From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Mon Nov 03 2003 - 19:38:37 GMT
DMB: [Pirsig] his theory asserts that truth is quality
of a particular kind; intellectual static quality. And that should be
treated as real too, just as all static patterns are. This is how the mere
subjectivity of SOM is turned into something more real in the MOQ. There is
nothing very grandiose about Pirsig's theory of truth and it is provisional
too, but ideas and explanations attain an ontological status not granted
under SOM, or under Rorty. Further, since the primary reality (DQ) is
pre-intellectual, it does not figure into this theory of truth. In the MOQ
truth is a particular species of static quality.
DM: A static pattern is real, but it is abstracted from experience.
As per Pirsig's story of the developing baby. So like many blind men feeling
the
elephant, we can only come up with a description of a static pattern from a
given
perspective. If we want a bigger picture it is good to have some
inter-perspective
conversation with other people. Subjectivity is not simply mere in SOM. SOM
can
be either dualistic, materialistic (where subject is mere) or idealistic
(where object is mere
and subject constitutes the world). Rorty rejects SOM dualism so as to give
full weight
to the humanities, so that for Rorty the humanities talk about different
things from the sciences
and are as capable of being taken as true as the sciences. Truth is
provisional for both
Pirsig and Rorty. It has to be, what is the alternative? This is truth with
respect to static patterns
which are an abstraction from experience as per Pirsig's science essay. Are
the patterns real in some
sense beyond our descriptions and abstractions. Well there is some sort of
pattern occuring and we can
call this real if you like. The only ontolological status Pirsig grants is
to quality. This is an undifferentiated
form of experience, and being undifferentiated you cannot describe it. This
is less a truth than a presupposition.
I think it is an excellent presupposition with great explanatory power.
Rorty does not wish to make any
ontological presuppositions. I think this is a mistake because if you do not
state your presuppositions that sneak
under your guard. E.G. Rorty's physicalism that I disagree with. But on
truth Pirsig and Rorty are very close.
regards
DM
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 12:58 AM
Subject: RE: MD Two theories of truth
> Andy and all:
>
> Andy Responds to DMB:
> Sorry, but Pirsig is talking about quality here and not truth. Two
> different discussions. I am probably a little dense for not recognizing
> that quality has a concrete and material existence, but Pirsig never says
> this about truth. In the Mcwatt thesis, he makes the point that Pirsig
> subscribes to a pragmatic theory of truth. This is what I meant when I
said
> that you wish to make truth a primary reality with quality. I think this
is
> a mistake.
>
> dmb says:
> Yes, we can look to Lila for a discussion of Pirsig's pragmatic theory of
> truth. That would be good. But my beef is with Rorty, which is a much more
> specific version of neo-pragmatism. Pirsig even distinguishes himself from
> William James because there was no way to prevent the NAZIs from using it.
> But more to the point, it only seems like two different discussions. Its
> true that Pirsig is talking about quality when he talks about treating it
AS
> IF it had a concrete existence, but his theory asserts that truth is
quality
> of a particular kind; intellectual static quality. And that should be
> treated as real too, just as all static patterns are. This is how the mere
> subjectivity of SOM is turned into something more real in the MOQ. There
is
> nothing very grandiose about Pirsig's theory of truth and it is
provisional
> too, but ideas and explanations attain an ontological status not granted
> under SOM, or under Rorty. Further, since the primary reality (DQ) is
> pre-intellectual, it does not figure into this theory of truth. In the MOQ
> truth is a particular species of static quality.
>
> Andy said:
> ...since truth is a property of language one, such as Pirsig, can hold a
> pragmatic theory of truth and still develop a MOQ.
>
> dmb says:
> I'm pretty sure Pirsig would not agree that truth is a property of true
> statements, as Rorty asserts. Rorty's truth is an adjective, Pirsig's is a
> noun. A more general sense of the word "pragmatic" applies well enough to
> Pirsig's theory, which is subject to revision, allows for many sets of
truth
> and measures the value of intellectual discriptions in terms of usefulness
> and explanatory power, but again, my beef is more specific than that. Its
> aimed at the idea that truth is an attribute of something else, without an
> independent existence of its own. I can't see how one can escape the
> conclusion that Rorty is saying that truth is merely subjective. He uses
> different terms, much fancier terms than that, but the idea is the same.
Can
> you tell me the difference between intersubjectively agreed upon
attributes
> and subjective qualities?
>
> DMB had said:
> Rorty's truth is such a flimsy and arbitrary kind of truth, but Pirsig
> insists there is something that holds it all together, just as there is
> something that holds the glass together and lets you drink. There is a
> rightness that holds
> "sanity" together, and its the same force that holds everything together.
He
> even asserts that this is the oldest idea known to man. (Mythology
expressed
> it before there were such things as ideas.)
>
> Andy replied:
> Right, I think. Rorty says that intersubjective agreement holds truth
> together. Pirsig points toward quality holding truth together.
>
> dmb says:
> I want to interject a point here because might actually agree. Or maybe
not.
