Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Sun, 9 Nov 1997 05:08:42 +0100
Martin:
--> So again this gives me the impression that at least some of you believe
DQ has intentions of its own (and an essence). If this is the case, then
from the argument above, DQ would definitely be rejected by Sartre.
<--
I am not quite sure I agree with your using essence in this sense, having
to do with 'intent'. I think the aristotelian use of essence, in his
distinction between accidental and essential features of something, has to
do with our structuring of the world into categories. This, I agree, might
be done from the viewpoint of intent - what use we can make of a thing, as
in the distinction between junk and quality tools.
But when we distinguish fire, women and dangerous things as one category,
from more harmless and predictable things as another, this is beyond our
intent and seems to have more to do with our adaptation to a larger world
beyond our powers.
This might be what Sartres argument is about, but I dont quite get it yet.
If he is saying that some larger power (god) having all-pervasive
intentions is unthinkable, because then the world would both be in this
intent and in its actual state, then I dont believe that to be a solid
argument, given that we can readily first imagine some tool and then go
ahead and create it. I simply do not see the contradiction.
My own position on this is somewhere in between the utter randomness and
the intentional creation. If the world 'in it self' is creative, as I have
tried to picture it before, if there is a potency, a force towards
actuality, then the 'utter randomness' picture is not quite true.
If you pick a random point at a circle, with some degree of precision, and
the go ahead and calculate the probability of picking exactly that point,
you will get a very small probability, smaller the more precisely you
specify the point. Now if there is some force towards the 'selection' of a
point on the circle, lets say you are throwing small sticks on the circle
from a distance, then eventually one will be picked.
This is how I see the arguments saying for instance that 'the probability
of life arising was one in a billion and the probability of the becoming of
humans through evolution are one to 10^40' or something. These numbers are
calculated on the assumption of a nature without any intent, but also
without any potency towards actualization.
My position is that there were no intent in the becoming of the universe,
our becoming on earth was not determined ahead of each of the
actualizations that are part of our natural history (off course, intent
came into the world when life arose, intent being having a goal, and hence
having a picture of where to go, having some picture of the world and
acting in accordance).
On the other hand we are not here as the result of a very improbable
accidence. The very unlikely events we see happening every day, happen
because there is something forcing them to happen - there are only lottery
winners every week because enough people try to win.
This creative force in our world (Pirsigs dynamic quality!?) is what
mechanistic science has excluded from its worldview, but I see it showing
itself in modern physics in a way which cannot be reduced, though not all
physicists wants to acknowledge that.
I am still not clear on Sartre, Martin, and I probably ought to read him in
order to understand better, but I dont want to spend time on that right
now. What are your own thoughts on the above?
Hugo
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