Matthew, David B and group.
Matthew's opening post cheered me: Out of the blue a person, not
"trained" by this venerated site before (grin), yet having a deep
understanding of the MOQ. It proves (1) that there are a lot of
thinkers out there and (2) that people nowadays may start by
reading "LILA", not confused by ZMM's reputation.
At times this silly old fool manage to sound as if Pirsig's idea is
some esoteric teaching - like Madame Blavatsky's or Rudolf
Steiner's - that depends upon believers spreading the word lest it
be forgotten. The MOQ is not like that, there is no way from here
other than the quality path. No way!
Over to Matthew who wrote: >>
> There is no such thing as a "subject-object metaphysics" per se.
> What Pirsig is referring to, of course, is the traditional division
> between mind and matter that has dominated philosophy since the time
> of Descartes. The underlying questions of all metaphysics are "what
> things exist?" and "what is the nature of those things that exist?"
> Descartes held that both mind and matter exist and that the
> existence of each is independent of the other. There are, therefore,
> two things that exist. I suppose that this would be a "purely SOM
> position."
Exactly! Even if you start by saying that there is no SOM ....'per
se', it ends up there eventually.
> However, this is certainly isn't the only possibility, and in fact,
> not many philosophers today hold to a duelist metaphysics. Occam's
> razor (and common sense) seems to dictate that it's more likely that
> the universe is only composed of one "thing". The materialists,
> then, say that it's matter (and that mind is created by matter), and
> the idealists say that it's mind (and that matter is created by
> mind). Strictly speaking, however, these paradigms are still
> assuming the mind-matter split.
Right! Declaring oneself a materialist or an idealist does not help,
the mind-matter notion stays covertly at the bottom of it all.
> Pirsig's metaphysics, on the other hand, claims that
> there is a more basic "thing" out of which both mind and matter
> arise.
> It's this "pure experience" that he calls Quality. Interestingly
> enough, as I'm sure Pirsig is the first to admit, this is not
> exactly an original position. As we all know, William James was
> probably the first to introduce the idea with his radical
> empiricism. As you may not know, however, Bertrand Russell (one of
> the founders of the logical positivist school surprisingly enough)
> also held such a view, dubbing it neutral monism.
Right, Pirsig says that the quality idea isn't original ( rather the
oldest there is) but the relationship to William James is IMO a bit
strained even if he has some positive things to say about him (as
well as Northrop). Your observation about the two metaphysical
stages may explain this (see below). Regarding Bertrand Russell
my philosophy book says nothing about his 'neutral monism'.
Sound like Hegel's 'monades'.
> In some ways, SOM is a straw man. Pirsig never explains exactly
> what he means by it, and he treats it as some sort of monolithic
> beast on which there is near universal agreement within the
> philosophical community and to which MOQ represents a dichotomous
> alternative. This, of course, is a rhetorical technique that he uses
> quite effectively, and I wouldn't criticize him too harshly for it.
> His point remains that in traditional philosophy, mind and/or matter
> are the most basic things possible. One is possibly reducible to
> the other, but they aren't reducible to anything else. What James,
> Russell, and Pirsig all maintain is that they are in fact reducible
> to something else, and this something else is "pure experience".
> This answers the first question of metaphysics: "what things
> exist?" Pirsig then goes in Lila where neither James nor Russell had
> tread. He address the second question: "what is the nature of those
> things that exist?"
This is a most profound and important observation. There has been
many MOQ-like attempts at reconstructing reality, but after the first
stage (what things exist) SOM has intervened and the second
(what is the nature of those things) has petered out.
> Going back to the original questions, then, it's fair to say that an
> overwhelming majority of philosophers (and non-philosophers for that
> matter) hold to some form of SOM (although we must understand that
> this is a very loose term). Similarly, the same overwhelming
> majority denies the existence of Quality (that is to say, they deny
> that there is something that is more basic than either mind or
> matter).
