Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Thu Jun 02 2005 - 18:05:50 BST

  • Next message: Matt Kundert: "Re: MD Bolstering Bo's SOL"

    Hi Platt --

    You discerned some relevance to "pre-intellectual Value" in this Damasio
    statement, which is one of the reasons I quoted it to you.

    > "I also suggest
    > that those internal states-which occur naturally along the range whose
    > poles are pain and pleasure, and are caused by either internal or external
    > objects and events-become unwitting nonviable signifiers of the goodness
    or
    > badness of situations relative to the organism's inherent set of values."

    You replied:
    > Note the phrase, an "organism's inherent set of values." Now where do you
    > suppose he got the idea that values are "inherent?" What genes carry
    > values? And if there are such things as value genes, how did those values
    > originate?

    It's understandable that one could interpret Damasio's description of the
    self-regulatory process of Nature as non-SOM "value", and I anticipated that
    you might see it this way -- particularly in the context of "goodness or
    badness". I see it somewhat differently. To me, this illustrates the
    "purposefulness" of creation, or what is commonly defined as Teleology. It
    is, in fact, a corollary of the Intelligent Design principle which, of
    course, implies a Creator.

    Compare Damasio's statement with this comment by a biologist:

    "The act of self-regulation, of purposiveness, implies the presence of
    something to regulate to, a goal that is being sought. The reactions of a
    living thing to its environment are such as will help it reach its goal. It
    seeks the maintenance of its particular inner organization. ...At the
    primitive psychical level -- if our theory is correct -- this goal is
    inwardly felt as something desired, at first unconsciously and
    instinctively, but with greater vividness in higher forms, and especially in
    man." [Edmond Sinnott, "The Biology of Life"]

    And, again, with one of my favorite passages from Schopenhauer (which will
    surely resonate with you):

    "The delusive ecstasy which siezes a man at the sight of a woman whose
    beauty is suited to him, and pictures to him a union with her as the highest
    good, is just the sense of the species, which, recognizing the distinct
    stamp of the same, desires to perpetuate it with this individual. ...Thus
    what guides man here is really an instinct which is directed to doing the
    best for the species, while man himself imagines that he only seeks the
    heightening of his own pleasure."

    Can we call this attraction to "goodness" Value? Of course. But it's an
    anthropic metaphor. The force that propels this union of a man and a woman,
    like the force that perpetuates the species, is the entelechy of a
    purposeful universe, the imprint of what we rationalize as "intelligent
    design", signifying a Primary Source. If we do not acknowledge that Source,
    then it becomes necessary to attribute "sensible" Value to insentient
    entities, an anthropomorphic notion that degrades the significance of Value
    in human experience. That's why I distinguish "goal-seeking" in the
    bio-physical world from morality and value as inherent in and proprietary to
    the individual and his free expression. In other words, I still regard
    Pirsig's attempt to make Quality the "primary empirical reality" nothing
    short of a copout to the pressing question of the essential Source.

    I wish I could consider this primary philosophical difference merely a
    matter of semantics; but it isn't. One can say that Goodness is a value
    because it conforms to man's notion of what is good. But man does not set
    the standard here. What may be good or better for mankind does not
    necessarily make it "right" or "purposeful" in the cosmic sense, and such
    humanistic judgments tend to obscure the transcendent meaning of man's
    existence.

    If the MoQers could only put aside their anti-religious sentiment long
    enough to take that one remaining step to a Primary Source, I think we could
    all reach an accord. I also believe that, by resolving this issue in a
    positive forthright manner, Mr. Pirsig would achieve the philosophical
    distinction he deserves.

    Anyway, I appreciate your penetrating insight and continued interest in the
    Value concept.

    Essentially yours,
    Ham

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