> As I see it, the quality that holds static patterns together is very
> different than intersubjective agreement. For Pirsig this rightness is a
> cosmic order, and it works as well for drinking glasses as it does for
> truth. Pirsig's theory of truth fixes those intellectual patterns into a
> larger structure. For Rorty, there is little else but intersubjective
> agreements, analogies all the way down, as the neo-prag might say. This is
> why I pointed to "Rht", the "oldest idea known to man" and Anthony's
opening
> quote.
>
> Andy continued:
> ...But the "matter of fact evolutionary relationship" between qualtiy and
> truth will be subverted if we don't allow a democratic process for
> determining which "truths" in the marketplace of ideas are "better" to
live
> by at each moment in time. This democratic process is what Rorty means
when
> he talks of intersubective agreement. And this is why truth is secondary
to
> quality.
>
> dmb says:
> Democracy, freedom in the marketplace of ideas, hope in progress. None of
> this is in dispute. Lots of people having nothing to do with metaphysics
or
> philosophy would go along with us on that. But I wanted to take issue with
> the "matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship". Sure, intellectual truth
> evolves and changes dynamically, as a result of DQ and static latching and
> all that. That's a movement toward an undefined betterness and we are
right
> to give it the space and freedom for that growth. But I was NOT talking
> about the relationship between DQ and intellectual truth. I was talking
> about the relationship between social static quality and intellectual
static
> quality, between the 3rd and 4th levels, as was Pirsig. Naturally, the
point
> here is to show that Rorty and Pirsig are different. Let me elaborate...
>
> The evolutionary relationship asserts that intellect is impossbile without
> language as a pre-requisite. There is no such thing as an idea without
words
> in the same way that there is no such thing as a wolf-less pack or an
> organism without atoms. It may seem like Rorty is saying the same thing
with
> respect to language and truth, but he doesn't draw that line between the
> third and fourth levels. This leads him to the theory that the latter is a
> property of the former. Pirsig says they are completely different levels
and
> exist in an evolutionary relationship. Remember the particulars Rorty used
> to describe his theory of truth? I nixed 'em long ago for the sake of
> brevity, but you may recall that his examples included widely different
true
> statements like "E=mc2" and "It was good that Jack left Jill". This is
just
> short of an outright denial that there are distinctions to be made between
> true statements, as if Dear Abby and Albert Einstien had something in
> common. :-)
>
> DMB had said:
> "He paints a picture of reality such that excellence in human life is
> achieved when one is somehow in harmony with this cosmic rightness. The
> static patterns are variously mastered, extinquished, or otherwise put to
> sleep. ...He's always been looking for the Buddha in one way or another
and
> so the MOQ is much, MUCH more comparable to Eastern Philosophy and
mysticism
> than it is to anything like neo-pragmatism."
>
> Andy replied:
> The Onus is on you to persuade us why we do need it. I am not ignoring
the
> spiritual aspect of Pirsig's work any more than I ignore this aspect in my
> own life. However, this spiritual pursuit described by the Buddha and
> Campbell is an individual pursuit. Campbell went through some pains to
> explain that the western world does not necessarily need more of this
> spirituality. Our individualistic culture has a much greater need for
> emphasis upon cooperative ideals that are needed to hold a society
together.
> Rorty addresses these needs and doesn't think a metaphysics is going to
help
> us acheive these societal goals. In other words the MOQ is not going to
> save the world from ourselves, only we can.
>
> dmb says:
> Whew! Lots to take issue with there. I don't know who ever said the MOQ
was
> going to save the world, but let's talk about abondoning metaphysics for
> political reform some other time. Campbell too. Suffice it to say that
this
> approach only marks another difference between Pirsig and Rorty. Pirsig is
> convinced that we need his improved metaphysics to grasp the political
> conflicts of our time. It does the only thing an idea CAN do; it explains
> things. And there is certainly nothing that prevents us from acting on an
> MOQ understanding in public life. It works for me. But the reason I think
> the MOQ is more comparable to Eastern philosophies than neo-pragmatism is
> not just that it says we ought to do this or that spiritual practice or
> believe in this or that doctrine, but because it describes a reality that
is
> fundamentally spiritual. The primary empirical reality (DQ) drives the
whole
> she-bang. Its the heart and soul of the MOQ. Its where we come from and
> where we are headed. Its the father of all static forms. In a very real
> sense, the MOQ was born during a mystical experience and describes a
> mystical reality. So in the MOQ, it doesn't really make any sense to say
> spirituality is a problem of hyper-individuality, that it should remain in
> the private sphere, or anything like that. Its an inherent part of the
total
> picture of how everything hangs together.
>
> I don't know if I can convince you of this if Pirsig hasn't already. But
it
> seems beside the point I was trying to make. I certainly do think Pirsig's
> picture is better than Rorty's, but so far my only hope is to point out
the
> differences, to show where they don't agree. First things first, you know?
>
> Thanks'
> dmb
>
>
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