just because it serves
a purpose in life." Morgan Stallings
"The very usefulenss of art is its uselessness" Tom Robbins
Michael Hamilton <thethemichael@gmail.com> wrote:Hi Platt
I can't let this one go:
Pirsig takes a dim view of James' pragmatism in
Lila, pointing out that Nazis were pragmatic. (For similar reasons I
object to postmodernists making pragmatism an object of worship.)
To put it mildly, this is a gross distortion. Pirsig shows total agreement with James' axiom "Truth is a species of good", and goes on to say how the MOQ supports James' pragmatism and RESCUES him from the Nazi criticism, which runs "if the Nazis had won WW2, their beliefs (about race etc) were pragmatically successful and therefore true". MOQ pragmatism, which Pirsig claims is what James intended but could not codify, does not validate truth claims based on social pragmatic success (what others allow you to "get away with"), but on intellectual pragmatic success (in James' words, that which "proves itself to be good in the way of belief"). The ambiguity of "good" is what got James into problems. The MOQ says that the good to which truth is subordinate is intellectual and Dynamic usefulness, not social usefulness.
Regards,
Mike
On 5/18/05, Platt Holden <pholden@sc.rr.com> wrote:Hi Erin,
> Ok but I still can't see how it can be considered a pragamtic approach. You
> said to ham in one post that assumptions are not empirical. With this
> expansion of the definition to include everything and its mother I don't
> see why assumptions are not considered emprical or pragmatic. Because that
> is getting into as you say "who experiences what"
Perhaps you can explain to me why you seem to consider a "pragmatic
approach" to be desirable. Pirsig takes a dim view of James' pragmatism in
Lila, pointing out that Nazis were pragmatic. (For similar reasons I
object to postmodernists making pragmatism an object of worship.)
The problem I see with a "pragmatic" approach is that it begs the
questions, "Useful in what ways to whom?" followed by a judgment, "Is
that good?" (Actually the judgment comes prior to determining the action
and its supposed beneficiaries.)
For example, welfare programs that dole out other people's money were
hailed as a pragmatic way to "help" the poor, but the results have turned
out to be anything but helpful, creating a permanent dependent class. The
successful trial and error experimental methods of science don't transfer
well up to the level of human societies.
"Pragmatic" social engineering usually ends up making more of mess of
things than the mess it intended to clean up, not to mention the loss of
individual liberty such engineering demands, a loss some people consider
OK so long as their idea of a "greater good" is served -- a road that
leads to tyranny.
As to your question about assumptions, they are indeed empirical if you
buy the MOQ view that ideas are experience like everything else. By
contrast, in the S/O worldview the same assumptions are not empirical
because they are not perceptible to the physical senses. It was in this
latter SOM, scientific context that I said "assumptions are nonempirical."
Platt
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