Re: MD URT vs MOQ

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sun Aug 07 2005 - 08:06:47 BST

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD dot-communism"

    Greetings, Platt, with reference also to David M. --

    > Hope your vacation was a good one, i.e., high quality. :-)

    It was, thank you. I'm too old to take extended roadtrips. Last week we
    traveled northeast to visit Danbury, CT, Lenox and Sturbridge (Village)
    Mass., the highlight of the trip being a concert at Tanglewood's
    Koussevitsky Shed to hear our favorite soprano, Fredericka van Stade, in a
    program of French music.

    You and David Morey have raised what you both see as a logical challenge to
    my concept of a "sentient" Essence. I'll get to that point in a moment.
    First, I want to make it clear that Kaufman rejects this idea also, making
    what I consider a paradoxical distinction between "awareness" and
    "consciousness".

    Keeping in mind that I'm foreshortening Kaufman's arguments by quoting only
    his conclusions, here is what he says about awareness:

    "As we've shown, there exists nothing we can call a physical reality in the
    absence of an experience of that reality. We can also state that there
    exists nothing we can call a physical experience in the absence of an
    awareness of that experience. ...In other words, awareness is intrinsic to
    the existence of what we experience as physical reality."

    So far, so good -- at least I'm in complete agreement and have said
    essentially the same thing in my own thesis. The problem arises when he
    tries to relate awareness to consciousness:

    "...the brain isn't the ultimate source of our awareness, for the ultimate
    source of awareness is existence itself. With that said, let's now turn our
    attention to this ultimate source of awareness and experience.

    "If awareness is existence being relative somewhere, then what could we call
    existence being absolutely everywhere? Consciousness! Consciousness is
    what exists absolutely everywhere and awareness is consciousness localized
    to a relative somewhere."

    A bit later he says:

    "We mistakenly call our awareness our consciousness because awareness is the
    child of consciousness, but awareness as such isn't consciousness.
    ...Absolute existence is consciousness, and all realities are formed through
    consciousness-existence coming to exist in relation to itself. ...Therefore
    consciousness isn't a product of physical reality, but rather physical
    reality is a product of consciousness."

    That conclusion would appear to be consistent with both the MoQ and
    Essentialism.
    However, by defining absolute existence as Consciousness and denying it
    awareness in this absolute state, his primary source becomes unconscious
    consciousness -- an obvious contradiction in terms.

    Okay, now as to my contention that Essence (the primary source) is
    sentient...

    Your dictionary defines the term as "conscious of sense impressions," and I
    assume it would apply to your cat's consciousness as well as our own. I
    have no quarrel with that empirical definition, since the only sentience
    creatures are familiar with is that caused by sense impressions. But this
    does not mean that there is no sentience beyond the dualism of finitude.
    Indeed, if the primary source is all-encompassing, it logically must
    encompass sentience in its absolute metaphysical state. What is absurd to
    me in this otherwise plausible ontology is to name Consciousness as the
    ultimate reality and deny it sensibility.

    I note some effort by you and other Pirsigians to attribute consciousness to
    the material universe, as a substitute for teleology, suggesting that atoms
    and molecules -- or the Quality that creates them -- have sentience. I find
    this notion metaphysically unacceptable also, although it is not
    self-contradictory.

    How do I resolve the paradox?

    First of all, I don't posit existence as the primary reality. That
    eliminates the need for an infinite regression of prior causes and the
    problems inherent in assigning existential attributes (like Quality) to the
    absolute source. Secondly, I base this source on "sensibility", which my
    Webster's New Collegiate defines as: "ability to receive sensations;
    awareness of and responsiveness toward something (as emotion in another)."
    Now, you will argue that the 'something' producing the sensations is an
    otherness, hence that sensibility presupposes duality. This is true in the
    relational world of existence; however it does not invalidate Absolute
    Sensibility as "self-awareness", (i.e., Essence aware of itself), for
    example, which does not require an SOM duality.

    As I replied to David Morey on this issue:
    > While it is my opinion that no specific
    > (i.e., finite) attribute is assignable to the primary source,
    > its link to conscious awareness does imply "sentience in its
    > absolute state", whatever that might represent metaphysically.
    > Without it, we may as well forego the idea of a primary
    > source altogether, since it adds nothing to the meaning of
    > the life-experience.

    Again, for those interested in the URT, a review of the author's
    introduction provides a fairly comprehensive synopsis of his thesis and is
    accessible at http://www.unifiedreality.com/.

    Thanks again for your insights, Platt, You always manage to fit my ideas
    artfully into the context of the MoQ, despite the metaphysical
    incompatabilities in our respective philosophies. You must have been an
    outstanding advertising copywriter ;-).

    Essentially yours,
    Ham

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