Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Thu, 14 May 1998 20:24:30 +0100
Horse et al
As I have said before ( in the first reply on this thread f.i., on which
I
got no responses) I do have another view of 'Subject-Object Metaphysics'
than the one Horse and others have been homing in on lately.
We need to keep 'the Subject-Object Metaphysics', the subject of this
thread, distinct from any one of the worldviews which Pirsig, as Horse
has
pointed out, calls '_a_ subject object metaphysics'. There is a danger
in
the speaking of Subject-Object Metaphysics as _the_ SOM, tempting us
to
conflate subject-object metaphysics with a single view, often a kind of
'objectivist' view, or the more subtle view of the logical positivists,
as
Horse does in the latest mail. But this looses the key to the critique
that
I think Pirsig intended.
I will try to present my view in a short, clear form. Page references
are
to Lila, Bantam paperback ed. 1992.
First of all, Pirsig is not only talking of explicitly dualistic views,
such as the Cartesian view that there are two basic forms of substance,
mind and matter, but also seemingly monistic views such as pure idealism
and pure materialism.
And his term 'subject-object metaphysics' adresses one particular split,
the subject-object split (e.g. ch.8, p 114), and not 'dualisms' in
general.
Taking subject-object metaphysics to be about dualisms in general misses
out on the crucial point which leads towards resolving the platypi of
subject-object metaphysics. I believe Pirsigs philosophy is 'monistic'
in
the way that any truly evolutionary philosophy is monistic. But I am
confident that discussing monism, dualism and pluralism in general terms
will lead us nowhere.
On subject-object metaphysics:
The logical positivists (aka logical empiricists) are philosophers of
science, as Pirsig points out (ch.5, p.72) in his explication of the
opponents of metaphysiscs per se. And this rejection of the need for
metaphysics is a main characteristic of the logical positivists, they
see
no need for talking of the ultimate nature of reality, be that material,
ideal or something else. What is important, is positive, rational
experience (by way of science).
The second major opponent (which Pirsig considers the more formidable)
of
metaphysics are the mystics. They consider metaphysics too 'scientific',
too alienating from the primary life and experience; language is
_about_
reality, splitting up reality. What is important is primary experience.
Pirsig does not speak of idealists or materialists here, he speaks of
the
dominant form of empiricism - the formalized experience of science, and
the
unformalized experience advocated by the mystics. And Pirsig clearly
declares Metaphysics of Quality a form of empiricism (ch. 8, p.113),
which,
byt taking value as primary to 'objective reality', makes a bridge
towards
the mystics.
In spite of these two ancestral positions of Metaphysics of Quality
being
squarely against metaphysics, Pirsig insists on the necessity of
metaphysics. He insists on metaphysics, because metaphysics is what can
make a bridge between the two opponents, between science/rationality and
experience/life. And this bridge is his analysis of subject-object
metaphysics.
(I am not sure if Pirsig actually made this analysis explicitly in Lila,
at
least I cannot find it right now - we need that on-line version; but I
would appreciate any references, or some confirmation that he did not
make
it.)
I don't have time right now to rewrite my take on an analysis
subject-object metaphysics, specifically on the above opening. What
follows
is my first reply on this thread, which has a slightly different angle.
If
I get some response, I will try to push the issue further.
____________Mail on this thread of 13.apr.98:____________________
Diana, Squad,
Diana posed the PROGRAM: "Explain the subject-object metaphysics".
And I will take a first shot at it.
The subject-object metaphysics, is a metaphysics which presumes the
subject-object split. Not deliberately, knowingly, but in the form of a
tacit, not questioned, prerequisite. As a result of the paradoxes (gr:
beyond thought) arising from this presumed split (f.i. the reality of
the
external world, the objectivity of knowledge), subject-object
metaphysics
has diverged into a web of opposite philosophical stances, dominating
the
history of philosophy (f.i: idealism/materialism, realism/nominalism,
rationalism/scepticism) which are easy to entangle and difficult to
unravel. No-one within subject-object metaphysics recognizes or accepts
these opposing stances as one common position, as they are evidently
oppositions.
Recognizing the common ground for these opposing stances, seeing that
the
paradoxes arise from a subject-object split which has been presumed, but
not inquired into; this is the first step out of what Pirsig calls
subject-object metaphysics. It is a difficult step, because we stand
upon
this metaphysical ground; our building of thought rests on what was
supposedly firm metaphysical rock, but came out as a faulty raft which
needed repair. Now we try out some new experimental designs, inspired by
the ancient vessels used by other cultures, fighting to keep our
building
of reason afloat until our new, hopefully more sustainable, raft is able
to
support a major reconstruction of reason.
In short: Pirsig's subject-object metaphysics includes all those
philosophical stances which work from the basic _tacit_ presumption of
a
subject in front of the world; - where there is some, implicit or
explicit,
subject opposed to some, implicit or explicit, object, taken as an
un-questioned point of departure.
If you find this unintelligible, maybe my mails on the same issue, f.i.
of
11mar98 (Re: Rambling on intellect and life) and 17mar98 (Re: SOM as MoQ
intellectual level), will help. If not, say so, and I will have another
go.
As always, this is my present opinion, comments appreciated, etc.
Hugo
____________end mail of 13.apr.98_________________________
For the sake of those unable to locate my former mails on this, I
include
part of my mail from 11.mar.98 below, where I first gave this
explication
of subject-object metaphysics. My apologies for the extra load.
