From: Valuemetaphysics@aol.com
Date: Wed Mar 16 2005 - 16:00:44 GMT
dmb:
'...if we're talking about where such things [emotions] should be
categorized within the four levels of static quality, as Pirsig seems to be doing in putting
feeling at the biological level, it seems that the social level is the only
reasonable place to put that list of emotions.'
Mark 16-03-05:
I have some sympathy with dmb's view, but i do not agree with it.
Here is a suggestion:
'Emotions are sophisticated patterns of biological values conditioned by
social and intellectual patterns of values.' (MM 22-02-05)
Thus emotions are biological in nature, which serve social patterns when
good, and undermine social patterns when bad. This view has wide textual support:
(1) The MOQ seems to classify compassion as a pattern of social cohesion
driven by strong biological emotions. When these two are combined with intellectual
patterns of quality the result is a strong force for the good, as in the abolition of
slavery. When compassion opposes intellectual quality, however the result can be
foolishness or even evil.
(2) Genuine compassion and talk about compassion often have different
purposes.
When compassion is talked up intellectually there sometimes emerges a
certain aroma of unction and piousness that makes me suspicious. Some preachers
use compassion the way Uriah Heep [Heep is a character in Dickens David
Copperfield] uses humility, i.e. to advance themselves.
(3) The narrative of ZMM is dominated by the compassion of the narrator for his son
even though he doesn talk about it as such, and when Phaedrus says Lila has
quality he is speaking compassionately and is held in contempt for this by Rigel
[the lawyer character epitomising social values in LILA]. Rigel is arguing that Phaedrus
compassion for Lila is damned foolishness. Phaedrus struggles in subsequent chapters
to show that it is intellectually sound.
(Pirsig 2002e in McWatt Phd Dec 2004 footnote 117 P.212)
Mark 16-03-05:
There are other indications that emotions have a biological nature:
This opposition of levels of static patterns offers a good explanation of why
science in the past has rejected what it has called values The values it has
rejected are static social prejudices and static biological emotions. When social
patterns such as religion are mixed in with the scientific method, and when
biological emotions are mixed in with the scientific method these values are
properly considered a source of corruption of the scientific method.
Science, it is said should be 8value free, and if these were the only kind of values
the statement would be true.
However, the Metaphysics of Quality observe that these two kinds of values
[i.e. the biological and the social] are lower on the evolutionary ladder than the
intellectual pattern of science. Science rejects them to set free its own higher
intellectual pattern [of truth]. The Metaphysics of Quality calls this a correct
moral judgment by science. (Pirsig, 1995a, p.15)
(SODV quoted in McWatt PhD P.116)
For a person who is not yet enlightened the way to avoid confusion may be
to ask of each desire, 8Is this a common ego desire? Is this a common sensual
desire? If not, then maybe the quality which stimulates the desire is Dynamic.
If it is a common sensual or egotistic desire, however, then one should wait a few
days and see if the desire weakens or goes away. Sensuality and egotism have a
way of waxing and waning in the manner of the emotions, whereas Dynamic
Quality tends to be steady and patient, in the manner of Gandhis favorite
Christian hymn, Lead Kindly Light
(Pirsig, 1997a quoted in McWatt PhD P.117)
In the third box are the biological patterns. (Pirsig, 1995a, p.14)
These include the functions, structures and processes of biology (such as
reproduction and DNA) studied by geneticists, microbiologists, botanists and
zoologists. Instances of biological quality include health and physical pleasure.
(McWatt PhD P.104)
Mark 17-03-05:
That emotions do not have a social nature is supported by the following:
The social patterns in the next box down include such institutions as family,
church and government. They are the patterns of culture that the anthropologist and
sociologist study. (Pirsig, 1995a, p.14)
For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the social patterns, denoted by the
MOQ, tend to refer only to behaviour that is learnt through imitation (such
as rituals and social customs) rather than hard-wired genetic behaviour
(as, for instance, observed in ant colonies). As with his definition of 8intellectual, Pirsig
justifies this cutting-off point on the grounds that if the term social is expanded
too far, it becomes meaningless. (ibid P.99-100)
It appears that the evolutionary purposes of social patterns of value (such as ritual
and custom) were developed to preserve and improve biological patterns. To the
extent that social customs and institutions reproduce, preserve, and protect the
relationships within a given society for the good of that society, they may be
regarded as 8social quality. (ibid P.101)
Mark 17-03-05:
If we view emotions in a social context, we may say that biological patterns
or emotional states, may be learned through imitation - carrot and stick to
put it bluntly. But the biological nature of emotions is being used to either
improve or undermine social cohesion, Pirsig: 'The MOQ seems to classify
compassion as a pattern of social cohesion driven by strong biological emotions.'
Therefore, the suggestion that, 'Emotions are sophisticated patterns of
biological values conditioned by social and intellectual patterns of values'
provides a good description of where emotions operate in the MoQ.
Mark
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