From: Mark Maxwell (sqsqcoherence@netscape.net)
Date: Mon Mar 22 2004 - 19:48:30 GMT
From: David Buchanan <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: "'moq_focus@moq.org'" <moq_focus@moq.org>
Subject: March 2004 - Metaphysics and the mystical reality.
Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2004 19:43:00 -0700
Thanks for getting the topic off the ground, Sam. I was beginning to think
there was some kind of secret strike or something.
Sam said:
Being in a curmudgeonly mood I'm going to have a crack at confounding DMB's
expectations. The essence of my objection lies in the following two quotes:
"Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that there
is a knower and known, but a metaphysics can be none of these things. A
metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or there isn't any
metaphysics. Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind of dialectical
definition and since Quality is essentially outside definition, this means
that a 'MoQ' is essentially a contradiction in terms." (Lila chapter 5)
"The MOQ associates religious mysticism with Dynamic Quality but it would
certainly be a mistake to think that the MOQ endorses the static beliefs of
any particular religious sect. Phaedrus thought sectarian religion was a
static social fallout of DQ and that while some sects had fallen less than
others, none of them told the whole truth." (Lila chapter 30)
Sam explained:
My problem can be expressed in the following way. Assume that "the mystical
reality" is ultimately indefinable. In the first of these quotations Pirsig
identifies the indefinable with Quality as such, in the second he identifies
it with Dynamic Quality.
dmb replies:
Yes, the mystical reality is beyond definition, we agree about that, but I
think you're making a mountain out of an ant hill by objecting to the use of
two different terms for that mystical reality. The first quote is from early
in the book, when Pirsig is addressing the mystic's objection to any kind of
metaphysics. He draws a distinction that is wholly relevant to this month's
question, which is why I included it in the opener. He's admiting right up
front that any metaphysical division violates the unity of the mystical ONE,
but also draws a sharp distinction between the two. Pirsig's first division
is between that which is definable and that which is not. In MOQ terms, he's
making a between (metaphysics) static intellectual quality, which is all
about definitions and (the mystical reality) Dynamic Quality, which is
beyond all definitions. I mean, the idea is certainly there, even if the
term is not. The second quote comes 25 chapters later, where the DQ/sq split
has already been fully developed and explained so that he can freely employ
the terms. I really don't think there's any more to it than that. And in
making this split he's saying what all mystics have said...
"They share a common belief that the fundamental nature of reality is
outside language; that language splits things up into parts while the true
nature of reality is undivided. Zen, which is a mystic religion, argues that
the illusion of dividedness can be overcome by meditation. The Native
American Church argues that peyote can force-feed a mystic understanding
upon those who were normally resistant to it,..." LILA (ch 5)
Sam continued:
When Pirsig talks about Quality and the SQ/DQ division I think he talks
sense. When he talks about DQ as religious mysticism I think he talks
nonsense. To bring this out I would say two things. ...The first is a
conceptual point. If Static Quality and Dynamic Quality are the subdivisions
of Quality then Dynamic Quality cannot be the mystical reality, for the
mystical reality must be the highest term in the metaphysics (else you no
longer have One, you have Many).
dmb tries to reply:
Nonsense? Must be the highest term? Hmmm. Not certain I understand you here.
Yes, DQ and sq are metaphysical subdivisions, but again he's not yet arrived
at the split when describing Quality as beyond definition. In fact, he
doesn't get to it until chapter the middle of chapter nine, where, just
prior to the introduction of this first division, he talking about cuts of
meat in the butcher shop in terms of Quality.
"In his book Phaedrus had tried to save Quality from metaphysics by refusing
to define it, ...He had demonstrated that even though you can't define
Quality you still must agree it exists, since a world from which value is
subtracted becomes unrecognizable.
But he realized sooner or later he was going to have to stop carping about
how bad SOM was and say something positive for a change. Sooner or later he
was going to have to come up with a way of dividing Quality that was better
than subjects and objects. He would have to do that or get out of
metaphysics entirely. Its alright to condemn somebody else's bad metaphysics
but you can't replace it with a metaphysics that consists of just one word.
