Wow, an entire web site devoted to ZAMM and Lila. I'm quite impressed, not
to mention overjoyed. I've always thought there should be a forum where we
Pirsig fans could discuss the MOQ and such. I just didn't know that one
already existed.
Well, here are some of my thoughts on the question:
"The subject-object metaphysics (SOM) that seems to attract so much blame
is also described as, 'a straw man, a position held by no-one'. Who exactly
does hold a purely SOM position? Who completely denies the existence of
Quality? If nobody, or very few people, who or what are we criticizing?"
There is no such thing as a "subject-object metaphysics" per se. What
Pirsig is referring to, of course, is the traditional division between mind
and matter that has dominated philosophy since the time of Descartes. The
underlying questions of all metaphysics are "what things exist?" and "what
is the nature of those things that exist?" Descartes held that both mind
and matter exist and that the existence of each is independent of the other.
There are, therefore, two things that exist. I suppose that this would be a
"purely SOM position." However, this is certainly isn't the only
possibility, and in fact, not many philosophers today hold to a duelist
metaphysics. Occam's razor (and common sense) seems to dictate that it's
more likely that the universe is only composed of one "thing". The
materialists, then, say that it's matter (and that mind is created by
matter), and the idealists say that it's mind (and that matter is created by
mind). Strictly speaking, however, these paradigms are still assuming the
mind-matter split. Pirsig's metaphysics, on the other hand, claims that
there is a more basic "thing" out of which both mind and matter arise. It's
this "pure experience" that he calls Quality. Interestingly enough, as I'm
sure Pirsig is the first to admit, this is not exactly an original position.
As we all know, William James was probably the first to introduce the idea
with his radical empiricism. As you may not know, however, Bertrand Russell
(one of the founders of the logical positivist school surprisingly enough)
also held such a view, dubbing it neutral monism.
In some ways, SOM is a straw man. Pirsig never explains exactly what he
means by it, and he treats it as some sort of monolithic beast on which
there is near universal agreement within the philosophical community and to
which MOQ represents a dichotomous alternative. This, of course, is a
rhetorical technique that he uses quite effectively, and I wouldn't
criticize him too harshly for it. His point remains that in traditional
philosophy, mind and/or matter are the most basic things possible. One is
possibly reducible to the other, but they aren't reducible to anything else.
What James, Russell, and Pirsig all maintain is that they are in fact
reducible to something else, and this something else is "pure experience".
This answers the first question of metaphysics: "what things exist?"
Pirsig then goes in Lila where neither James nor Russell had tread. He
address the second question: "what is the nature of those things that
exist?"
Going back to the original questions, then, it's fair to say that an
overwhelming majority of philosophers (and non-philosophers for that matter)
hold to some form of SOM (although we must understand that this is a very
loose term). Similarly, the same overwhelming majority denies the existence
of Quality (that is to say, they deny that there is something that is more
basic than either mind or matter). However, from a certain standpoint, no
one in there right mind truly denies the existence of Quality. You would be
hard pressed to find someone who won't admit that some things are better
than other things. Value judgments, that is, clearly exist. But they are
hard to explain in traditional metaphysics. On the other hand, they are
perfectly explainable in MOQ. They're everything! And they explain such
basic questions as why life exists and how human society is possible. Even
the most basic question of all, why does anything exist at all, is answered.
This, I believe, is where the main strength of Pirsig's argument lies.
Science can explain how the world works, but it can't explain why. MOQ can.
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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