Struan Hellier (struan@clara.net)
Wed, 25 Mar 1998 17:20:58 +0100
Hugo,
--------------------------------
>I would request that we do not consider this discussion of ethics as some
>sort of test of Metaphysics of Quality (MoQ). I believe there is much to
>MoQ besides ethics, -- first of all a metaphysics. And our discussion of
>whether we can construct a coherent and plausible system of ethics on the
>grounds of MoQ, here and now, can hardly be taken as a critical test of the
>MoQ as such. Rather, it is part of an ongoing probing and development; --
>as you say, the ethical dimension is related to the rest.
---------------------------------
I think that the MoQ has to have practical value if it is to be worth
anything and the only possible practical value I can see for it is in the
field of ethics. If there is some other area where it might be useful other
than as an intellectual exercise, then I would be very happy to hear about
it.
-------------------------------------
>Well, I had rather hoped you would bore me with a short summary of your
>view. I find it difficult to discuss whether to wear my Quality trousers
>today, if they are the only ones I have -- I would hate if I found them
>not good enough to wear ;-)
>Seriously, I hope you would be kind enough to indicate which sort of ground
>you base your ethics on. I am not familiar with the latter two writers you
>refer to, neither do I have any easy access to their works, and I am sure
>some others on the Squad are in the same situation.
----------------------------------------
With the greatest respect, I'm not really sure my personal view is relevant
to this forum. I have merely endeavoured to point out flaws in the MoQ and
to explain what I see as its true motivation. I would equally respectfully
suggest that most good bookshops will be able to get you the books I have
suggested and that you would find them a most worthwhile investment as they
directly relate to your views as you have put them here. This sounds a bit
like a cop out, but I don't want to turn myself into a spokesman for Berlin
or MacIntyre, not least because I am not capable of doing them justice and
the primary sources are there for all to see. I hope you will allow me to
continue merely to analyse the MoQ rather than postulate an entirely
separate ethical system.
Having said that, the basic position of Berlin seems to be that there is no
objectivity in morals, that people are the best judges of themselves. But he
emphasises pluralism, empathy, understanding and respect, historical context
and the use of reason.
MacIntyre is more difficult in the sense that he almost takes an outsiders
view of ethics and rarely gives value judgements. I think that summing him
up in a few sentences here really is not a sensible thing to do. His aim (I
think) is partly to attempt a bridge between the Emotivists, Aristotelian
Thomists and the rationalists. He is engaged in pointing out the flaws of
all of these traditions in the hope that they recognise their own
limitations.
In the context of the MoQ I would suggest that the limitation is that it is
irrational. On this forum we have the odd situation of people agreeing that
it is irrational yet trying to argue that it is still rational in a
fundamental way. This is surely a contradiction.
-----------------------------------------
>On the question of naturalism. Naturalism is a dangerous concept to use,
>and I must take the responsibility for bringing it up. Naturalism has been
>used in different ways through history, in concordance with the development
>of natural science. The way I use naturalism takes the fallible nature of
>our theories of the world into consideration, (only) stating that there is
>some connection between how the world is and what we ought to do, between
>the true and the good. In this perspective MoQ is a radical form of
>naturalism, stating that the true is (but) a kind of good.
>
>Moore said that any philosophy which seeks to define good (for instance the
>idea that the established natural science can decide on what is good)
>commits the naturalistic fallacy. Taking of, I believe in Humes questioning
>of how any propositions on what ought to be (values) can be deduced from
>propositions on what is (facts). Moore did not consider good the kind of
>property which could be decided upon through experience (e.g. science).
>Later on the naturalistic fallacy has been taken (e.g. by R.M. Hare I
>believe) to be the confusion of the distinction between the description and
>the evaluation of a thing.
>
>Pirsig takes the opposite route of Moore and Hare, he says that value is
>basic in experience, that the distinction between description and
>evaluation is a secondary distinction. In a way we might say that Pirsig
>agrees with Moore that the good cannot be defined by way of a descriptive
>theory, because the good is primary to any description, primary to the
>distinction between knower and known. Pirsig agrees with Moore that the
>good is not a kind of property which can be found by way of observation;
>the good is not something inherent in objects. But Pirsig furthermore says
>that the good is not something imposed by (the emotion of) the observer.
>The good is primary to the distinction between subject and object, this
>observation, which comes from the basis of Pirsig's metaphysics, makes for
>the view of ethics entailed by MoQ.
>
>We might consider Pirsigs philosophy a resolution of an ethical paradox, as
>coined in Moores naturalistic fallacy:
>"If there is no path from what is, to what ought to be, no path from the
>true to the good, then where the h... does good come from?"
>
>Regards
>
>Hugo
>
-----------------------------------------------
Beautifully put. But Pirsig is forwarding a resolution which has no
empirical evidence to substantiate it. Is not altogether more 'reasonable'
to take a non-cognitivistic resolution and simply say that ethical language
is not descriptive and indeed that ethics itself is not a form of knowledge?
Of course if we are wanting to be unreasonable then that is fine with me, so
long as we realise that we are being unreasonable.
Struan
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