From: Dan Glover (daneglover@hotmail.com)
Date: Sun Nov 13 2005 - 19:58:47 GMT
Hello everyone
>From: "Paul Turner" <paul@turnerbc.co.uk>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss@moq.org
>To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
>Subject: MD Two Theses in the MOQ
>Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2005 16:59:08 -0000
>
>Final post for now! I won't be able to respond very quickly but I wanted
>to
>get the posts out there anyway as they've been sat in my draft folder for a
>while.
Hi Paul
Thank you for writing. I've taken the liberty of interspercing some
questions and comments into your most excellent post. If you feel that a
response is called for, please take all the time you need as I still owe you
a letter concerning the essay I put together regarding Bodvar's SOL. Soon.
Anyway, it may well be that I've misconstrued your meaning behind thesis (1)
and thesis (2) so I look forward to being corrected regarding any
misconceptions on my part.
>
>I have suggested before that it may be useful to recognise two theses
>within
>the overall static pattern of the MOQ. Broadly speaking, insofar as thesis
>(1) is largely an articulation of an epistemology of Quality,
If, as I understand it to be, Quality is (purposely) left undefined in ZMM,
then what articulated epistemic modality pertains to "it"? Isn't that
instead what the MOQ is all about, as described in LILA?
>thesis (2) is
>a dialectical exposition of a metaphysics. I will try and briefly outline
>the scope of each thesis, as I see them.
>
> --------------------------------------
>
>Thesis (1) only describes the view that a reality of essentially undefined
>Dynamic Quality, and not of independent objects, is what is primary in
>experience and, significantly, is what produces all intellectual patterns
>of
>knowledge. This thesis is mainly contained in ZMM, crystallising with
>Pirsig's realisation that "[Dynamic] Quality is the generator of everything
>we know," but is restated in LILA in the sections prior to the end of
>Chapter 8. In this thesis, the everyday world of distinguishable things is
>understood as the result of ongoing Dynamic Quality within the context of
>different intellectual patterns or analogues.
Introducing Dynamic Quality into ZMM seems analogous to introducing the
Quality event into LILA -- while it's easy enough to do, it seems improper
somehow, not at all in keeping with Robert Pirsig's intentions (as I
understand them to be). No disagreement with your theses, mind you, rather
it seems better to leave Quality undefined within the context of ZMM.
>
>It should be stated here that in thesis (1) (N.B. this includes all of ZMM)
>the terms 'intellectual patterns' and 'intellectual' do not refer
>unequivocally to the static patterns which are defined by the intellectual
>level of thesis (2) because in thesis (1) there are no levels.
This reminds me of a quote that I used to begin a chapter in LILA'S CHILD:
“In the sky there is no distinction of east and
west; people create distinctions out of their
own minds and then believe them to be true.”
—Buddha
This quote seems (so far as I can tell) to refer to both thesis (1) and
thesis (2) so I use this particular sentence as a basis for my comments
throughout in your post.
>
>I suggest that it is the largely epistemological thesis (1) which Pirsig
>refers to when he says in LILA'S CHILD that "Philosophic idealism is part
>of
>the MOQ" and provides the context for understanding such statements as:
>
>"Within the MOQ, the *idea* that static patterns of value start with the
>inorganic level is considered to be a good *idea*." [LILA'S CHILD,
>Annotation 97]
>
>"It is important for an understanding of the MOQ to see that although
>"common sense" dictates that inorganic nature came first, actually "common
>sense" which is a set of ideas, has to come first. This "common sense" is
>arrived at through a huge web of socially approved evaluations of various
>alternatives. The key term here is "evaluation," i.e., quality decisions.
>The fundamental reality is not the common sense or the objects and laws
>approved of by common sense but the approval itself and the quality that
>leads to it." [LILA'S CHILD, Notes on Annotation 97]
>
>The key point of thesis (1) is that knowledge does not consist of
>representations of independent properties of an objective world.
So let's just say according to thesis (1) that there are no distinctions.
Intellectually (according to thesis (2)) we create distinctions and believe
them to be true.
>Rather, it
>is suggested that the properties of the world arise within the composition
>of knowledge (and it is here that it agrees with philosophic idealism),
>and,
>crucially, that this knowledge emerges from the ongoing experience of
>Dynamic Quality and the value judgements it produces within the context of
>existing patterns.
I would like to add that these "properties" would seem to be properly
regarded as "intellectual" properties of the world that arise within the
composition of knowledge, in the context of philosophical idealism. Created
in the mind, these intellectual properties lend a kind of sense to the world
and obscure it's nature simultaneously.
>
>So, as with all knowledge according to this thesis, the intellectual
>pattern
>of the MOQ is itself generated by a procession of value judgements, which
>leads us to thesis (2).
>
> ---------------------------------
>
>Thesis (2) is the articulation of the particular intellectual pattern - the
>"plain of understanding" - of the MOQ. I think this second thesis is
>almost
>entirely contained in LILA, starting from Chapter 9. In this chapter we
>see
>a transition from the Dynamic Quality that *produces* intellectual value
>judgments to the explanations that are the *result* of those value
>judgments. These explanations include things like
>
>-- the relationship between Dynamic Quality and static quality
>
>-- the evolution of value patterns
>
>-- the stratified ontology of the four levels
>
>-- the moral codes which have evolved along with the levels
>
>-- with respect to the first thesis, the other static patterns that it
>proposes are required for social and intellectual patterns of knowledge to
>be able to latch in the first place.
