Anders Nielsen (joshu@diku.dk)
Tue, 25 Nov 1997 09:29:30 +0100
> > well.. The phenomenon of gravity most certainly did exist before
> > Newton. I
> > hope we can agree on this. Stuff fell to the ground before newton.
> >
> > In the same way logic existed before Aristoteles (not Boolean) put the
> > first theory of logic into writing. People selling goats in the
> > streets of
> > Athen knew that they couldn't contradict themselves in a sentence, and
> > at
> > the same time say something true. I mean logic was floating around
> > "unspoken", before Aristoteles.
> >
> > (it is certainly a viable point of view to think of contradictions not
> > as
> > false, but rather as senseless but that's not relevant to this
> > discussion)
> >
> > But in any event this doesn't even relate to our discussion, because
> > the
> > theory of gravity most certainly deals with objects as opposed to
> > subjects,
> > and therefore supports the subject-object schism. While logic per
> > definition doesn't deal with objects or subjects, but deals with the
> > truthfullness of sentences.
> >
> Sorry to appear tangential to your original thread, but you are using
> the terms "subject" and "object" in an unusual way for me. Could you
> please help me understand? Do you agree that "subject" implies the self
> and "objects" are all that is not self?
well..yes
> From ZMM, we know that you and logic are One thing, Quality. It is only
> our dualistic conventions separate the two for convenience.
yes...everything is Quality, but we can't really get very far with just
this idea...We have to make cuts into Quality, and divide it to get
anything useful.
> If you are saying that logic deals with things which are not subjects,
> nor objects, then, according to Pirsig, you have defined Quality.
I don't understand this objection.
> And logic is not the source and substance of all things (thankfully).
>
> If you are trying to say that, look, logic exists independent of any
> thinker, you are espousing dualistic thinking.
>
> So if you are saying none of these, then you have a different definition
> for "subject" and "object."
>
> This is where I would like help.
Logic exists in the same way as gravity does. When we go throughout the
world we percieve quality, and this immediate experience we split into
different things. The primary split is that in most quality-perceptions
there's an I, and a "something that is not I" (subject and object...I leave
the door ajar for the possibility that there is quality from which no
subject and object can be abstracted). And the "somethings that are not I"
can again be divided into a great many things.
The use of this kind of language is wrong, but necessary. I can't really
say that "we" walk around in "the world" percieving quality, because "we"
and "the world" are abstracted from the quality itself so really there's
only the pure perception (quality), but it will do.
But we have many perceptions, and we(both as the human race, and as a
personal development from infant to adult) have found out that certain
patterns exist in these perceptions...There are objects that exhibit stable
behaviour: I have perceptions that I can only communicate to you by
referring to as objects. I see my computer standing on top of my table, and
a heap of books and clothes lying around on the floor, etc..
Some of these stable patterns are what we call objects (tables, computers,
other peoples bodies, books, etc..) and others are like gravity. How the
two kinds differ is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps gravity is harder to
find because its always there, while the books and stuff, I only percieve
when Im in my room. I dont know. But Logic is to utterances and sentences,
like gravity is to objects. When ever you are in a situation with a
physical object gravity acts on it, and whenever you want to make yourself
understood you have to obey logic. Its so universal that its harder to see.
It's quite true that logic doesn't per se deal with the truthfullness of
sentences, and I did in fact mention that twice in my first letter, but no
matter. If truthfullness of sentences has anything to do with logic, it is
because logic guarantees that if you put true sentences into a valid
syllogism (or similar valid derivation) you get a true conclusion, but you
have to go out and find the original true sentences yourself. (which in
itself is a fascinating subject)
Hugo:
>Logic was first made explicit by Aristotle, and, given my present
knowledge
>of this, logic arose in connection with his work on the categories, his
>structuring the world in a non-contradictory way. And by non-contradictory
>I dont intend to say that logic arises from language, which would be a
>circular argument, but that logic arises as an integrated part of the very
>nature of *representing*, whether in language or pre-linguistic.
>So, is logic something which exists independently of this categorical
>structuring, or does it arise as an integrated part of such structuring? I
>would say the latter, and saying this I distinguish myself from the
>platonist view of logic and mathematics, which asserts the first.
Not necessarily. Only if you claim that the structuring that Aristotle did
was completely arbitrary. That is, that he could have chosen to it in
another way that wouldnt give rise to logic (so to say). This may sound
quite impossible, and maybe it's unfair to ask for a structuring that
doesn't entail logic, because the word "structuring" so strongly implies
logic. But is there a non-logic way to gain any knowledge of the world? a
knowledge that can be communicated and perhaps developed by more people
than one. Could we imagine 2000 years of science and philosophy without
logic? I don't think so. Then people may call logic eternal and godgiven,
or just a common condition shared by the human race, but the fact remains
that we cannot do without it.
>Modern logic claims to have dismissed of the material intent, or the
>semantics, to be detached from any ontological implications. If this were
>true, one might wonder how logic can claim to posses anything like truth.
>And (I am afraid this discussion takes on more and more issues) if we
agree
>on logic saying something on the truth of sentences, what kind of truth is
>this? Knowing the origin of logic, I propose that the 'truth' of modern
>logic is un-ambiguity per se, nothing more nothing less.
>And, if we wish to tangle with the other kind of truth, the empirical
>truth, the truth which has meaning, which has ontological (or less SOM -
>metaphysical) implications, modern logic has no say on this.
And you will learn the same in any introductory class on philosophy.
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