Hi, MFs
Interesting month to sort out all the problems we've found both in the MOQ
and our own little forum. Marco's latching proposition is a very good one.
We should have thought about it ages ago. This forum seems very appropriate
for discussing problems, and a section on the site listing our conclusions
would do us good.
Anyway, let's see what we (well, you ;) brought up this month...
>MFs
>
>I've done some processing on the problems and come up with a list.
>Personally I don't agree that all these actually are problems and I expect
>yous don't either, but in the spirit of brainstorming let's leave that for
>the time being and ask, is there anything else that ought to be included?
>
Nothing I can think of. But like Bo, I'd like to take a quick shot at those
below.
>
>QUALITY = MORALITY = REALITY
>
>1.1 Pirsig shows that morality is a type of quality, but this does not mean
>that the opposite is always true.
The original position was that Static Reality was composed of levels of
moral orders. The "morality" of atoms only means the rules by which static
inorganic patterns interract, and has nothing to do with morality as
socially defined (its usual definition). The morality of a given level is
defined by which interactions are valued at this level (in the case of human
societies this can get pretty complex). It doesn't (or shouldn't) define
what is *possible*, but what is usual and accepted. The unaccepted and
unusual is the expression of Dynamic Quality.
Morality (at whichever level) is therefore a static subset of Global
Quality. The opposite is, of course, untrue.
>
>1.2 Pirsig has proven that quality is real. However, that quality is
reality
>itself has been left almost totally unsupported.
>
Quality as Reality is, as Bo puts it, an axiom. It cannot be proven any more
that the axioms of Euclidian geometry can be. In any case, the RMP-given
"proof" of Quality being real (which we find in ZAMM, not Lila) isn't much
of a proof at all. That quality (lower-case, as that of an English
composition) is proven to exist doesn't mean that Pirsig assumption (ie.
this preintellectual perception is a guide to goodness and enlightenment) is
true. In fact, the MoQ issues a warning that it is very easy to confuse
static crap with dynamic goodness. A skeptic mind is all the more necessary
when you realize how little is *sure* or *proven*, and how many of
yesterday's truths have become lies.
As to whether the MOQ solves traditional philosophical problems first raised
by Aristotle's writings, in my view it does better than solving them, it
*dissolves* them (pardon the pun), until you wonder why on Earth did you
ever ask such a stupid question.
>1.3 Pirsig has previously made it quite clear that patterns of static
>quality can all be placed within the four levels of the MoQ, but he also
>says that morality operates between the levels. Thus morality seems to be
>quite different from patterns of quality and it's a contradiction to say
>that quality and morality are the same thing.
Ditto 1.1
Quality and Morality aren't the same. OTOH, Static Quality/Reality and
Morality are. Jonathan understandable confusion stems from the fact that
Pirsig often forget to remember that the levels aren't as separate as he
portrays them. Interaction between levels isn't frequent : it's the norm.
Values from all levels rub shoulders continuously. Therefore, any global
comprehension of a level must include the "how?" of its interactions with
the other levels. This is the "between" part of a level's moral code.
Morality and Static Quality/Reality are the same thing : patterns of values
and their relationships.
>
>1.4 For a conception to exist there has to be a counterconcept (ie, for
>there to be Good there must also be "not Good", for there to be moral,
there
>has to be immoral), but there are no counterconcepts to
>Quality/Morality/Reality.
>
The MoQ axiom (Quality) is a monism, remember ? It's in ZAMM.
And where does this strange notion of everything having an opposite comes
from, anyway ?
Oh yeah. Aristotle.
>
>QUALITY AND DYNAMIC QUALITY
>
>2.1 Pirsig doesn't adequately distinguish between Quality and Dynamic
>Quality
Since Quality has to be left undefined, this is hardly a surprise. Dynamic
Quality is the unexpected, the strange, the scandalous, the unexplainable,
therefore it has a passing ressemblance to Quality, if it was to be
contemplated in all its glory, unfiltered by human perception (a quest of
epic proportions, in and of itself).
But Quality is EVERYTHING (what you've already experienced and what you
haven't).
