Re: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the Nazi, Part III

From: David MOREY (
Date: Wed Oct 15 2003 - 22:52:28 BST

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD What is a person?"


    Just to cheer you up, I believe you partly, I agree that Pirsig slips up
    and there and looks like an essentialist, and this goes against trying to
    quality/dynamic concept/becoming back into philosophy, but they are slips
    not commitments,
    but I have no problem with doing metaphysics like Pirsig, having read a lot
    Nietzsche, Heidegger, Rorty, Derrida and post-modernism I think when they
    metaphysics that are attacking a couple of forms of metaphysics, the sort of
    metaphysics that seek certainty, correspondence, an unmediated presence, and
    banish openness/freedom/change. However, and this is very clear in
    Nietzsche's attack
    on being in the name of becoming, there is a case for a form of metaphysics
    that merges
    these two into be(com)ing. This, to me, looks alot like quality(sq/dq). Its
    a type of metaphysics that
    puts openness centre stage, that asserts the endless embellishment of
    reality, that sounds a great deal like
    pragmatism, post-modernism, Cupitt, but instead of basing its position on a
    demonstration of slipperyness
    actually adopts it as a principle. It ties in very nicely with quantum
    theory to literary ironism, but it also
    has the possibility of dojng some nice
    religious/mystic/sacred/universal/public/unifying work and get us
    out of that sad old private interests world of isolated pragmatists. Damn,
    did I say I was trying to agree
    with you. You heard it here first, maybe, next big thing in philosophy all
    things post/non-secular. Or how about
    Physics, Phenomenology and God.

    David Morey

    ----- Original Message -----

    To: <>
    Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 12:29 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Begging the Question, Moral Intuitions, and Answering the
    Nazi, Part III

    > Hey Steve,
    > Steve said:
    > "I really don't buy that. If you're not talking about the world then what
    could you be talking about? See below."
    > and
    > "I don't see how a pragmatist who "don't make assumptions" could possibly
    explain anything since we established that reasoning must begin with
    assumptions. It would seem that pragmatism as you describe it can only be a
    negative philosophy. All it seems to be good for is saying, "Hey, you're
    not being a good pragmatist" (or "you're begging the question.")"
    > Matt:
    > I think there is some confusion about what it means to be a pragmatist.
    First, you are right, the pragmatism that Rorty espouses is almost
    exclusively a negative philosophy. This isn't a strike against pragmatism
    because it doesn't make you choose between the negative philosopher (Rorty)
    and the positive philosopher (Pirsig). Second, the pragmatist doesn't say
    "don't make assumptions" because you are right, we couldn't possibly explain
    anything without them. All reasoning needs them. Third, I am talking about
    the world, I'm just not attempting to say how it _really_ is. I'm just
    attempting to cope with it.
    > The pragmatist makes a distinction between trying to get at the way the
    world _really_ is through language or other means and simply trying to cope
    with the world, trying to survive and perhaps some other private things. If
    you don't make a distinction, if you think everybody has a metaphysics, if
    you think that everybody makes assumptions about the way the world _really_
    is whether they like it or not, then you can't engage with the pragmatist in
    an argument because the two of you don't have a crucial assumption in
    > But, again, I didn't really want to talk ad nauseum about pragmatism and
    Rorty, I wanted to discuss them within Pirsig and what it means for Pirsig.
    Nobody seems to want to believe me.
    > Matt
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