Ant McWatt (ant11@liverpool.ac.uk)
Tue, 3 Mar 1998 18:55:30 +0100
On Mon, 2 Mar 1998 16:09:43 -0500 (EST) Donald T Palmgren
<lonewolf@utkux.utcc.utk.edu> wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, 27 Feb 1998, Ant McWatt wrote:
>
> >
> > "Wisdom is almost as satisfying as good porridge, whereas
> > knowledge has less body to it than tepid water poured over
> > old tea leaves."
>
> My friend Dr Van de Vate (now retiered from achademia) said in
> responce to the growing specializing and sub-specializing in Phil. Dept.s,
> "These clowns don't realize that you can't dilute water." You just
> reminded me of that. :)
Another good quote there, Donny.
>
>
> > "In the objective world there are no qualities, only
> > quantities: sight-colours are various wavelengths of the
> > electromagnetic spectrum; sound-music are air pressure
> > waves; smell-odours are molecular configurations, as is
> > taste and touches are pressure sensation. No where out
> > there is quality (or values) to be found.
>
> Let's be careful here about confusing two sense of the word
> "quality." (P points out this distinction in ZMM) It can mean "good" or
> "excelent" (this becomes the capital Q). But it also can mean "property"
Yes, I realise that. Qualities in terms of values are also
usually classified as subjective. Unfortunately, the term
"quality" can be ambiguous in this respect.
> -- like whitness is a property of my shirt, along w/ softness and (since
> I've been wearing it) warmth. Whenever you see the quality-quantity
> distinction it always refers to this sense of the word, and not "value."
>
>
> The impacts on
> > our sense organs are transmitted into electrochemical
> > impulses travelling to the brain where it is translated
> > back into our subjective perception. There is NO direct
> > connection between the two realms ...if you start with the
> > subjective/objective metaphysics (or the mind/matter idea
> > if that sounds less "metaphysical")... subjectiveness is
> > subjectiveness from here to eternity as is objectiveness;
> > nowhere does the two overlap."
> >
> > (e-mail from Bodvar Skutvik to Anthony McWatt, September
> > 30th, 1997)
> >
> > As can be seen from the diagram on SOM, quality is on one
> > side of a metaphysical chasm and quantity is on the other.
> > Quantity is perceived as inhering in substance, qualities
> > are perceived as being non-substances. They are mutually
> > exclusive and should therefore not be able to have an
> > effect on each other. However, the fact that your mind can
> > decide to move your little finger (a physical object) and a
> > few pints of beer (a physical substance) can alter your
> > mind totally dispels this idea. There is a serious
> > metaphysical problem here."
>
> And not remotly a new one! That's been the critique of Cartisan
> M-B duality since he came up w/ the thing. That's why it's so populer to
> flee to either M or B and call the other an illusion or some-such
> (Idealism: Nothing is spacially extended. Positivism -- what I call
> "science apolagetics": Nothing is not spacialy extended.) But this is the
> same metaphysical delima that the German Idealist tackeled.
The Mind/body problem is an old one. What is impressive
about Pirsig`s MOQ is that it avoids both the mind and/or
body options. At the end of part two of ZMM, the narrator
mentions Phaedrus`s Copernican Revolution with the example
of Kant`s fitting of the "objective" world with our sensory
capabilities and not the other way round as previously
attempted (and as you`ve also recently mentioned). What
Pirsig does, of course is to put subjects and objects in
terms of values and not the other way round (as many, if
not all, philosophers have been doing). Whether Pirsig`s
Copernican Revolution is as great as Kant`s is a debatable
point though I think it will become more appreciated as
time goes on.
> A problem when you read Aristotle, say, is that you look
> at the poor guy through this vast...
> Now if you want -- just for closure -- I can probly wrap up the
> rest of German Idealism's life (Ficht, Schelling and Hegel) in two more
> posts. Of course this would be ultra-ultra condensed but it might, sort of
> let you see (or sense) what it was about Hegel that let him put such a
> frighteningly original spin on metaphysics. Interested?
I certainly would be. I also agree with you that Kant
would have tended to favour the MOQ rather than SOM
(as it stands today).
Anthony.
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