Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Thu, 19 Feb 1998 14:17:07 +0100
Hi Donny, and velcome to the lila squad!
I am all for critical analysis of the MoQ, and this is not an immune
reaction :-)
If I have understood you correctly, you say Pirsig conflates (whether
deliberately or not) the mind/body dualism (MBd) with the subject/object
dichotomy (SOM). Alas, I cannot give any references to Pirsig, as I have
not had time to reread his books in detail for the last couple of years - I
have had my hands full with the rest of philosophy ;-) (For your
information I am an Aristotle-Bateson-Bohr-Peirce-Pirsig-Popper-etc. kind
of guy, just getting acquainted with John Dewey.)
My take on this question (MBd versus SOM), is
A) that there is a difference, these two oppositions are not analogous, and
B) I find your iterative approach towards analysing their meaning very
interesting.
On A:
Given there is a difference, what is the relation between MBd and SOM? In
short, I think the MBd is mostly an ontological, and SOM mostly a logical
distinction. But we have to dig deeper.
Mind Body dualism has been a well established and out in the open world
view since the Antiquity. It is related to various transcendental views,
that there is something beyond our ordinary world; commonly connected with
Platos distinction between an ideal and an ordinary world and most evident
in the Christian philosophy and similar religious world views, including, I
believe, much New Age philosophy.
But perhaps we should distinguish between transcendental MBd and a more
Cartesian form of MBd (that we litteraly are dual beings, made up of
matter/flesh/body and mind/spirit/soul), at least I am not quite clear on
the relation between these two. I see transcendental MBd as basically an
absolute stance, the stance that there is something out of this world which
we will never be able to know, because it is by definition 'out of this
world'. This is a kind of view which can never be rationally or empirically
rejected, and probably the majority view in the world today. I suppose the
more Cartesian MBd will be resolved into either a pure transcendental
stance, or a pragmatic distinction between levels of reality, similar to
Pirsigs levels, but others may have a different view on this.
The Subject Object Metaphysics has lived a more concealed life, though is
has its root in the Antiquity too. I take the subject object distinction to
be a logical distinction, but one which has only been tacitly assumed, not
openly expressed (and criticized) until quite recently, as far as I know.
As such, the distinction is not something which can be rejected as false,
it is an analytical tool which may be used in an appropriate way.
Perhaps I should pause to explain how I use the words 'logic' and
'ontology', touching upon B) above. Logic is basically the necessities in
our knowledge, and ontology is our basic view of the world. The interesting
point is that they are interdependent or, more precisely, interplaying in
an evolutionary process (I call this evolutionary metaphysics). One way of
putting it is that there is no absolute stance. (This is not relativism,
but evolutionism or contextualism - in 'ism' terms; Peirce and Dewey are
important players here.) Another way of putting it is that talking about
words and talking about logic _is_ talking about the world, at least
hypothetically - in terms of the possible. (And this goes against the
transcendental dualist view, the 'platonistic' view, which is quite common
among mathematicians for instance.)
Returning to Pirsig, he was the one who made me aware of this tacit
assumption (the SO-distinction) in our basic logic (and, speaking of
speaking of words, language and metaphysics are mutually interwoven).
Knowing that many other gifted philosophers have worked intensely with
these issues, I dare not say that Pirsig was the first to make it explicit;
I have met upon related views in many others. But he did make it explicit
that SOM is an assumption which can be circumscribed, that we can go behind
it, so to speak. And this is of course where his basic term quality enters,
and his suggestion of another basic dichotomy: dynamic-static.
My view of his suggestions, the MoQ, is that they are part in an
evolutionary process; and furthermore I consider them very valuable parts,
which I foresee will eventually gain more influence. And, from the point of
view of evolutionary metaphysics, showing that SOM is no absolute stance,
that we can move behind it, is but one (maybe a crucial one) step in a long
process of revealing absolute stances as not really absolute; we could call
it a contextualization of rationality.
So, SOM is not a position, hold by anyone, but a hidden assumption, an
absolute stance. And the reactions towards unveling this assumption,
circumscribing the stance, are not considered as adressing anyone's
position; either one is willing and able to take part in this unveiling,
and thanks Pirsig or whomever for this eye-opener, or one is not willing or
able to see that there is any unveiling to be done, and looks upon Pirsig
or whomever as a pain in the ass, - or not quite sane.
Unlike the transcendental MBd however, I do believe that SOM can be
addressed through open inquiry. Because SOM, or those parts of philosophy
and science which tacitly assumes SOM, are already part of the rational
project, they live by open inquiry and cannot hide outside of it, as
transcendental MBd can.
I am looking forward to more on Kant, whom I know too little of,
considering his philosophical importance.
Regards
Hugo
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe alroe@email.dk alroe@vip.cybercity.dk
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