Quality is the event of our life. Dynamic Quality represents the juicy
bits... ;)
>
>DYNAMIC AND STATIC QUALITY
>
>3.1 The various descriptions, definitions and examples of Dynamic and
static
>quality aren't consistent with each other.
>
Well, yes... Dynamic Quality is somewhat too loose and often described as
equal with Quality, for the reasons given above (2.1). But the three
definitions given by Diana (in a former post you'd better check if you want
to understand what's below ;) all tie into one.
1. What causes changes is a new perception of what constitutes "goodness".
2. This new perception comes from a temporary relief from static perception
into dynamic perception.
3. Since Quality is the event of perception from which the (static) world
is deduced, change, (new) goodness and enlightenment all come from an act
of dynamic perception ; ie. Dynamic Quality.
>
>THE LEVELS
>
>4.1 The levels are not defined well.
How sadly true. The upper two levels have been reduced to a "social fascists
against intellectual democrats" kind of battle, totally ignoring 8000 years
(probably more, but I have to stop at the beginnings of writing) of
intellectual evolution, philosophy, science and beliefs... sad, really,
and how approprietly western-oriented.
Pirsig pet theories about the conflicts of the century have sidetracked a
perfectly good idea into the swamp of broad generalizations and poorly
thought-out hypotheses. I hope we'll be able to get out of this. Perhaps
next month... :)
>
>4.2 There is no rational way to resolve same-level conflicts.
There is no rational way to live your life. That's old ground : been there,
done that.
>
>4.3 Pirsig does not explain well how levels emerge out of underlying
levels.
>
That's a bit of nitpicking, but it is sure *interesting* nitpicking.. :)
On the other hand, I wouldn't want people to turn away from the MOQ because
it doesn't have ALL the answers. In case people have forgotten, we still
have no viable scientific hypothesis for the apparition of life, either.
I think some, like Bo, have said that RMP *has* answered. Well, yes and no.
You have to admit that it doesn't get far from broad generalizations. While
they are interesting, people are going to want more, and we should at least
offer some leads.
>4.4 The rational morality doesn't consider matters of degree. Eg, a
forestry
>corporation may be more moral than a log, but is it more moral than the
>entire rainforest?
>
>4.5 The MoQ states that a higher level "trumps" a lower level, but has a
>duty to preserve the lower level. Thus, both sides of any moral conflict
can
>always be argued with equal support from the MoQ.
>
>4.6 Using the levels as a moral guide can only work if we have complete
>information about an issue, but, as this is impossible, then the moral code
>is impractical.
>
Ditto 4.2
>4.7 Pirsig's levels aren't entirely consistent with the way neurologists
>tell us the brain actually works.
The levels are in serious need of revising, obviously. Starting from a
scientific point of view might be one good way to find a better way to cut
static reality into slices (or at least refine Pirsig's cut of the upper two
levels). After all, the MoQ must also include an eraser if it is to evolve.
>
>4.8 Quality is just what you like, so the MOQ's morality is emotivism
>
Gosh, is that a joke, or what ? This argument has been reduced to flinders a
hundred times over, first by Pirsig himself in ZAMM.
>
>EVOLUTION
>
>5.1 RMP's definition of evolution is not in agreement with conventional
>science. Evolutionary biologists do not rank humans above bacteria on any
>evolutionary scale.
Evolution is linked to the levels, therefore it is hardly surprising that
from bad premises, bad conclusions would follow. The levels are often
described in Lila as "on an evolutionary scale", by which RMP means "in
ascending moral precedence". But the levels coexists in a much more
symbiotic way that Pirsig conflict-ridden description assumes. Pirsig was
out to save a sense of morality, by basing it on reason. In doing so, he
forgot his own advice to look within for moral answers, not without.
"And what is good, Phaedrus, and what is not good... Do we need anyone to
tell us these things ?"
>
>5.2 LILA claims in various parts that Quality is the source, the track of
>evolution, and the goal. That breaks down to "Quality evolves from itself,
>towards itself on a track of Quality." This is a very difficult position
to
>explain. I believe Pirsig once explained that reality evolves from
>"low-quality" to "high-quality", but this explanation raises (at least) as
>many problems as the original position.
