Re: MD novel/computer heirarchy

From: Valence (valence10@hotmail.com)
Date: Sun Jul 20 2003 - 06:44:53 BST

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    Hey Johnny and all,

    J
    > Hi Rick,
    > What about 1)?

    R
    Sheesh :-) Fine. I skipped #1 because I've never been a big fan of the
    whole computer analogy thing, but the hey...

    J
    1. Doesn't the MoQ say that the 4th level patterns exist on top of 3rd level
    patterns the way a novel sits on top of a computer? The intellectual level
    doesn't sit on top of 2nd level patterns (people)....<snip-see below>Please
    address the novel/computer metaphor as it relates to the 3rd and 4th levels.
    I think it clarifies the difference between thinking in a biological sense
    and thinking in an intellectual sense.

    R
    I don't think the analogy itself has much to add to the "thinking" debate.
    In ch. 12 Pirsig uses the computer as an analogy to the interrelationship of
    different levels of static patterns of quality. He is illustrating what he
    wrote at the top of pg 173, "This classification of patterns is not very
    original, but the MoQ allows an assertion about them that is unusual. It
    says they are not continuous. They are discrete. They have very little to
    do with one another. Although each higher level is built on a lower one it
    is not an extension of that lower level. Quite the contrary. The higher
    level can often be seen to be in opposition to the lower level, dominating
    it, controlling it where possible for its own purposes." I don't think that
    much more can be drawn about the respective natures of the specific levels
    from the computer analogy than that (ie. the historic purpose of a 'novel'
    wasn't to help word processors survive). So my specific response to your
    inquiry would be that in relation to the 3rd and 4th level, the
    novel/computer analogy says only that intellect is built on society, but is
    not an extension of it. They are each discrete from each other and have very
    little to do with one another, other than that their independence may cause
    them to conflict.

    J
    They don't come out of individuals, they come out of society and are about
    society. They help a society find food, not an individual find food.An
    individual uses biological patterns of intellegence and repeats social
    patterns to find food. Is this wrong?

    R
    Remember that in the MoQ the term "Society" (as in Social Patterns... the
    3rd level), isn't defined as contra-individual, it's defined as
    contra-biological. To Pirsig, the 3rd level includes both "collective"
    social patterns and "individual" social patterns. So to Pirsig, it's not so
    much that intellectual patterns don't come out of "individuals", it's that
    they don't come out "biological patterns". A "human animal" entirely
    dominated by biological patterns would follow his genetic programming to
    find food; if dominated by social patterns, he'll just copy and repeat the
    behaviors of others in his society which help find food; if dominated by
    social patterns that are dominated by intellectual patterns, he'll use
    symbols that represent his experiences to find better, more efficient ways
    to find food.

    > > Now,
    > >instead of saying that there are 'intellectual patterns at different
    > >levels'
    > >we can say there are 'interpretive patterns at different levels'.
    Instead
    > >of saying that Quality is the 'pre-intellectual' cutting edge of reality,
    > >we
    > >can say it is the 'pre-interpretive cutting edge'. Instead of speaking
    of
    > >"pre-intellectual awareness" we can speak of "pre-interpretive
    awareness".
    > >What do you think?

    J
    > It does make sense, yes, in terms of what is gong on pre and post
    whatever.
    > But what did the interpreting? I think the way the whole undifferentiated
    > quality is carved up and interpreted is dictated by quality itself it
    > contains moral patterns that cause consciousnesses to interpret or carve
    it
    > up the only way they can.

    R
    I agree with you that, "the way the whole undifferentiated quality is carved
    up and interpreted is dictated by quality itself", but it gets tougher when
    we try and get more specific about it (evidently). But since I'm still up,
    I thought I might take a quick crack at it:

    PIRSIG (from SODV)
    In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind,
    matter, and Quality. Because something is not located in the object does not
    mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be independently
    derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived from the
    relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs at the point
    at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing. It is an event. It
    is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object. And because
    without objects there can be no subject, quality is the event at which
    awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible. Quality is not just
    the result of a collision between subject and object. The very existence of
    subject and object themselves is deduced from the Quality event. The Quality
    event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly
    presumed to be the cause of the Quality!

    R
    Quality is the one. The undivided. And if Quality is the source (cause) of
    subjects and objects, then just as he says, it's not a *collision* between
    subject and object (it couldn't be), rather it's a *divergence* into subject
    and object. And it's an event. Quality is the event at which subjects and
    objects diverge from the whole to an extent sufficient to cause the subject
    to 'become aware' of objects. But Pirsig also tells us that subject/object
    is just one way that the whole might be carved up. So more generally, we
    might say that Quality is the event at which the whole diverges into
    patterns of awareness. We (the aware, the interpreters, the subjects) are
    created in that event simultaneously with the rest of the world (the
    empirical, the interpreted, the objects). Neither comes first; nor is one
    contained within, or created by, the other (tat tvam asi). Each "individual
    awareness" is just a different divergence, a different face of the whole.
    And so why does it do it? Why does the whole diverge and create these rich
    and complex patterns of awareness? My only guess is... for the sheer fun of
    it.

    take care
    rick

    The very problem of mind and body suggests division; I do not know of
    anything so disastrously affected by the habit of division as this
    particular theme. In its discussion are reflected the splitting off from
    each other of religion, morals and science; the divorce of philosophy from
    science and of both from the arts of conduct. The evils which we suffer in
    education, in religion, in the materialism of business and the aloofness of
    "intellectuals" from life, in the whole separation of knowledge and
    practice -- all testify to the necessity of seeing mind-body as an integral
    whole. - J. Dewey

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