Agreed to, particularly about denying quality or value or morals in a
basic sense.
> However, from a certain standpoint, no
> one in there right mind truly denies the existence of Quality. You
> would be hard pressed to find someone who won't admit that some
> things are better than other things. Value judgments, that is,
> clearly exist. But they are hard to explain in traditional
> metaphysics. On the other hand, they are perfectly explainable in
> MOQ. They're everything! And they explain such basic questions as
> why life exists and how human society is possible. Even the most
> basic question of all, why does anything exist at all, is answered.
> This, I believe, is where the main strength of Pirsig's argument
> lies. Science can explain how the world works, but it can't explain
> why. MOQ can
Like you said above: no one adheres to any SOM; one is either a
materialist or an idealist ...... but ...nota bene .... value or quality is
something subordinate to the primary reality of both camps.
Now, in the opening examples of LILA Pirsig sets out to
demonstrate that value is the primary reality, but as it is counter to
both S-O sides it's horribly difficult to bring his point home. To
prove that everything is subjective is simple (the empiricist
argument about senses vs. reality), but that is just the first
argument of the Q idea. It rejects the subjective as well!!!
The 'hot stove' argument is crucial, we have been at it several
times. Over at the MD Struan Hellier has analyzed it and found it
"fawlty". I won't discuss it here, but wish you all would read what -
for instance - the neurologist Benjamin Libet writes about nerve
signals' way from its origin to consciousness (funnily enough he
uses a very similar example as the hot stove). His work was
published in 1963 so no MOQ references of course. Also, I know
positively that Pirsig did not know about Libet when writing LILA.
**********************************'
I do not disagree with any single point of DMB's (11 Feb.)
message, just want to "twist" it into my own mould. :)
David spaketh thus:
> With all this talk about the nastiness of SOM we're in danger of
> getting that the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution sure
> seemed like a good idea at the time........etc.
Yes, it sounds like condemnation, but IMHO it's merely the 'M'
banner that the MOQ ought to wrestle away from the SOM. The
subject-object distinction per se is great value as you writes so
persuasively about. Saying this all the oldies will know that here
comes Bo's favourite idea that the S-O division IS the intellectual
level itself (SOLAQI=subject-object logic as quality's intellect)
> SOM has roots that go back nearly as far as recorded history...etc.
Yes and those roots looks uncannily like intellect's roots. If what
ZMM is about (the Greek section) is the birth of SOM, it can as
easily be seen as the birth (or coming of age) of the intellectual
level; no contradictions that I see if we drop the intellect-as-thinking
idea.
> This is where the negative side of SOM comes into the picture.
> It was great to differentiate social and intellectual values....etc
Right, but alternatively: only by the growth of intellect did social
value become visible. Before that social patterns of value had been
top notch and one does not see the peg one sits on; a new value
level "degrades" the former by moving on to a new peg (intellect)
which in turn becomes HIDDEN.
> And I think Pirsig chooses the label "SOM" because the distinction
> between subjects and objects is at the heart of this >
disassociation.....etc..
Yes, but the S-O distinction can just as well be seen as the heart
of intellect. It's the value of pursuing objectivness - AKA "truth" -
before (social) duty. A conflict that has gone on for millenia and still
fuels the Western crusade against dictatorship and despotism (for
human rights, democracy, humanism ..etc.)
SOM/Intellect degraded social value in its time, now the Quality-
idea is in the process of degrading intellect (from subject-object
METAPHYSICS to mere subject-objectivism). This is what gives
the MOQ such a revolutionary character that it even frightens me a
bit; where will this lead? Pirsig's thesis is that each value level joins
forces with second one before it (the unholy intellect-biology
alliance against society) will a "new level" join society against
intellect?
Thanks for reading.
Bo
PS.
Wonder if this made any sense to Glenn re. his last post to David
Buchanan?
PPS
Thanks Andreas for your "platypus" message. I feel a bit out of my
depth in these practical matters, but it made great sense.
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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