John, Hamish and squad,
John wrote
>I have been reading Pinker's 'How the Mind Works', which explores mental
>functioning from the bases of evolutionary theory and information theory.
I have read Pinker's book (and his earlier one The Language Instinct) and I
did try to bring it up once before on MD
http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/0003/0014.html
http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/0003/0006.html
>I'll elaborate on his understanding of the emotions because I happen to
>think that one of the real problems with a view of the intellect as the
>highest order static value is that it just doesn't do justice to the
>complexity of life, in which emotions play a powerful and significant role.
>This accords with my experience, both personal and in working as a
>therapist, where intellect is as much a problem as an advantage.
Indeed. As I see it Pinker's work highlights a basic flaw in Pirsig's work,
namely his reliance on the idea that the different levels are seen as
having evolved one on top of the other - he makes the analogy to software
and hardware. But it just doesn't really fit with what cognitive and
evolutionary scientists say.
It's as if he's treating the mind as if it were a black box, as if we can
only speculate as to what goes on based on what behaviors we see. But this
just isn't true, there's a great deal of information about what actually
happens in brains.
>I do not see any simple way that Pinker's understanding of the emotions can
>be incorporated into a Pirsigian worldview.
I picked up a book by Danah Zohar yesterday called "Spiritual Intelligence,
The Ultimate Intelligence". I haven't finished it yet but basically she's
arguing that neither intelligence nor emotions are sufficient to explain
human behavior. She writes:
"Physically speaking the brain consists of lots of independent 'expert
systems' some of which process colour, some sound, some tactile sensation
adn so on. When I look at the room in which I am working, all these expert
systems are bombarded by millions of pieces of perceptual data - visual,
auditory, tactile, thermal and so forth. Yet my consciousness sees the room
as a whole: I have a unified perceptual field. The mystery of how this can
possibly be so is known in neurology, psychology and philosophy ad 'the
binding problem'. How does my brain bind its disparate perceptual
experiences together."
And she says that the indications of a highly developed SQ include:
the capacity to be flexible
- a high degree of self-awarness
- a capacity to face and use suffering
- a capacity to face and transcend pain
- the quality of being inspired by vision and values
- a reluctance to cause unnecessary harm
- a tendency to see the connections between diverse things (being holistic)
- a marked tendency to ask "Why?" or "What if" questions and seek
fundamental answers
- being what psychologists call 'field independent' - possessing a facility
for working against convention.
Basically they're the qualities that lead to morality, yet don't seem to be
intellectual/rational or emotional.
Steven Mithen's book "The Prehistory of Mind" also talks about "cognitive
fluidity" which seems to be a similar concept.
hamishtmuirhead wrote:
> One or two 'quibbles' [I try to use the work in its least controversial
>aspect] :
> the 'triumph' of Reason I would argue is only in a few albeit influential
>walks
> of life [= society, I guess].
Yes and almost nobody believes it completely. Yet it's become the mythos
because it seems to be able to outsmart any other theories.
You wandered a lot after that, I'm not sure how to respond. I really don't
have time to go into Clinton/Holocaust/Death penalty. Sorry.
Anyway. The main point is Emotivism sees good as an adjective, the MOQ sees
it as a noun.
Diana
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