Magnus Berg (MagnusB@DataVis.se)
Sun, 23 Nov 1997 16:51:35 +0100
Hi Hugo
>Modern logic claims to have dismissed of the material intent, or the
>semantics, to be detached from any ontological implications. If this were
>true, one might wonder how logic can claim to posses anything like truth.
>And (I am afraid this discussion takes on more and more issues) if we agree
>on logic saying something on the truth of sentences, what kind of truth is
>this? Knowing the origin of logic, I propose that the 'truth' of modern
>logic is un-ambiguity per se, nothing more nothing less.
>And, if we wish to tangle with the other kind of truth, the empirical
>truth, the truth which has meaning, which has ontological (or less SOM -
>metaphysical) implications, modern logic has no say on this.
Einstein once put it like this:
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain,
and as long they are certain, they do not refer to reality."
Magnus
>
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