Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Tue, 18 Nov 1997 13:49:00 +0100
Dave:
"Which lead to the question someone can surely help me with:
Is Pirsig saying that Quality is capable of make the distinction between
right and wrong?
If so where does that leave free will?"
I will try. In my view 'free will' is a term that can only be used of
self-consciouss (self-reflective) creatures. 'Will' is a term we may use of
any organism, of any autonomous entity, describing the goal involved in
autonomity. And 'free will' is the ability to change that goal, the ability
of an autonomous entity to chose between more than one predetermined (as
for that entity) goal. This is the ability following from self-reflection.
In discussing these issues we have to be very aware of which levels and
which systems or entities we are adressing. Hence, while the individual
non-self-consciouss organism has no free will, and thus is predeterminded
(or - static) in terms of the organismic goal, being autonomous implies
that it is not predetermined (static ;-) in terms of dynamics or behaviour.
Being automous involves indeterminacy - we cannot talk of autonomity in a
deterministic framework, in order to reach a specific goal you have to be
free to avoid the hindrances on your way towards that goal.
We only have the philosophical choice between a *completely* deterministic
world, with no autonomity, no free will, no choice, no love, etc.,
something utterly incomprehensible to humans I would say, and an
indeterministic world in some balance between dynamis and stasis. Many has
sought this balance in a dualistic philosophy of mind and matter, while
Metaphysics of Quality takes this very balance as its foundation.
Returning to your question, it seems to me that the way Pirsig uses the
term 'moral' goes beyond the use in traditional subjectivist or idealist
use of the term. Pirsig uses moral (my interpretation for now) in
describing the law of evolution, in order for a new level to establish
itself, it *has* to constrain the level it arises from, be that inorganic,
biological or intellectual. Social dynamics constrains biological dynamics,
and this is 'justified' because this is the only way social dynamics can
exist. Intellectual dynamics constrains social dynamics, as it has to do if
there is to be any intellectual dynamics at all.
This, I think, is *very* different from the ordinary use of the term
'moral'. And in fact, I just discovered, Pirsig's use of 'moral' (if it
*is* his use) is surprisingly similar to Charles Sanders Peirce's use of
'ethics' in a novel way (paraphrasing from his 'Short intellectual
autobiography', 1904): "Ethics is concerned with the act and process of
control ... with investigating the controllable and the uncontrollable as
they appear in power and resistance".
Be that as it may, my short answer to your question is that Pirsig's moral
says that it is 'right' for free will to arise in the course of evolution.
I am not sure it sayes anything on the rights or wrongs involved in
different exercises of free will.
Comments anyone?
Hugo
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