MD Intentions and Morality

From: Mark Steven Heyman (markheyman@infoproconsulting.com)
Date: Sat Jul 02 2005 - 22:34:24 BST

  • Next message: mark maxwell: "Re: MD Our Immoral Supreme Court"

    Hi Matt,

    Thanks for the great post. I'm always delighted when you swing your
    ponderous intellect and erudition into areas of interest to me. Ok,
    time to put away the grease gun...

    On 2 Jul 2005 at 11:42, Matt Kundert wrote:

    Matt:
    I don't care much at all about the political feud (keep up the good
    work Mark, though Erin has a point about the politicians/businessmen
    thing), but the issue of "intentions" strays into moral philosophy
    and is something I'm interested in.

    msh:
    I'll look forward to your thoughts on my response to her (Erin). As
    well as to Erin's response, of course.

    matt:
    I'll say upfront, I have zero answers on the topic of how intentions
    play into moral matters. I don't know. But I did want to say this:
    historically, intentions have almost mattered more to moral
    philosophers and ethicists since Kant then actual actions. I can't
    remember all the history involved leading up to Kant, but for Kant,
    intentions were the whole sha-bang and have been primarily what the
    modern mind thinks about when he thinks ethically.

    msh:
    I remember, back in the day at UCLA, sitting in Ethics 101 and
    hearing about Kant and his focus on intentions. The questions I
    asked at the time were these: What does it mean to say an intention
    is immoral? Aren't we really saying that we would be immoral if we
    ACTED upon the intention? How is Kant or anyone else able to know
    another's intentions? If intentions other than our own are
    unknowable, what systemic ethical mileage is achieved by focusing on
    intentions at all?

    These are the same questions I have today.

    matt:
    Mark is moving _against_ the grain of modern ethical thought when he
    says that he's not interested in intentions, only in actions. But
    he's using the wrong moral categories when he says that actions-sans-
    intentions can be selfish or selfless. Those categories are the
    studs of intentional thinking.

    msh:
    I think this is a good point, and a definite weakness in my analysis
    of selfish vs. selfless acts. But let's explore this with a
    hypothetical situation. I'm on the beach and see a swimmer being
    swept away by rip currents. A stranger near me sees the same thing
    and dashes into the surf, swims like an otter against the deadly
    current, and pulls the endangered swimmer to shore. Have I witnessed
    a selfless act, or the act of an individual eager to get his name in
    the papers? How would I decide? More important, does it matter?
    In this respect, I think, intentions are next to non-existent, except
    to people who believe in a judgmental god who can read one's mind.

    matt:
    I read a wonderful book a several months ago that impressed me
    greatly on the subject, Susan Neiman's "Evil in Modern Thought."

    <snip a lot of good commentary on Nieman's and Hannah Arendt's books>

    But Neiman argues that almost everyone has missed the point of the
    book (perhaps even Arendt herself): the point was that evil is no
    longer detectable through intentions. No longer is evil an
    extraordinary occurrence, it is a banal occurrence, something normal
    people can do because of the structures (social, political, etc.)
    surrounding them.

    msh says:
    My only comment here is that, IMO, evil has NEVER been detectable
    through an analysis of intentions, assuming such an analysis is even
    possible.

    matt:
    Neiman suggests that we need to rethink our ethical categories and I
    tend to agree. I don't think it is possible to think about the
    Holocaust with intentions at the forefront of our mind. I think this
    rethinking is already happening, but it is late coming to philosophy.

    msh:
    Better late then never.

    matt:
    <snip some stuff about Mark and Platt and the moral dilemmas faced by
    consumers>

    but I think we need to remember the Holocaust and how that demands a
    change in the categories we use to think about evil. Evil isn't so
    simple as to be in the intentions of an individual. Evil is banal,
    something we all could be participating in.

    I don't know what the answer is. Clearly, intentions are still a big
    deal. But actual actions are what do the actual evil. What's
    disturbing is that we all could be doing evil. So what do we do
    about it?

    msh says:
    Evil is banal but not invisible. With astute external observation,
    and lots of reflection inward, and, most important, the unfettered
    flow of information between the island universes we've made of
    ourselves, our participation in evil can be minimized and maybe
    eliminated altogether. I think this will have to do, until the
    estranging sea we've set between us subsides and the illusion of
    proud individuality disappears, once and for all.

    Great post, Matt. Thanks for the hard work.

    Mark Steven Heyman (msh)

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