From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sun Mar 21 2004 - 22:36:52 GMT
Dear David B., Don (drose) and Leland (and Platt?),
David B. wrote 20 Mar 2004 12:48:22 -0700:
'I think that you belittle the debate as "bickering" not because America is
polarized, but because you deny one of Pirsig's central ideas; the idea that
we are presently in a period of evolutionary change and that the social and
intellectual levels are at war.'
I distinguished 18 Mar 2004 08:29:48 +0100 between:
'discussing ABOUT POLITICS' and 'discussing IN A POLITICAL WAY' in a
polarized political climate.
When we are discussing about politics (about our experience of the social
and intellectual patterns of value that constitute 'politics') we can
discuss whether the polarized political climate in America reflects the
tension between social and intellectual patterns of value and whether 'war'
is a fitting metaphor.
Indeed, you (David B.) and Platt apparently agree that the social and
intellectual levels are at war and that the 'political Giant' should not
'corrupt intellectual honesty'.
You (David B.) continue to discuss (20 Mar 2004 14:10:15 -0700) in a
polarized political way (with Platt) 'about who tends to violate' the
principle that the 'political Giant' should not 'corrupt intellectual
honesty'. My 15 Mar 2004 08:18:45 +0100 assessment of your discussion as
'bickering' followed your accusations of using as source 'politically
inspired junk science' (Platt 14 Mar 200408:31:47 -0500) respectively 'a
right-wing junk think tank' (David B. 14 Mar 2004 17:18:37 -0700).
I cannot help but experience that type of discussion as low quality. You
have no chance at all to convince each
other in that way and you are lowering the standard of discussion in the MD
list.
This experience of mine is independent of my position regarding the issue
whether political polarization in America (or on this list) reflects a
social/intellectual tension or the issue whether 'war' is a fitting
metaphor. If I translate your discussion into a discussion about how the
polarized political climate in America reflects a tension between higher and
lower quality intellectual patterns of value (about which side represents
the higher quality patterns of value), I still don't experience it as
constructive to call each other's sources 'junk' apparently just because
they are 'left' or 'right'.
David B. continued 20 Mar 2004 12:48:22 -0700:
'But then maybe this is all pointless to you, Wim, because your
"definitions" are entirely different than Pirsig's and so maybe were not
even discussing the same topic....'
I would gladly discuss solely on the basis of Pirsig's definitions of the
social and intellectual level and leave my alternative definitions out for
the moment ... if we could agree on what 'Pirsig's definitions' are.
He defined the intellectual level only in 'Lila's child' as 'the collection
and manipulation of symbols, created in the brain, that stand for patterns
of experience', but from your earlier writings (e.g. 23 Feb 2003
15:58:51 -0700) I understood that you don't want to use that definition.
As far as I know Pirsig never gave a definition of the social level that
clearly distinguishes it from the intellectual level (only from the
biological level: as subjective versus objective).
Tell me what definitions from Pirsig you want me to use and I will try to do
so in this discussion. We can then test whether these definitions describe
levels that are discrete in the sense explained by Pirsig in chapter 12 of
'Lila' as analogous to the relation between hardware and software in a
computer.
In 'Lila's Child' Pirsig writes about comparable conflicts ('the battle
between the Zuni priests and the brujo', 'Joan of Arc' and 'the Catholic
Church condemning Galileo'):
'I think the conflicts mentioned here are intellectual conflicts in which
one side clings to an intellectual justification of existing social patterns
and the other side intellectually opposes the existing social patterns.'
According to me Pirsig may well have changed his mind about his
interpretation of 'the theme song of the 20th century'. I don't see why
interpreting the 20th century conflicts he and you refer to and present-day
political conflict in America as intellectual conflicts would imply
inflicting 'destruction ... on the MOQ's key terms' if Pirsig himself does
so with comparable conflicts.
David B. continued 20 Mar 2004 12:48:22 -0700:
'We shouldn't associate intellectuals with the intellectual level? Why not?'
