Doug Renselle (renselle@on-net.net)
Mon, 3 Nov 1997 22:11:51 +0100
Needed Term Definitions:
dualism
existentialism
idealism
materialism
monism
noumena
Occam's [Ockham's] Razor
ontology
phenomenalism
presupposition
THE NOUMENON OF QUALITY - By Martin Striz -
[Reviewed and marked by Doug Renselle - NOV1997. My comments (all in
brackets) assume the MoQ context, unless specifically stated otherwise.]
Phenomena are the experiences or sensual appearances of things by a
perceiver. They can be distinguished from noumena, or
things-in-themselves. The perceiver, or subject, experiences sense data
about an object, but as to whether the actual object is experienced has
been a controversy in philosophy. The main cause of this controversy is
the ontological presuppositions that one holds-usually either
Materialism, Idealism, or a metaphysical dualism that incorporates both
subjects and objects. Phenomenology is a philosophical tradition that
originated with Husserl and attempts to examine the ontological nature
of reality from a presuppositionless view point. This tradition
culminated in Jean-Paul Sartre's work "Being and Nothingness."
o It is my intention to show that none of the three
presuppositions mentioned, which are individually held by almost
everyone, are a logical or practical framework for reality. They
cannot make complete sense out of the questions of reality that can
be posted.
o Furthermore, it is my intention, by using the argument espoused
in "Being and Nothingness," to:
o show that phenomenology is not a presuppositionless
framework, and
o [show] that any ontological viewpoint will have some
basic presuppositions.
It is up to us to select the best one [presupposition] in terms of its
sense, goodness, and practical utility. I will conclude by offering one
[a presupposition] that is both rational and practical.
[MATERIALISM]
First let us examine each of the three main ontological cases in turn.
Materialism posits an ontological framework of reality in which all
real things are of one nature, that being objects. In phenomenological
terms they are noumena, things-in-themselves. Objects are independent
of a potential perceiver, static in their existence, follow strict
'natural' and logical laws, and contain the perceivable data that a
'subject' can obtain. However, a 'subject' is not a real entity
in-itself. It is only real in the sense that it is objective material
arranged in a state where perception is possible. In mind-body
considerations, a mind is the result of neural and chemical interactions
in a physical brain.
Materialism fails in that it posits a 'nature' of existence that it
cannot possibly justify. This nature is the object devoid of
perceivable values, the noumenon. As Locke pointed out, if we try to
talk about an object aside from the sense data the subject perceives, we
find ourselves talking about nothing at all.
[One may infer from this interpretation of noumenon that it is an object
which is undefinable. In SOM-land this is a self contradiction, right?
In MoQ-land DQ is the realm of the undefined, right? DQ is NOT an
object, right? Noumenon manifests a desperate SOM grasping for that
which (TLS understands) reality is in: Quality. Without redefining the
term it appears that we must leave it as one of the wasted accoutrements
of the now subordinated SOM philosophy. 2NOV97 Doug Renselle.]
[Materialism Problem 1:]
Perception is a purely empirical activity, and the positing of an
underlying object that contains or holds the empirical data, but is not
the perceivable data itself, is completely meaningless. It cannot be
justified by empirical means, however it cannot be justified by rational
means, either. [How to solve this? Complementarity. 2NOV97 Doug
Renselle.]
What logic would necessarily lead one to conclude that a non-sensual,
objective entity underlies the data of experience? None. [The logic of
complementarity? 2NOV97 Doug Renselle.] The data of experience can
exist in-themselves just as easily, and the underlying 'object' becomes
unnecessary and easily eliminated with a swipe of Occam's Razor.
[Division/disjunction may also be perceived as FAULT or at best
intentional change toward incompleteness/simplicity. SOM is either/or.
MoQ and complementarity are both/and. Nature, by observation, pursues
increasing both complexity and simplicity - not just increasing
simplicity. See Ilya Prigogine's "Order Out of Chaos." Prigogine's
entropy has a production term AND a dissipation term. The SOM classical
second law of thermodynamics assumes only dissipation. 2NOV97 Doug
Renselle.]
[Materialism Problem 2:]
The object has over time become 'intuitively obvious' to Western
thinkers, but in reality offers nothing useful. And since it is
unjustified, unnecessary, and meaningless, there are no logical grounds
for taking it into consideration as an ontological framework.
However, aside from its unjustifiable position, there is no practical
use in accepting the Materialist position. In fact, there are
contradictions and problems inherent with this ontological framework, so
it must necessarily be thrown out.
[Martin, this discussion reminds me of the commentary of both sides in
the heated wave vs. particle debate which raged for centuries between
the Huygens and Newton camps. Note that the intrinsic complementarity
of MoQ fixes the problems of the ancient ISMs the same way that Bohr's
complementarity fixed the wave-particle duality problem. Assuming that
Ockham's razor is a SOM tool of absolute truth and concomitant biformal
dichotomies, my perception is that the excision of Ockham's razor might
be the more beneficial recursion for us to pursue. It is, IMhO, no
longer a useful tool in MoQ-land. I assume that you assume a SOM-land
context as you write this: as you said, "Please let me know if I'm
being overly-rationalistic." 2NOV97 Doug Renselle.]