By even using the term 'Quality' he had already violated the nothingness of
mystic reality. The use of the term 'Quality' sets up a pile of questions of
its own that have nothing to do with mystic reality and walks away leaving
them unanswered. Even the name, 'Quality' was a kind of definition since it
tended to associate mystic reality with certain fixed concepts and limited
understandings. Already he was in trouble. Was the mystic reality of the
universe really more immanent in the higher-priced cuts of meat in the
butcher shop? ...Phaedrus had no answers."
dmb adds:
Again, Pirsig only begins to employ the term DQ in chapter nine and I think
this explains the misconception under which you are laboring. But there is
another way to get at it too. Think of it this way. If we say that Quality
refers to the mystical reality. And if Quality includes both sq and DQ, then
we are saying that both sq and DQ is the the mystical reality. This would be
hopelessly confusing. It would mean a major contradiction because sq is
defined as that which is definable and indefinable at the same time. It
would erase Pirsig's first metaphysical distinction and otherwise make a
mess of things.
Sam continued:
The second is more pragmatic. ...Pirsig's writing on mysticism seems to
imply that Quality can only be present with those like the brujo who are at
the cutting edge of their society's experience. I think this undermines his
understanding in all sorts of ways, and lies behind the following quotation:
Pirsig:
"...as long as the rituals are seen as merely a static portrayal of DQ, a
sign-post which allows socially pattern-dominated people to see DQ. The
danger has always been that the rituals, the static patterns, are... allowed
to destroy the Dynamic Quality they were originally intended to preserve."
dmb says:
Quality is only for those at the cutting edge? Not at all. Its for
meditators, motorcycle mechanics, peyote eaters and everyone else. Can't
imagine why this implication comes from Pirsig. I think he's only saying
that those at the cutting edge of society are the ones who bring about
social change just as changes in science come from those with cutting edge
ideas. Its just part of his larger case about DQ driving evolution at all
levels. Beyond the unfounded implicaton, I wonder what understandings of
Pirsig's are undermined, as you see it? I also wonder if you could explain
how the "static portrayal of DQ" quote is related to the Brujo story. I
don't follow that at all.
Sam continued:
To my mind, this quotation encapsulates what is both good and bad in
Pirsig's writing. He concedes that static patterns can enable the
apprehension of Quality; but he also reifies Dynamic Quality as what the
rituals 'were originally intended to preserve' - which I think is a mistake.
The rituals
are static representations of Quality as such, not Dynamic Quality. So a
religious (mystical) path can validly include the static patterns that
particular religious traditions have accumulated - as Pirsig himself
concedes elsewhere.
dmb replies:
He reifies DQ??? OK, now you're just being far too "inventive". After all
Pirsig's talk of "static portrayals and "certain fixed concepts", after the
many, many time he insists the mystical reality is beyond definitions, after
saying pithy and memorable things like, "Metaphysics is not reality.
Metaphysics is NAMES about reality. Metaphysics is a restaurant where they
give you a 30,000 page menu and no food." you still accuse him of reifying
DQ??? And based on a quote that complains about reification no less!!! I
think that you are quite conspicuously incorrect, sir!
Sam concludes:
In other words, I think it is an error to identify DQ with the mystical
reality, and I think that because Pirsig makes this error he is inconsistent
with his own metaphysics. Consequently I think that Pirsig's work does NOT
help us sort out the distinctions between metaphysics and the mystical
reality.
dmb does too: (Whew!)
As I've tried to demonstrate, I think the error is yours, not Pirsig's. What
you see as an inconsistency is merely a misreading on your part. The
difference between 'Quality' and 'Dynamic Quality' as referents to the
mystical reality is only the difference between ZAMM and LILA, between
pre-MOQ terms and MOQ terms. His second book only gets more specific because
he no longer refuses to do metaphysics. As such it is perfectly consistent
for Pirsig to identify DQ with the mystical reality, especially since the
first eight chapters serve as a transition from ZAMM's Quality to the MOQ's
Dynamic Quality. To the extent that the rest of your criticisms rest upon
and follow from this one misconception, I feel I have successfully defeated
your entire argument.
thanks
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