Maybe an argument that may convince you is contained in Pirsig's own words
in his letter of 27/9/03 to Paul quoted in Paul's posting of 29 Sep 2003
16:52:03 +0100:
'Like so many words, "intellectual" has different meanings that are
confused. The first confusion is between the social title, "Intellectual,"
and the intellectual level itself. The statement, "Some intellectuals are
not intellectual at all," becomes meaningful when one recognizes this
difference. I think now that the statement "intellectually she's nowhere,"
could have been more exactly put: "As an intellectual Lila is nowhere." That
would make it clearer that the social title was referred to and the dispute
about her intellectuality would not have arisen.'
Don (drose) wrote 18 Mar 2004 20:27:53 -0500:
'I believe I agreed with you that the levels are discrete. I suppose I
disagree that war is necessarily an inapt metaphor for the conflict between
the discrete levels. It's sure that Pirsig likely disagrees, since it is his
metaphor. However, it is hardly germane. Surely you agree that the levels
are in conflict?'
Pirsig may have changed his mind (see above).
In chapter 12 of 'Lila' he introduces the idea that the levels are discrete
thus:
'This classification of patterns is not very original, but the Metaphysics
of Quality allows an assertion about them that is unusual. It says they are
not continuous. They are discrete. They have very little to do with one
another. Although each higher level is built on a lower one it is not an
extension of that lower level. Quite the contrary. The higher level can
often be seen to be in opposition to the lower level, dominating it,
controlling it where possible for its own purposes. ... An excellent analogy
to the independence of the levels, Phaedrus thought, is the relation of
hardware to software in a computer.'
This does not imply a type of conflict in which both parties are equally
able to 'win' and that could be aptly referred to as 'war'.
Don (drose) wrote 16 Mar 2004 20:05:01 -0500:
'The levels are discrete, but interactive. All levels are active at all
times. Which level is ascendant at any given time is constantly in flux.'
and asked 18 Mar 2004 20:27:53 -0500:
'Is your problem with this statement or with my admittedly simplistic
description of the relationship between the q-levels?'
I agree that the levels interact to a limited extent. Too limited in fact to
call it 'war'. I don't know what you mean with a level being 'ascendant'.
Don (drose) wrote 16 Mar 2004 20:05:01 -0500 that he didn't understand my
statement:
'They can motivate their behaviour using intellectual patterns of value of
different quality.'
and added:
'As a rule, people don't actively motivate their behaviour.'
My statement can be explained with Pirsig's description (see above):
'intellectual conflicts in which one side clings to an intellectual
justification of existing social patterns and the other side intellectually
opposes the existing social patterns.'
Please note that 'social patterns' is almost synonymous with 'patterns of
behaviour' for me, if you subtract hard-wired, biological behaviour.
Your statement that people usually don't actively motivate their behaviour
is the exact starting point of the way in which I distinguish between social
and intellectual patterns of value: Social patterns of value are the
patterns of behaviour that don't need motivation for their continued
existence (and aren't based on DNA-copying either). Intellectual patterns of
value are patterns formed by the exceptions to that 'rule': the patterns in
the motivations that people DO give for (a small part of) their behaviour.
More general: the patterns in the explanations that people give for their
behaviour and for the rest of their experience. That doesn't contradict
Pirsig's definition of the intellectual level: people 'explain experience'
by collecting and manipulating symbols that stand for patterns of
experience.
Leland wrote 16 Mar 2004 17:41:30 -0600:
'the lower levels have different (and often diametrically opposed) goals
from the levels above. For instance, q-biology wants nothing more than to
eat, sleep, defecate and procreate (with no concern for who is being eaten,
defecated on, or procreated with). It's the ultimate selfish level, because
it's all about the self. Q-society wants to build a structure where people
can live together in relative peace and prosperity under a strict set of
rules and codes of conduct. This is in direct opposition to q-biology.
Similarly, q-intellect wants to uncover the truth about everything,
regardless of existing social structures.'
You are writing about q-biology, q-society and q-intellect WANTING things.
Wanting things implies motivating your behaviour. So you are not describing
biological, social and intellectual patterns of value themselves, but
intellectual representations of them. Rephrasing Pirsig's words: you are
describing intellectual conflicts in which some cling to intellectual
justifications of behaviour in 'truth', others to intellectual
justifications of behaviour as necessary for the well-being of society and
yet others to intellectual justifications of behaviour as necessary for
(selfish) biological well-being.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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