[Materialism Problem 3:]
For example, in the view of Materialism, objects, or substances, are
continuous through space and time. This is part of their independent
and static nature.
However, quantum physics has shown that on the subatomic level particles
consist of quanta, which are essentially packages of existence. These
quanta appear and disappear rapidly and continuously, so that an
'object' is never completely there at once. Since objects do not
satisfy in practice their own ontologically objective nature, they are
contradictory within the framework of Materialism! Since quantum
physics is based on materialistic presuppositions, Materialism defeats
itself.
[Materialism Problem 4:]
Another example is the free will paradox. (Although determinism does
occur to a degree, in that one's choices are always pre-determined by
the limits of one's environment, the ability to act or not to act is
always a free choice. That is, if one can either go to the movies or to
the mall, one has been relegated in a deterministic sense to these two
options because they may be the only viable choices on a particular
Saturday, but no causal event goes into the choosing of one or the
other, or of simply choosing to stay home.)
Within the Materialistic framework, this freedom of will cannot exist
because any choice or thought made by the mind must be reduced to a set
of chemical or neural interactions within the brain. And since objects
function on a causal basis and adhere to strict natural laws, any choice
must be caused. So, if one chooses to go to the mall, this thought is
formed by neural signals. Taking causality into consideration, what
triggered those neural signals? If one has never made such a choice
(i.e. taken that neuro-chemical path) before, there is no precedence on
which one to take. Do the neurons or chemicals interact randomly to
make a choice? This would violate their causal nature. So Materialism
cannot account for the ability to choose or make new thoughts. These
are just two [four?] simple examples, but hopefully the point is clear.
There is no practical use for Materialism, but in fact it is quite
unuseful in practical affairs.
[IDEALISM]
Leaving Materialism aside, or rather discarding it wholly, let us now
turn to Idealism. This framework also posits an ontological monism,
however in this case any real thing is a subject, or a conception of
that subject. The whole of reality is of this particular nature.
Consciousnesses and subject-based 'things' differ from phenomena in that
the latter are considered to be fallible, sensual appearances of real
noumena, while the former are reducible to conscious thoughts not based
on any noumena, and these thoughts or concepts constitute reality. In
this case the 'subject' is not a special state of objects, but rather
objects are false intuitions about things that are nothing more than
concepts that subjects hold.
Idealism can logically justify the nature of its reality (thoughts) by
employing the idea of empirical means of gaining knowledge, however
Idealism cannot logically account for several concepts without positing
additional concepts that are unjustifiable.
[Causality:]
For example, causality. The notion of causality is that given the
occurrence of A, the occurrence of B will always follow. Causality is a
very very important concept. It is the force that makes science and
experimental repetition valid, and indeed gives us the certainty to
believe a chair we sit on will hold us up and not fall, or fly straight
up for unknown reasons. Causality is central to our understanding of
reality. In the context of perception, the Materialist held that the
occurrence of B, the phenomenon, was caused by the occurrence of A, the
noumenon. This made sense until we realized the noumenon was an
unjustifiable proposition. For the Idealist, the occurrence of B, the
thought, is apparently caused by nothing, since thoughts are the whole
of reality.
[Idealism Problem 1:]
Without any other 'thing' out there, there is no thing to produce
thoughts aside from the creative will of the subject.
[Idealism Problem 2:]
Then the whole of reality is reduced to whatever the subject wills it to
be, which is a contradiction to how we know reality functions (by
[probabilistic] causation that is usually independent of ourselves).
We certainly don't will to have our houses robbed, but it happens. So
what causes the occurrence of 'things' and 'events' in the subject? The
Idealist answer is usually that another mind, or subject, exists on a
higher plane of existence. This mind, often called Big Mind or World
Spirit, contains within itself all subjects and their concepts, and all
of reality can be reduced to concepts within Big Mind.
[Idealism Problem 3:]
The problem for the Idealist now becomes that Big Mind cannot be
empirically determined, but the entirety of their position originally
rested on the empiricist method of gaining knowledge! Now they have had
to resort to rationally inventing a concept to reconcile Idealism with
causality.
However, when inspected, it really amounts to nothing more than what was
just stated, it is an invention. Much like the noumenon, it cannot be
justified, only supposed. Anything else could likewise be supposed,
including an infinite regress of Big Minds, each on a higher plane of
existence than the former.
As for the practicality of Idealism, this should be even more clear.
