From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Sat Feb 26 2005 - 22:53:39 GMT
Hi Wim, Matt, Nathan, all,
A few comments. Firstly, the article from the TLS was originally submitted
with my post of 22/2, which was split by the moderator into three posts,
that of 22/2, that of 23/2, and the moderator's post of 24/2. The most
important element from the article that I wanted to have established
reasonably swiftly was the point that "emotions are active, cognitive states
for which we are responsible, rather than irrational, physiological
feelings that overcome us against our will". Whilst this is still contended
in some quarters, I think it well enough established to be worth working
from. As such I agree strongly with Matt's point: "If Pirsig identifies
emotion at the biological level, it won't work because it's too
reductionistic" and is incompatible with "contemporary understandings in the
philosophy of mind and neuroscience" as I described them in the original
question. In some of the debates that we have had earlier on MD this has
seemed to be an assumption behind some viewpoints. I think it needs to be
argued for positively, not just assumed (this is the 'enlightenment bias
against emotion' that I mentioned earlier).
Nathan asked:"whether [I] can agree that emotion stems from motivation". I
take this to correspond to the question of whether emotions are intentional
(in the philosophical sense of 'intentional', ie they refer or are 'about
some aspect of the world'). So my answer is definitely 'yes'. I'm quite a
fan of Nussbaum, and her book 'Upheavals of Thought', which I read last
year, is her main statement of 'neo-Stoicism' which sees emotions as
intentional in just this way.
Some specific points from Wim's post:
> I don't see the problem:
> Intellectual patterns of value don't need "access" to DQ, because they
> already embody static intellectual quality, which is (an embodiment from
> the
> point of view of other levels and a measure of) DQ. Neither do patterns of
> value of the other levels. Taken together all static quality can be
> (contradictory) identified with DQ...
That's a point of view which I think is probably right, but it's not the
view of Pirsig, as articulated by some of his defenders here. I'd be
interested to hear what they say.
> I don't like the suggestion that "emotion" rather than "feeling" should be
> understood as a broader term for "primary discernment of value", at least
> at
> the upper three levels.
Had I argued for that? It's an interesting line of thought.
> "Experience" (without "sensual" or "sentient") and
> "quality" are perfect broader terms.
How do we know that when, eg, we use 'experience' in this broader way, we're
not simply letting language 'go on holiday' and mislead ourselves into
thinking that we know more than we actually do? That is, we have a pretty
good idea of what 'experience' means in the normal course of events, but
what does it mean when it is being used in this extended, 'broader', sense?
That's not clear to me.
> The idea that something should be
> primary to something else in the MoQ is for me a wrong extrapolation from
> Pirsig's argumentation in "Zen ...", 'Quality first, objects and subjects
> derived' (yes, also by himself). The MoQ as elaborated in "Lila" doesn't
> need DQ to be primary to sq or (some parts of) sq to be primary to DQ. DQ
> and sq are a contradictory identity.
I agree, but many don't.
> The wrong turn in your argumentation above is where you talk about
> "biological manifestions of these emotions [at higher levels]". These
> manifestations are not "biological" in the MoQish sense of the word, as
> then
> don't affect the biological patterns of value, the patterns of value
> configured by DNA.
Does blushing have a biological pattern as part of its overall explanation?
I would say yes, and it is to that element that I referred.
Finally, Matt's point about discrete levels, which I think is a bit of a
kicker. Let's remind ourselves of what Pirsig says:
"...static patterns of value are divided into four systems: inorganic
patterns, biological patterns, social patterns and intellectual patterns.
They are exhaustive. That's all there are. If you construct an encyclopedia
of four topics-Inorganic, Biological, Social and Intellectual--nothing is
left out. No "thing," that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be
described in any encyclopedia, is absent."
Rushing ahead of much argument, it seems to me that emotion doesn't fit into
any one of those four levels, but is transitive across them. Rather like
'person' which is a 'forest' of static patterns, emotions seem to similarly
evade a pigeonholing. Does this make it a 'platypus' in the MoQ?
Sam
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