Re: MD Objectivity, Truth and the MOQ

From: David MOREY (
Date: Tue Feb 03 2004 - 19:22:31 GMT

  • Next message: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT: "Re: MD Do we all need philosophy?"

    > Because it implies the possibility of correspondence to
    > objects-in-themselves. That is one view of truth but there are others.

    DM: By the way things-in-themselves implies SOM and a
    problematic gap between appearance and reality, so that aletheia
    and truth as un-covering implies a unity prior to SO divide that
    truth in its closeness to reality also implies.

    David M

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Paul Turner" <>
    To: <>
    Sent: Tuesday, February 03, 2004 3:33 PM
    Subject: RE: MD Objectivity, Truth and the MOQ

    > Bo
    > > Bo previously said:
    > > OK, we may be reconciled here if you accept Truth in the sense of (ZMM
    > > "Truth. Knowledge. That which is independent of what anyone thinks of
    > > it. The ideal that Socrates died for. The ideal that Greece alone
    > > possesses for the first time in the history of the world."
    > > Paul previously said:
    > > That was their definition of truth after it was separated from belief
    > > and placed higher than the good.
    > Bo said:
    > Wrong, this is P. of ZMM's definition of what took place at that time.
    > Paul:
    > Of course that quote is Pirsig, but if you look at what he was
    > interpreting, Plato had Socrates say that truth and knowledge were
    > "recollected" and were not the mere product of belief.
    > "But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a
    > human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding
    > to bring many perceptions together into reasoned unity. That process is
    > the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was travelling with
    > god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its
    > head to what is truly real instead.
    > For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher's mind grows
    > wings, since its memory always keeps as close as possible to those
    > realities by being close to which the gods are divine. A man who uses
    > reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most
    > perfect level of initiation, and he is the only one who is perfect as
    > perfect can be" [Plato, PHAEDRUS (249c)]
    > "The things we now call real" as opposed to "what is truly real." It
    > doesn't take too much interpretation.
    > Bo said:
    > Socrates, Plato or Aristotle did not know any subject/object
    > distinction. Socrates definition was TRUTH ...not separate from belief,
    > but different from OPINION (that the Sophists kept
    > manipulating) but note that Pirsig feels the need for strengthening it
    > by his: "That what is independent of ...etc." which is what we define as
    > Paul:
    > By "belief" I meant what you mean by "opinion." I should have said
    > *mere* belief. I don't think Pirsig is adding anything that Plato failed
    > to mention. What you are describing is Pirsig's summary of the birth of
    > subjective and objective in the epistemological sense.
    > Bo said:
    > Plato's permanence were IDEAS, only with Aristotle did something
    > resembling S/O (form/substance) emerge.
    > Paul:
    > And here you are talking about how Aristotle invented subjective and
    > objective in the metaphysical sense.
    > Bo said:
    > The kernel of all this is: It's the MOQ's interpretation of the past we
    > talk about, and my assertion is that everything Pirsig writes points to
    > a S/O definition of intellect. How Socrates, Plato and Aristotle defined
    > their own struggle is almost irrelevant, Socrates did NOT (in his own
    > words) place truth higher than good.
    > Paul:
    > Socrates didn't write anything down so we don't know what he said "in
    > his own words." Plato, however, did place truth higher than good, both
    > in his dialogues and in the "MOQ interpretation."
    > "In order to win the battle for Truth in which areté is subordinate,
    > against his enemies who would teach areté in which truth is subordinate,
    > Plato must first resolve the internal conflict among the
    > Truth-believers." [ZMM p.388]
    > "Plato's second synthesis is the incorporation of the Sophists' areté
    > into this dichotomy of Ideas and Appearance. He gives it the position of
    > highest honor, subordinate only to Truth itself and the method by which
    > Truth is arrived at, the dialectic. But in his attempt to unite the Good
    > and the True by making the Good the highest Idea of all, Plato is
    > nevertheless usurping areté's place with dialectically determined
    > truth." [ZMM p.388]
    > Bo said:
    > Truth was his highest good.
    > Paul:
    > No, good was his highest Idea.
    > > Bo said:
    > > Still I wonder why the "objective" term so inedible?
    > > Paul:
    > > Because it implies the possibility of correspondence to
    > > objects-in-themselves. That is one view of truth but there are others.
    > Bo said:
    > Will you never understand? As a static level 'subjective' and
    > 'objective' lose their metaphysical "in-themselves" quality they had in
    > SOM and becomes the static value of such a distinction.
    > Paul:
    > It is you that makes it difficult to understand. In the past you have
    > said that intellect is SOM then it was subject-object logic then
    > subjective/objective knowledge and now it is impartiality. Seven years
    > and counting Bo, is it the misunderstanding of all of us?
    > Look at what you have written here:
    > "Yes impartial, that's it. In ZMM Pirsig writes (in describing the
    > emergence of SOM): "...But now as the result of the growing IMPARTIALITY
    > of the Greeks to the world around them ...etc."
    > So S/O is just impartiality, an approach to knowledge, but then
    > "this is the way the the S/O distinction must be understood in the MOQ;
    > the value of an objective reality versus opinion."
    > Now it's about objective reality again, a metaphysical claim!
    > Paul previously said:
    > > In
    > > Plato's dialogues, you often find his characters using the "analytic"
    > > truths of mathematics to demonstrate this "objectivity" but even those
    > > have been shown to be one from a possible many, as described by Pirsig
    > > in the section on Poincare in ZMM.
    > Bo said:
    > About "one from a possible many" (many what?) you have to spoon-feed me.
    > Paul:
    > Axioms, "self evident truths."
    > "Poincaré concluded that the axioms of geometry are conventions, our
    > choice among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts,
    > but it remains free and is limited only by the necessity of avoiding all
    > contradiction. Thus it is that the postulates can remain rigorously true
    > even though the experimental laws that have determined their adoption
    > are only approximative. The axioms of geometry, in other words, are
    > merely disguised definitions." [ZMM p.270]
    > Regards
    > Paul
    > P.S. As an aside, I'm currently writing a report on Information Quality
    > for a company in the UK, nowhere does a sharp subject/object distinction
    > or the search for immortal principles come into the writing of the
    > report yet it is clearly not just a social activity. A manipulation of
    > abstract symbols to convey (hopefully) coherent ideas describes what I'm
    > doing perfectly. What level would BoMOQ put my report writing in?
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