Intuitively we tend to assume noumena exist, and the rejection of
noumena by Idealism clearly shows its lack of intuitive or rhetorical
soundness. It does not make practical sense to say an elephant charging
at one's self is merely a concept in the mind, an intuitive illusion,
when that elephant can easily kill you. It can be answered that the
concept becomes glaringly real when you consider that your belief in
yourself, the subject, is also a concept. And so it becomes the case of
the elephant illusion charging at the self illusion. All this amounts
to is that the terms 'subjective concepts' or 'illusions' are
unnecessary descriptions of a charging elephant, which the Idealist
admits is a real and 'objective' event by saying the subject and
elephant are equal (the elephant is no longer 'just' a concept of the
subject, but it is obviously not of the same nature as the subject
either, so its 'objectivity' is all that remains). The word 'illusion'
or 'concept' becomes meaningless and unnecessary if every real thing is
one. These unnecessary descriptions just complicate matters and can be
eliminated with the swipe of Occam's Razor. They are not practically
useful for the sole reasons that it is not practically useful to treat a
charging elephant as merely a concept, and to treat the objectivity of
the situation as a false intuition!
[DUALISM]
Having thrown out Materialism mainly for its logical absurdness, and
Idealism mainly for its practical absurdness, let us now turn to a
metaphysical position that is often considered to be a common ground
between the two, or an inclusion of both. This is the framework of
subject-object dualism which states that there are two primary forms of
reality, having different natures, and interacting by the process of
perception. The object realm is physical, continuous, causal, and
follows set laws, while the subject realm is creative, changing,
unpredictable, and perceives the object realm.
The main problems with subject-object dualism, aside from sharing many
of the logical and practical inconsistencies with Materialism and
Idealism, are found in the interaction of subjects and objects, and the
many disjunctions formed by this line of thinking.
[Dualism Problem 1:]
Having completely different natures, subjects and objects are deeply
divided.
[Dualism Problem 2:]
Perception is an attempt to interact between the two realms, but it is a
fallible form of interaction that is often mistaken and misguided.
The subject cannot actually know about an object as it exists; only by
sensation and further interpretation of sense data, and then by
conceptualization, can a subject get to know about the world. This is a
fallible form of gaining knowledge since the subject necessarily
'subjectifies' its perceptions. In all other respects, it is utterly
trapped within its own realm.
[Dualism Problem 3:]
Some dualists may disagree with this view and posit the notion that a
subject 'comes out of itself' to experience objects.
This is a position that cannot be justified and is met with much
opposition, furthering the uselessness of subject-object dualistic
thinking.
[Dualism Problem 4:]
The subject-object division causes people to concentrate their efforts
in one half of the dualism or the other, producing such divisions as
romantic or classic, theoretic or aesthetic, nature or nurture, Eastern
or Western, and scientific or artistic modes of thinking.
People from the West find it difficult to communicate with and
understand people from the East because of such disjunctions. The
impracticality of this mode of thought is quite evident.
PHENOMENOLOGY
Casting subject-object dualism away with Materialism and Idealism, and
without further ado, let us examine phenomenology. To the
phenomenologist following Husserl's example,
[Phenomenology Problem 1:]
one must start examining the ontological nature of existence without any
presuppositions.
This line of thinking practically culminated with Jean-Paul Sartre's
famous existentialist book "Being and Nothingness." However, upon
further investigation, one will find that Sartre indeed starts with many
presuppositions of his own. For example, he is an ardent atheist and
never gives any justification for this view, but rather pronounces it as
a given fact. Sartre and other phenomenologists also treat the noumena,
the things-in-themselves, as objects much the same way Materialists do.
An object of the noumenal kind is not just a thing-perceived, but it
includes many of the characteristics of materialistic objects. These
include continuity, rigidity, causality, and so forth. In fact, Sartre
concludes that subjects are 'nothingness,' they are negations of
'being.' All the world consists of as 'actual existences' is the
noumena. This is for all practical purposes a Materialist account of
ontology!
If one were to start from a truly presuppositionless ontological stance,
where would one start? There is none.
[Phenomenology Problem 2:]
There can be no presuppositionless stance since all rationality and
investigation requires a necessary foundation to start from.
[SEGUE]
Thus far we have investigated Materialism, Idealism, their inclusive
counterpart called subject-object dualism, and a contradictory
phenomenological account. Western thinking is in one way or another
completely made up of these views, however our investigation has led to
the conclusion that they are all somewhat irrational and impractical.
But instead of stopping here and letting the whole of this essay turn
into one pessimistic scorn at reality, I will advance a positive,
rational, and practical ontological framework for reality.
(To be completed.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm ready for the lashing. :-)
Martin
[Martin,
No lashing here. I hope my marks above are useful. When will TLS get
to see '...the rest of the story?'
Doug Renselle.]
-- "...the Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one construction of things--that which corresponds to the 'objective' world--and all other constructions are unreal. But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute 'Truth.'"Robert M. Pirsig Page 100, "Lila" hard-bound, Bantam, 1991.
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