Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Tue, 25 Nov 1997 15:35:14 +0100
Anders:
> If truthfullness of sentences has anything to do with logic, it is
>because logic guarantees that if you put true sentences into a valid
>syllogism (or similar valid derivation) you get a true conclusion, but you
>have to go out and find the original true sentences yourself. (which in
>itself is a fascinating subject)
Indeed it is, - perhaps later?
Hugo:
>>And, if we wish to tangle with the other kind of truth, the empirical
>>truth, the truth which has meaning, which has ontological (or less SOM -
>>metaphysical) implications, modern logic has no say on this.
Anders:
>And you will learn the same in any introductory class on philosophy.
Yes, I know that was what you said, but my objection was that this idea of
total valuelessness of logic might not be quite true, as I went on to say
in my mail: "I think the thingish worldview is tacitly presumed in modern
logic"
Thus, in my view, the limits of logic is not only that is pure derivation
from given assumptions, but also that is entails tacit assumptions of
dealing with a thingish world, as a heritage from its origin.
So we have to distinguish two positions, one being that logic only gives
true answers from true propositions; and the second being that language has
no powers beyond logic.
And when I read what you write, I get the impression that you agree with
this second position - do you disagree with this? Or have I misunderstood you?
For example you (Anders) write:
"But Logic is to utterances and sentences, like gravity is to objects. When
ever you are in a situation with a physical object gravity acts on it, and
whenever you want to make yourself understood you have to obey logic. Its
so universal that its harder to see."
and:
"But is there a non-logic way to gain any knowledge of the world? a
knowledge that can be communicated and perhaps developed by more people
than one. ... I don't think so."
And this gives me the impression that you indeed take logic as universally
valid as opposed to me saying that it is only valid in a thingish world.
The point being that our world is not a thingish world - or, it may look
kind of thingish but there is more to it. With a banal example, 2+2 is 4 in
an entirely thingish world, but in our world 2+2 may be 1000 before you
know it if the objects are rats. Or, to put it a bit more subtly, the
evolution of our world is creative, it does produce novelties - given this,
how do we assess our powers of logic and rationality?
"Whenever you want to make yourself understood you have to obey logic.",
you wrote, and I take it that you by saying we have to 'obey' logic, is
saying that we cannot make ourself understood if we disobey logic, if we
say something non-rational. Again, I might have you wrong (our problem
being we cannot go beyond *language* in email discussions ;-), but I do
find it immensely important, and an essentiel part of metaphysics of
quality, that we acknowledge the limits of rationality and logic. We should
indeed disobey logic, go beyond the rational discussion, if we are in any
way to pursue 'the good', if we and Gaia are to dynamically continue our
stable patterns of value. Logic and science is of limited use in an
evolutionary world, *good* use - I am not anti-science or anti-logic, but
still limited. We need to provide space in our discussions and decision for
the non-rational, and providing space, limiting the role of rationality,
brings with it the responsibility of what we are making space for, what to
put instead. I see MoQ and its ethical implications as an important player
in this field.
Stepping down from the soapbox (nice expression, Platt), we may look at
this issue of logic in a different way, given the recent discussion of
whether rationality was necessarily subject-object thinking. We might take
MoQ as providing a different and more general kind of rationality, which
subsumes (as I think Doug put it) the subject-object kind of rationality.
And - make no mistake about this - this issue has indeed been the
preoccupation of some of the great philosophers in history. I recently
learned that Schelling (Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, 1775-1854) was
concerned with this issue, he spoke of "the original potentiality", "the
eternally creative original force of the world which produces all things
out of itself" and he adressed the ground of the subject-object split (I
include below a snip from a review from which I learned this - I find it
most interesting in relation to MoQ).
Those on LS who recall my postings on Charles Sanders Peirce will not be
surprised that Peirce acknowledged Schelling as an important inspiration.
Indeed, Peirce did see his semeiotic (theory of signs) as a more general
kind of logic, subsuming ordinary logic (Peirce is also famous as a
logician). But from what I know of his semeiotic, it is not quite the kind
of more general rationality I referred to above, it seems like a strictly
phenomenological theory which does not bridge the gab from subject to
object. But Peirce's work is very complex and *huge*, so perhaps something
will turn up.
Regards
Hugo
-------snip on Schelling, from: H.G. Callaway: Schelling and the Background
of American Pragmatism (review of Franz Josef Wetz, _Friedrich W.J.
Schelling, zur Einfuehrung_, Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1996.)
---------------------------
[16] In contrast with this [Hugo: Fichte's view of the Wissenschaftslehre
as the only science], Schelling held that it was the
"objective [of the philosophy of nature] to draw the subjec-
tive from the objective;" and the task of transcendental
philosophy was to work "only in the opposite direction".
"Drawing the subjective from the objective," we look
for an explanation of the subjective within nature, which
seems very naturalistic indeed. Going in the opposite direc-
tion, we would seek to explain our representation of nature,
on the basis of the "subjective." Notice too Schelling's
substitution of the Deweyan sounding "intelligence" for the
Fichtean or Kantian "I" (or transcendental ego) in the open-
ing paragraphs of the introduction to his _System of Trans-
cendental Idealism_ (1800).
We can call the quintessence of everything
merely objective in our knowledge _Nature_;
the quintessence of everything subjective, on
the other hand, is called the "I," or intelli-
gence. The two concepts are set in opposition
to one another. Intelligence is originally
thought as the merely representing, Nature as
the merely representable, the one as the cons-
cious, the latter as without consciousness.
There is, however, in all knowing a necessary
interpenetrating meeting of both (of the cons-
cious and of the in-itself non-conscious); the
task is: to account for this coincidence.
[17] The word translated is "Intelligenz." Schelling's
opening opposition between the objective and the subjective
thus becomes the contrast between "nature" on the one side
and "intelligence" on the other. Schelling sets the problems
to be addressed in his "philosophy of identity," as develop-
mental problems: to explain how intelligence develops in
nature and equally to explain how intelligence comes to re-
present the world. The suggestion is, of course, that these
are somehow two sides of the same coin. It is important to
note that transcendental idealism is only part of Schell-
ing's philosophy.
[Hugo: The other major part being his philosophy of nature, which takes
nature as a living organism (like Giordano Bruno, who was burned for that),
which evolved from one origin (his 'priciple of identity') - big bang and
evolutionism, very interesting!]
---------end of snip on Schelling--------------
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