Philip has suggested a provocotive topic and I expect this to be a
lively month.
So I'm glad I didn't go first because I was going to suggest (like Bo)
that Pirsig coined the term Subject/Object Metaphysics but luckily Diana
looked it up and sure enough the term has been kicking around for quite
awhile in the philosophy community. But here it is called the
subject/object dichotomy, and it seems to have far less authority when
it's called a dichotomy and typed in lowercase. So maybe Pirsig *was*
the first to suggest it as a metaphysics. Anybody know?
I've always had a bit of confusion about the term SOM; "you have
subjects on the one hand and objects on the other". And sometimes the
next line goes: "and you have nothing else". But other times the next
line goes: "and the differences between them are irreconcilable". I
think this comes from an overloading of the word "subject", which is
sometimes referred to as just another kind of object, and at other times
to "subjectivity"; but its forgivable that people don't say
subjectivity/objectivity all the time because it's such a mouthful. I
was confused enough about this at one point to mildly entertain that
Pirsig was suggesting SOM had "subjectivity", but this is not the case.
It would have caused me less trouble if it were just called an Object
Metaphysics. When he speaks of the gulf between subjects and objects he
really means the gulf between the subjective and objective, and so here
he is speaking of the dichotomy.
Intangible things like concepts, likes and dislikes, and emotions are
not objects so already SOM as a metaphysics is flawed, since a
metaphysics, by definition, is supposed to cover everything. So SOM does
not even qualify as a metaphysics, yet Pirsig advertises it as one and
then goes on to show that it is a very bad one.
Of course the counter-argument to this is that the SOM juggernaut
brainwashes people into believing only in objects, and wispy stuff like
concepts and emotions are not real. So to the believers in SOM, subjects
and objects ARE everything and now you have your metaphysics back. But I
ask you, who in this world really believes this? Who actually denies
having emotions? Who? One might say that emotions are a lot different
from rocks, one might say that emotions are not objective reality, one
might even admit to feeling that rocks are "realer" than emotions
(perhaps by some argument that emotions are fickle or unverifiable), but
who will say emotions are unreal, when everyone has them? Not the
busdriver. Not the Lila's of the world. Not anyone who didn't go to
college or university. Not anyone who went to college or university and
majored in history, literature, anthropology, religion, art, dance,
music, psychology, sociology, philosophy, foreign languages, political
science, and business administration. And even physics and mathematics.
And chemistry. Am I sticking my head out too far here? I don't think so.
But Pirsig isn't always so strident. He doesn't always say that SOM is
solely a belief in objects. In chapter 9 he suggests SOM can see values
but "it can't explain [them] worth a damn". This line of thinking makes
sense to me. But on the prior page he says any constructions outside
SOM's objective world are unreal. But if you pay values enough mind to
try to explain them (even though failing), don't you think they're real?
Conversely, would I bother trying to understand ghosts if I didn't think
they were real? So his second statement doesn't fly with me. I don't
think he believes it either. I think he just got carried away with
himself trying to make SOM the bad guy. I think I could come up with
more examples of this.
Diana wrote:
[SOM is] a social-intellectual split, intellectually we know it's wrong,
socially we follow it anyway.
It depends on what you mean by SOM. If you mean that SOM has trouble
understanding subjectivity by employing scientific methods then I agree
with you. If you say the man on the street doesn't believe quality,
values, and morals are real, then I disagree. Pirsig seems to want to
make both arguments.
I always thought Pirsig wrote Lila for people who were classically
trained in physics, chemistry, computer science or mathematics, because
surely only people like these, who are or were at one time steeped in
the study of things far removed from human experience, would have the
potential to believe subjective stuff were unreal. But even this is
far-fetched. The worst thing you can say about the hard sciences is that
they ignore the human experience. They have nothing to contribute in
that arena. They would if they could but they can't so they don't. And
the worst outcome from such a training is that the trained will become
dehumanized and lack a moral base. But even this is rare. Most likely
such people, if they develop problems at all, feel a sense of futility
and disconnectedness from humanity because there is no bridge that
connects their discipline to the common world they mill around in.
Pirsig ends up saying this last bit, but he thinks everyone feels this
way (when it's really about 2% of the population that does) and he
thinks it's SOM to blame (a belief no one or next to no one holds). Is
there any need to wonder why Lila didn't have the popular appeal of ZMM?
But having said all this you can still read between the lines and get a
lot from Lila and I do like the book. I'd have preferred that "the evil
thing" not be positioned as a rival metaphysics but simply a way of
thinking that develops from classical training, in particular the
scientific method. For it's this kind of training that makes clear the
great divide between the objective and subjective; and MOQ, with its
static levels and evolution by dynamic quality, is the bridge over this
divide these people are looking for.
Regards,
Glennn
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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