MD Conflict and Discretion

From: Valence (valence10@hotmail.com)
Date: Thu Jun 26 2003 - 00:55:39 BST

  • Next message: Valence: "Re: MD The Transformation of Love"

    Hi Wim and all,

    > Rick wrote 25 Jun 2003 09:58:41 -0400:
    > 'I can't help but note that in the MoQ, the patterns of different levels
    are
    > supposed to be in conflict to a certain
    > extent.'

    WIM
    > I always find it confused that in 'Lila' different levels are BOTH
    presented
    > as discrete AND as conflicting.

    RICK
    Yes, I've also had some trouble coming to terms with these two
    characteristics.

    WIM
    > Pirsig seems to make a start ending that confusion in 'Lila's Child' with
    > annotation 52 (published version):
    > 'I think the conflicts mentioned here are intellectual conflicts in which
    > one side clings to an intellectual justification of existing social
    patterns
    > and the other side intellectually opposes the existing social patterns.'
    > I'd say that patterns of value of different levels cannot conflict,
    because
    > they are discrete. Only patterns of value belonging to the same level can.
    > Intellectual patterns of value however consist of symbols that stand for
    > patterns of experience of all levels. So intellectual patterns of value
    that
    > stand for intellectual patterns of value can conflict with intellectual
    > patterns of value that stand for social patterns of value (which in their
    > turn can conflict with intellectual patterns of value that stand for
    > biological patterns of value etc.). It is not the levels themselves (or
    the
    > patterns of value of different levels) that conflict with each other, but
    > their reflections on the intellectual level.

    RICK
    I don't have my copy of LC handy so I don't know what conflicts Pirsig is
    addressing, but I'm not entirely sure I agree.

    You concluded: "It is not the levels themselves (or the patterns of value of
    different levels) that conflict with each other, but their reflections on
    the intellectual level." But what kind of 'reflections' would they be if
    the patterns they reflect aren't genuinely clashing?

    Moreover, you said, "Intellectual patterns of value however consist of
    symbols that stand for patterns of experience of all levels." But in LILA,
    Pirsig tells us that prior to his Metaphysics of Quality there already was
    one...SOM. He explains that SOM is just a Metaphysics of Quality in which
    the first "post-intellectual" slice of "pre-intellectual" experience (pure
    experience... pure Quality) is into Subject and Object. His Metaphysics of
    Quality, by comparison, uses a different initial "post-intellectual"
    slice... Dynamic and static. The levels (all 4 of the them) are a secondary
    'post-intellectual' slice of the static component of the initial slice (you
    with me so far?). That is, all four of the levels (I,B,S,I) only exist
    'post-intellectually' to begin with and ALL are 'ideas that stand for
    patterns of experience' or 'intellectual reflections of experience'. They
    have all been 'deduced' from the raw experience (Quality). Prior to the
    experience, pre-intellectually, there is only Quality. The levels,
    including intellect, are supposed to be (post) intellectual reflections of
    the experience of this initial undivided Quality. So defining intellect
    (the 4th level) as "...symbols that stand for patterns of experience of all
    levels" seems undesirable to me as it would make Intellect the only level
    that doesn't reflect some aspect of pre-intellectual Quality, rather, it
    would be reduced to reflecting a mere 3-levels of post-intellectual static
    quality.

    If given the choice between the discretionary nature of the levels and the
    conflicting nature of the levels, I think I would sooner jettison the
    discretionary nature. I would say that the levels are not entirely
    discreet. They have fuzzy boundaries that defy precise definition on the
    basis of experience alone (ie. for the sake of 'precision' Pirsig draws the
    line for social patterns at humans alone; note that this is a policy-based
    boundary and not one that necessarily jives with experience; many convincing
    arguments have been made in this forum that social patterns are sometimes
    found among other animals). The levels conflict with each other precisely
    over where these boundaries should be drawn. I think I prefer that solution
    right now, but I'll think about it some more.

    take care
    rick

    I can't understand why people are frightened by new ideas. I'm frightened of
    old ones. - John Cage

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Jun 26 2003 - 00:54:21 BST