Regards
Hugo
_________From my mail to Lila Squad 11.mar.98:_______________
I think it is crucial to get more clear on the SOM-MoQ relationship, and
here follows some reflections on the latest contributions from Bo and
Doug.
Bo poses the question: Where is SOM to be found in MoQ? But this is not
the
right question, I think. Subject Object Metaphysics is Pirsigs term for
the
traditional frame of thinking, which takes 'the subject-object divide'
as
an unquestionable foundation. MoQ moves byond that, by putting this
divide
into question. There are two main views available within SOM. One is
'the
view from without', or 'the view from nowhere' - the idea that the
observer
is somewhere outside of what is observed, and the idea that all that can
known for certain is that, which can be viewed from without. (The
observer
which is implied in this view, is usually neglected precisely because it
is
outside, it is idealized away by the combination of a subject-object
divide
and the idea that the knowable, the 'objective reality' is all that
matters.) The other main view is 'the view from within', or 'the blind
subject' - the idea that the observed is always part of the observer,
and
that all that can be known is this view from within, the subjects view
of
it self. This is of course, as is also Pirsigs explication, a huge
simplification. Logical empiricism, or positivism, for instance,
combines a
strong empiricism with a focus on the 'objective', it may seen as a sort
of
'collective subject' view, stating that we can know no thing beyond our
experience, but also that we can have 'objective knowledge'. There has
been
all sorts of efforts towards avoiding the bad implications of the hidden
SOM presumption, making the philosophical landscape a lot more
complicated
than can be handled in one book, let alone in a few emails. But in order
to
address the really fundamental questions, such a coarse explication can
be
necessary; - in the long run, however, a more detailed analysis will be
needed. Here I am concerned with the fundamental question of the
relation
between SOM and MoQ.
Both oppositions above are logically strong, within their own
presumptions.
Pirsig's genius (and it was a stroke of genius, what ever predecessors
there may have been) was to see that the presumptions were common for
these
two opposites . What is presumed, metaphysically presumed, that is,
unquestionable from within these stances, is the subject-object split.
(And
this is where we have to be very careful and thorough.) The
subject-object
split is not something which is *part* of SOM, - it is *presumed* by
SOM,
it is the very foundation upon which SOM is build; but not a *known*
foundation, not something which can be looked upon and criticised within
SOM. And this is the only justification for Pirsig to attack 'SOM' as
one
common position, - that it rests on a common foundation. Those who
cannot
see that, do not feel as part of one 'SOM'-position, and they are right,
there is no recognized such position. No one could hold the
'SOM'-position,
because to see it as a unity one has to be aware of the common
presumption,
and being aware of the common presumption, one is already halfway into
MoQ
or some similar larger metaphysical frame. This is what these
philosophers,
whom we have seen as predecessors or relatives of Pirsig, have in
common,
they have sensed, and explicated more or less, a larger metaphysical
frame
which could do more than argue one of the two (big sweeps here)
oppositions, which could point to a third path that threw light on both
the
oppositions as what they were: reductio ad absurdum's of one and the
same
wrong presumption, of which they were insufficiently aware.
We should not ridicule this inability to see the metaphysical foundation
The path towards awareness of one self, including ones foundation for
living, for feeling, and for thinking, is a long and difficult journey;
and
it is a journey never ended. We ourselves are only on our way, we have
not
and cannot reach no goal, no place of complete awareness, no more than
there is and end to the mirror views of one mirror in another.
So, in my view MoQ is a step further, beyond SOM, on a path towards
greater
awareness; greater intellectual awarenes, - because it is only on the
intellectual level that we can be aware of our selves, this is indeed
what
makes the intellectual level distinct.
What does this mean for the relationship between MoQ and SOM?. SOM is
not
the intellectual level of MoQ, they are both intellectual phenomenons,
both
specific ways of looking upon our selves and our world. And SOM is not
simply subsumed as a part of MoQ, because SOM arose from neglect of the
presumed subject-object split, diverging because of this, and there is
no
ground for this diversion in MoQ or some similar metaphysics. Both of
the
extreme oppositions are no good, as anyone who succeeds in seeing their
metaphysical roots will acknowledge. This does not mean that
*everything*
has to be dumped. The oppositions were, and are, extremes, there are
many
intermediate positions, even some resembling Pirsig's. And the strength
of
any larger metaphysical frame, which makes clear where and how the
subject-object split is at work, is exactly, that in such a frame we can
*use* the subject-object split as a tool, being aware of what we are
doing,
instead of blindly presuming some subject-object split, the workings of
which we are not aware of. *Only* in some frame like MoQ can we use the
subject-object split as a tool, with skill, this could not be done
within
SOM.
This is why a MoQ-like metaphysics provides for a new concept of
objectivity, something which will change science to some degree, and our
view of science to a large degree; and for a new concept of
subjectivity.
Subjectivity and objectivity will merge into contextuality. And this is
why
our view of truth will change, whether from a relativistic position or
and
objectivistic position, these views of truth merging into a
complementary
view of truth. The complementary view of truth is a truth which is
contextual, and by being contextual it leaves room for the good to rule.
It
is not objectivism, which has no place for the good, and it is not
relativism, which has no place for truth.
____________end mail of 11.mar.98______________________
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hugo Fjelsted Alroe alroe@email.dk alroe@vip.cybercity.dk
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