Re: MF Discussion Topic for February 2004

From: Steve Peterson (peterson.steve@verizon.net)
Date: Tue Feb 10 2004 - 16:42:36 GMT

  • Next message: skutvik@online.no: "Re: MF Discussion Topic for February 2004"

    Hi All,

    When Wim said that we should answer as to whether "'the MoQ' is
    understood to be [Pirsig's] ideas which we can only interpret" based on
    our definitions of an intellectual pattern, my first thought was that
    while use of the possessive "Pirsig's" maintain's the intellectual
    level meaning of identifying which ideas are up for discussion, it
    loses the social pattern reference of indicating personal property. In
    other words, thinking of the MOQ as an intellectual pattern, the MOQ
    does not belong to anyone since property ownership does not exist
    intellectually. This is why when Pirsig comments on the MOQ in LC and
    other places, he often qualifies his statements or explicitly says that
    we should not take his word to be gospel. He is not right about the
    implications of the MOQ because he is Robert M Pirsig. His ideas must
    be considered based only on their intellectual quality rather than
    based on his social status as the Great Author.

    The MOQ is a pattern of thought that anyone can participate in, but it
    remains to be settled what is the particular set of Pirsig's and
    perhaps other's ideas that are referred to under the banner of "the
    MOQ." With the exception of Bo, perhaps we can agree that the MOQ is a
    root expansion of rationality based on postulating Quality as empirical
    reality that attempts to explain experience in terms of static value
    patterns and dynamic quality. Fewer of us but most of us would also
    agree that the static value patterns are understood in the MOQ to form
    an evolutionary hierarchy of inorganic, biological, social, and
    intellectual value patterns. Without these understandings, someone
    could perhaps be talking about "an MOQ" but not "the MOQ" in my
    opinion.

     From this point, we (as well as Pirsig) try to reason out the
    implications of such postulates. We (as well as Pirsig) can then say
    things like,"If I understand the MOQ correctly, there is no such thing
    as human nature," and we can be right or wrong about what the MOQ
    implies. Whether we are right or wrong depends also on how we define
    the levels, and how we define the levels is also clearly up for
    discussion--a conversation in which Pirsig himself has participated in
    LC and in his recent letter to Paul.

    So in short, I think we can talk about "the MOQ" if we have a shared
    understanding of what is essential in use of that term and we can also
    talk about our own understandings and interpretations of what "the MOQ"
    says and its implications in a manner that is consistent with the
    following quote:

    "Unlike SOM, the MOQ does not insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held
    to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one construction of things -- that which
    corresponds to the 'objective' world -- and all other constructions are unreal. But if quality or
    excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths
    to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute 'Truth.' One seeks instead the highest quality
    intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future
    this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something better comes along. One can
    then examine intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings in an art gallery, not with
    an effort to find which
    one is the 'real' painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those of value." (Ch 8)

    Though "the MOQ does not insist on a single exclusive truth," if we
    have no shared understanding of what the MOQ is then we are simply not
    talking about the same thing at all when we say "the MOQ." Perhaps we
    can agree that when we say "the MOQ" or "Pirsig's MOQ" we mean at least
    something like the following suggested definition:

    "a root expansion of rationality based on postulating Quality as
    empirical reality that attempts to an intellectual explanation of
    experience in terms of static value patterns and dynamic quality where
    static value patterns are understood to form an evolutionary hierarchy
    including inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual value
    patterns."

    Additions? Subtractions?

    Thoughts on the idea of agreeing on an essential definition of "the
    MOQ"?

    Thanks,
    Steve

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