From: Valuemetaphysics@aol.com
Date: Sun Sep 12 2004 - 03:26:49 BST
MF September topic
Hi people,
This is a summary of the argument that I have been intending to make for
a while on the topic of language and the social level. It is my belief that
language, properly understood, is the equivalent at the social level of
DNA at the biological level. When I return from my holiday I shall try and
give more substance to my argument - I'm afraid that for now you have to
rely on what is in my long term memory, which will have the virtue of
brevity
if nothing else.
Mark 12-9-04: Sam should be suggesting that (functions of language - ?) at
the Intellectual level is the equivalent of (functions of molecules - DNA) at
the biological level. The functions language serves at the intellectual level
are those such as mathematics, logic, abstraction, etc.
A few things to support that.
1. I have written before about Wittgenstein's view of language, principally
that language has a 'depth grammar' which relates the words spoken/written
to their context within a form of life (lebensformen). Wittgenstein's view
of language specifically breaks down the positivist view (descending from
Descartes) that sees language as composed of distinct units of sense (ie
'clear and distinct ideas') which map clearly on to 'reality'. In contrast
to this view - very much part of SOM of course - Wittgenstein's conception
is much 'thicker'; he is the one who rejects 'flatland' most profoundly.
My earlier posts (from 2001/2002) go into this in more detail.
Mark 12-9-04: No wonder Sam completely ignores the following: "Language does
not contain value, rather, value contains language. Therefore, an MOQ
analysis of language should enquire into which evolutionary related patterns of
value contain language." Sam's account of language is not an MOQ account.
2. Two things specifically from Wittgenstein's analysis which are relevant:
i) the private language argument. A key part of the early argument in
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is the debunking of the notion
of a private
language, ie one in which the reference for words or concepts is only known
to the person developing the language. Wittgenstein shows how this is
radically confused. Language is essentially shareable and cannot be
otherwise (in
other words, language has to have some sort of public and communal 'cash
value' or else it isn't language at all).
Mark 12-9-04: This is irrelevant. The MOQ's does not draw a severe boundary
between the public and the private. Such a distinction is SOM.
ii) the notion of following a rule. Similarly, Wittgenstein argues that
rules must be public and verifiable, and embedded in a social practice.
So grammatical rules, but also things like mathematics must be embedded
in a social context which reinforces the rule and gives it its sense.
(Practice gives the words their sense) You can't have a rule which is
separate from
its 'embeddedness' within a particular lebensformen. If you try, then you
either have individual choice (hence, not a 'rule') or you have a private
language.
Mark 12-9-04: DQ creates new static rules. DQ is not public or private.
3. Now, if you follow through these elements from Wittgenstein's thought
then you have a notion of language as something which is a) essentially
social and b) embedded in concrete practices. It seems to me that this is
a key part of what Pirsig is describing when he talks about the social
level, in all its various manifestations. So, although language is not the
whole
part of what the social level is about, it is a necessary component, in
that, if there is no language, there is no social level, and language is
the way in which the social level operates and evolves. It is precisely
the equivalent of DNA - it is the building block of the social level (ie
the lebensformen or 'language game' which can be very small and local is
what the social level is built up from).
Mark 12-9-04: Many life forms are social but do not use language.
4. An input from Steven Mithven (? check name) and his book 'The Prehistory
of the Mind'. There was a biological change in the architecture of the human
brain, related to language processing, which triggered the great
advancements in human civilisation 60k - 30k years ago, ie the invention of
art, ritual
etc. This would seem to tie in quite naturally.
Mark 12-9-04: Symbolic manipulation is an evolution of intellectual
patterns, not social patterns.
5. The point about Descartes and Pirsig's revision: 'French culture exists,
therefore I am' - this is very much a part of what Wittgenstein is
debunking.
Mark 12-9-04: Culture is composed of soical and intellectual patterns in the
MOQ.
The ironic thing is that Pirsig himself is still a Cartesian (ie an SOM
thinker) when it comes to some elements of his system. Specifically, the
idea that the fourth level is about 'the manipulation of symbols' comes
crashing down if there is any truth in Wittgenstein's perspective. Which,
at least as far as the above goes, is not all that controversial any more.
What is a symbol if not a 'clear and distinct idea'? And how can it be
manipulated in the way that Pirsig wants (eg in higher mathematics) if there
is no
social lebensformen within which the rules governing that manipulation can
make
sense?
Mark 12-9-04: There is no DQ in 'Wittgenstein's perspective.'
Once more, I think Pirsig's conception of the fourth level has more
holes than a piece of fermented milk from a mountainous canton in central
Europe.....
Regards to all
Sam
Mark 12-9-04: Complete and utter ignorance of, "Language does not contain
value, rather, value contains language. Therefore, an MOQ analysis of language
should enquire into which evolutionary related patterns of value contain
language."
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