RE: MD Two Theses in the MOQ

From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Wed Nov 23 2005 - 16:51:12 GMT

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    Platt,

    >Thanks for explaining your position on some of the questions I asked. It
    >appears our differences boil down to a single key idea that you set up as
    >follows:
    >
    >> I think judgement implies an element of reflection or consideration . . .
    >
    >Contrast this to Pirsig's description of knowing the value of a situation
    >without any reflection or consideration:
    >
    >"Any person of any philosophic persuasion who sits on a hot stove will
    >verify without any intellectual argument whatsoever that he is in an
    >undeniably low-quality situation: that the value of his predicament is
    >negative. This low quality is not just a vague, woolly-headed, crypto-
    >religious, metaphysical abstraction. It is an experience: It is not a
    >judgment about an experience. It is not a description of experience. The
    >value itself is an experience." (Lila, 5)
    >
    >Note particularly Pirsig's caution, "It is not a judgment about an
    >experience." Yet, the individual "knows" (without judging) that the
    >situation is low quality.

    Paul: This paragraph you have quoted hits the nail on the head. The MOQ
    starts from this basic premise: that value itself is an experience and not
    what you think about, or even feel about, an experience. To miss this
    difference between value and value judgements leads to an understanding of
    the MOQ which, I think, is very far from Pirsig's. I have correspondence
    which supports this but I have learned that sharing it is not always well
    received here so I'll quote from a letter available at moq.org, where you
    can read the whole thing if you wish, instead:

    "Anthony McWatt attended a class on ZMM where the teacher...had no grasp of
    what value was, only what a value judgement was." [Pirsig, Letter to Bodvar
    Skutvik, September 15th 2000]
      
    >Here then is the crux of my confusion. It seems I can know I'm having a
    >low quality experience without making a value judgment, i.e., I'm able to
    >instantly evaluate a situation without thinking.

    Paul: Or rather, the "situation" emerges within your thinking following the
    experience of value.

    >To put it another way, art critic Clement Greenberg describes the esthetic
    >experience: "Esthetic enjoyments are immediate, intuitive, undeliberate
    >and involuntary leaving not room for conscious application of standards,
    >criteria, rules or precepts."
    >
    >I've always felt that Greenberg and Pirsig were describing the same
    >phenomenon.
    >
    >> Paul: I think your confusion comes from conflating Dynamic 'value' with
    >> static 'value judgements'.
    >
    >Indeed, that may be the problem. Do you see experiencing Dynamic 'value'
    >the same as Greenberg describes the aesthetic experience?

    Paul: It certainly sounds the same from what you've quoted above although
    historically terms such as "immediate" and "intuitive" cause problems in a
    philosophical sense, as Matt can point out. "Standards, criteria, rules and
    precepts" are definitely part of the static quality which contributes the
    context within which one makes value judgements and not part of ongoing
    value itself.

    Regards

    Paul

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