Bodvar Skutvik (skutvik@online.no)
Sat, 1 Nov 1997 06:06:00 +0100
Hugo wrote (29 Oct.)
> I disagree with this (I am not sure where exactly Pirsig stands on this
> issue). I consider the social level and social values much, much older.
> Sociality is part of most everything of the life we see and enjoy around us.
> Your view of the levels might be much more common, though. In Denmark a guy
> named Simo Koeppe (da: Køppe) wrote an interesting book called 'The levels
> of reality', in 1990; it is a very thorough analysis of the new 'wholistic'
> or systemic sciences where the he uses the same major levels as Pirsig. He
> actually puts the social and intellectual (I think he calls it the
> psychological level) in parallel - next to each other on top of the
> biological level, on top of the physical level. I belive this is wrong, and
> that it comes from trying to preserve the mind (or soul) as something
> specifically human, when moving towards an evolutionary and hierarchic
> view. I myself follow Gregory Bateson (see his Mind and Nature for
> instance) on this issue; Bateson argues that mind is something which we
> share with the rest of the living, - 'the big step' is not from animal to
> man, but from non-life to life. I have argued before on LS on this, saying
> that if we bend Bateson into a Pirsigian shape, we get a mind-less level
> and three levels of mind, the first step being a mind (a subject)
> reflecting its environment (or better: 'umwelt' - the environment as it
> sees it), the second step being minds mutually reflecting other minds, and
> the third step being a mind reflecting itself. (And I do see this as a
> definition of the levels, even though some say that can't be done.)
> If we are to place the revolutions of stepping onto a new level in our
> evolutionary history, I would point to the becoming of life, the cambrian
> revolution, that is - the becoming of multicellular (social ;-) life (at
> least this is the earliest significant trace we have of the social step in
> the history of life - see Stephen Jay Goulds 'Wonderful life'). And we are
> of course in the midst of the third revolution.
I agree - and disagree - with you Hugo. The disagreement is about
the "age" of Society. Pirsig's position (IMHO) is that ALL
levels start as part of - and indistinguishable from - the parent
level. The social values were for aeons in the service of life
(according to Magnus a biological body is a society), but as a moral
order in its own right it is younger and more like the picture
that Martin paints. The first (human) social manifestation beyond
family (which is a transient stage) was the clan/tribe cooperation.
In this context the individual still was a mere member - in Jaynes'
book it is argumented that early humans were mindless (in MOQish
d
not value freedom from society), but a little bit freer than in the
family clutches (Yes, look, the intellect was already budding, but
still in the service of society!).
I find your exposition good. Particularly the section about mind as
seen by Bateson versus Köppe interested me greatly. I have Bateson's
"Mind and Nature", could you give the page where he elaborates on
this? The bending of him into Pirsigean shape I have a few comments
to: Mind in this (umwelt) sense is the very same that I tend to call
"intelligence" (any organism's universe depending upon its neural
complexity) to distinguish it from the Intellectual level of MOQ.
Your ladder of minds above matter i a "tempting" solution
(Life=reflecting environment; Society=reflecting other minds;
Intellect= reflecting itself), BUT IS IT QUALITY METAPHYSICS???????
I ask because I am not sure. I notice that you use the expression
"levels of mind". Can it be understood that you regard Life as well
as Society and Intellect as levels of mind? If so why not include
Matter? Unless you do, it is the old story of
matter-at-a-moment-in-time-becoming-imbued-with-mind; a larger
version admittedly, but still good old SOM. I harp so much
on this because you are the only one who shows a definite position
on this crucial issue. Before I read Pirsig, Colin Wilson was my guru
- and he constantly spoke about "deeper levels", and it sounded good
and "spiritual" and promising as long as it lasted, but I soon butted
into SOM's shapeless figure. His "ladder of selves" were hardly
objective, and however "deep" they were nonetheless subjective, i,e:
just figments of our minds, and I felt back at square one again and
again.
Pirsig's idea is (Western) philosophy's first head-on confrontation
with the Mind/Matter villain, and this is MOQ's essence. If mind as
an entity beside matter is introduced nothing is won. I have
said that everything or nothing is mind in MOQ. As I touch
upon in the "Book Review" there are so many impressive theories of
stages and levels that evolution is propagating along, but
unless Pirsig's revolutionary clean slate operation is observed,
it ends up in the Subject/Object trenches.
Welcome and thanks to Martin for dumping such a big question in our
midst, and to Hugo for giving me an occasion to "take off" on my
favourite tangent. Please follow it up. Are we at odds or am I
inscrutable?
Bodvar
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