>
It's funny (funny-weird, not funny-haha), because for me this sentence sums
it up pretty well... :)
Quality is a mystic truth. Only when language becomes circular and
paradoxal can it point at the central tenet of mystic revelation. It
doesn't make it any easier to convince the squares that it exist, but if we
let go of an undefinable Quality then there's nothing left to save.
Anyway, Reality doesn't evolve : it changes. Empirically, we see that it
does so by becoming more complex, which is what Pirsig has, perhaps
falsely, equated with "high-quality". But I'd prefer to let morality (in
the sense of a definition of goodness, of "higher-quality") on the side of
rational thought. We have to understand that, while we know what good is,
we CANNOT explain it, nor can we describe the way to obtain it in our
endeavours.
In any way, I'm not looking to the MOQ to explain all the mysteries of the
universe to me. I think this complexity thing might be more interesting if
studied in the fields of paleonthology or mathematics. It's a subject that
requires experimentation, and philosophy is woefully short on that.
>
>FREE WILL
>
>6.1 Pirsig's explanation of free will is flawed because in order to have
>free will you must have a subject, or else who's "will" is it that is free?
>
This answer was rushed OK, and everyday I find that this is the perfect
example of Pirsig's most glaring flaw : he's no scholar, and is neither
patient nor thorough in his works.
People on this forum (including me) have already proposed what seems to me
to be a logical MOQ answer : free will is a intellectual chimera, because a
will comes from a self, and the self (as any Buddhist will tell you) is an
illusion.
Pirsig says that a person is a collection of patterns from all four levels,
and from this wonderful start he flubbers the free will problem. We act
according to what our values are, with the occasional dynamic insight
setting us on one course or another, and in the meantime our intellect
insists on getting all the credit. You can attack this all day and it
still makes sense. It even still make sense for a society to destroy or
imprison the values that threaten it. Personnal responsability doesn't
disappear, it just changes. Whether or not we have a deeper "atman" mystic
self that tries to set us on the course of "higher goodness" is a question
for mystics. Let's not overestimate ourselves. Or Pirsig, for that matter.
>
>SELF
>
>7.1 Pirsig doesn't explain how an individual being, a self, fits into the
>MOQ.
See above
>
>7.2 If we operate from the belief that there is no such thing as the self,
>and that Quality or Reality is one undifferentiated continuum, then the
>question of choice, freedom, good and morality does not arise.
>
Freedom and choice are SOM notions. They do disappear in the MOQ. Good and
Morality don't. Why is this so difficult to accept ? They seems to me to be
more than a little demagogy here.
>7.3 If there is no self and the MOQ is reduced to being only a "feel good"
>Metaphysics of Mysticism then evolution in all respects should follow a
>linear progression by itself, without any setbacks or reversals since DQ as
>an evolving force is complete and fully present at all times.
>
I can't see by which miracle the Self has anything to do with the emotivism
charge, or where does this ties with a "linear progression" of evolution.
Would somebody care to make this clearer ?
>7.4 Since all conceptions, beliefs and their counters are aspects of
>perception can "static patterns of value" have any existence outside
>perception?
Simple one : NO. Outside perception (before it, in fact) lies raw Quality.
>
>
>SPACE-TIME
>
>8.1 The MOQ describes an evolutionary process which appears to take place
>within fixed parameters of space and time, yet we know from physics that
>space-time is not fixed in this way.
The MoQ has never tackled the space time problem. We'll might have a go at
it one day. Nuff' said.
>
>
>THEM PESKY INJUNS
>
>9.1 The conjecture that Indians had some huge influence on American thought
>is never supported well.
>
>
Nutty guy writes an anthropology paper.
"Give us proof ! Give us proof !" - say the professors... (smell the
sarcasm ?)
I'm going on vacation/holidays, but I might check in before the end of the
month, if babysitting my niece doesn't take all my time... ;)
Seeya
Denis
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
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