>
>These are the pragmatic 'high quality' explanations of how the world might
>operate in accordance with the assumption that values are the ubiquitous
>element of an evolving reality. These are one set of general
>'co-ordinates'
>with which we might understand everything from the movement of electrons to
>enlightenment. None of these explanations are forwarded in thesis (1).
Well, in a way, all these explanations revolve around the central thesis of
Quality -- undefined ZMM Quality -- yet at the same time in order for us
each to better understand (the key word here is better) the nature of this
undefined Quality these explanations are offered in LILA until (and here
comes that word again) something better comes along.
>
> -------------------------------------
>
>Below are some brief suggestions on how the distinction into two theses can
>be put to work in understanding the overall MOQ.
>
>To begin, I think confusion has resulted from statements such as this one:
>
>"The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
>composed of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an
>extremely high quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical
>to do so. But the MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific
>view
>of reality is still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that
>"independent
>scientific material reality" would not be able to change as new scientific
>discoveries come in." [LILA'S CHILD, Notes on Annotation 4]
>
>I think the confusion occurs with this statement because it contains the
>perspectives of both theses and arguably equivocates on the term 'The MOQ'
>as the name for both of them. I translate this statement as:
>
>"The [second thesis of the] MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific
>view of reality as composed of material substance and independent of us.
>It
>says it is an extremely high quality idea. We should follow it whenever it
>is practical to do so. But the [first thesis of the] MOQ, like philosophic
>idealism, says this scientific view of reality is still an idea. If it
>were
>not an idea, then that "independent scientific material reality" would not
>be able to change as new scientific discoveries come in." [LILA'S CHILD,
>Notes on Annotation 4]
>
>And another example:
>
>"The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas, which produce
>what we know as matter. The scientific community that has produced
>Complementarity almost invariably presumes that matter comes first and
>produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that
>the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!" [LILA'S CHILD,
>Annotation 67]
>
>Which I translate as:
>
>"The [first thesis of the] MOQ says that Quality comes first, which
>produces
>ideas, which produce what we know as matter. The scientific community that
>has produced Complementarity almost invariably presumes that matter comes
>first and produces ideas. However, as if to further the confusion, the
>[second thesis of the] MOQ says that the idea that matter comes first is a
>high quality idea!" [LILA'S CHILD, Annotation 67]
>
>It helps me to think about which thesis is under question when I am talking
>about the MOQ - most of the time it is thesis (2).
In the translated quotes above, it appears (to me) that Quality (in a ZMM
sense) is being conflated with quality (in an intellectual LILA sense). The
thing is, we have to "get it" when it comes to the MOQ and getting it
involves letting go of certain preconceived notions concerning the nature of
how it is that we have come to perceive reality. Conflating the notion of
Quality with the notion of quality doesn't lend itself well to us "getting
it," in my opinion (of course).
>
>It has also occurred to me that an interesting perspective on 'the
>container
>problem' may be provided by thinking in terms of the two theses. With this
>device, thesis (1) can be said to 'contain' thesis (2) as one of the many
>patterns of intellectual knowledge produced by Dynamic Quality, e.g.
>alongside all the variations of SOM. Thesis (2), however, can be said to
>be
>how the world is *from within the pattern of the MOQ* and as such does not
>'contain itself' or any other competing, general description of reality
>i.e.
>metaphysics. There may be problems with this and I include it as a
>tentative suggestion only.
I'm not a fan of "the container problem" to begin with as it seems rather
silly to believe a metaphysics can contain anything other than the idea of
itself. Look to the mystic's objection to writing a metaphysics as described
in LILA and perhaps you'll better catch my drift.
>
>I also think the distinction between the two theses sheds light on some of
>the problems of terminology encountered in the MOQ. Firstly, as implied
>earlier I think 'intellectual' as it is used in thesis (1) is subdivided
>into social and intellectual quality in thesis (2) and one should be wary
>of
>equivocation here.
I'm unsure of just what you're saying here. Earlier you state that thesis
(1) has no levels yet here you seem to be saying that with thesis (1) you're
using the intellectual level in a cultural sense (social and intellectual
combined). Could you please elaborate on this?
>
>Secondly, the term 'pre-intellectual', which is mostly used within the
>context of thesis (1), could be modified to 'pre-static' (i.e. the
>experience of indeterminate value prior to its contextualisation into any
>static patterns) when used within the context of thesis (2) so as not to
>erroneously relate Dynamic Quality solely to the intellectual level.
Pre-intellectual seems to refer to that which is prior to "intellectual"
experience so perhaps the above paragraph could be amended to reflect that.
>
> ---------------------------------------
>
>I suggest that the two theses represent distinct stages in the development
>of the overall pattern of the MOQ and that the first stage is not so much
>left behind as expanded by the second.
Yes I can go along with this.
>Moreover, I suggest it is sometimes
>necessary to 'back up' into the first stage to answer questions mistakenly
>or inappropriately levelled at the second e.g., If intellect creates
>subjects and objects, how is it that inorganic and biological objects
>existed before intellect? The answer is that in thesis (1) all divisions
>and assumptions are indeed contingent upon the activity of a discriminating
>intellect.
Why? If, as stated prior, thesis (1) contains no distinctions, no levels,
then why are you introducing divisions now?
>However, thesis (2) already accepts one pragmatic set of
>divisions and assumptions and, on the basis of these, offers an explanation
>of how they relate in a historical context.
Yes, thesis (2) would appear to be the one that is contigent on a
discriminating intellect.
>
>If this confuses things for you, or if you think it superfluous, please
>ignore it. If it helps, I'm glad.
Thank you again for taking the time to write.
And thanks for reading,
Dan
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