Hugo Fjelsted Alroe (alroe@vip.cybercity.dk)
Tue, 2 Jun 1998 14:10:44 +0100
Theo, Diana, Squad,
Theo, thanks for your response. Your post puts a central question up
front, I believe, and I will try to make my position on this more clear.
Theo:
>One thing Hugo. Are you agreeing with Diana's definition and simply
>adding that the SO is unexamined? This seems to be your position in
>your last post. Or are you saying something more?
Diana's proposal (18.may.98) for a description of
subject-object metaphysics:
"The subject-object metaphysics is the assumption that reality is
divided into two separate and irreducible realms of subject and object.
The subject being that which experiences and the object being that which
is experienced. From this assumption arises the idea that there is a
subjective reality experienced by each individual and an objective
reality which exists independent of any individual. "
I agree with Theo that this description does not capture the full
spectrum of what I would consider subject-object metaphysics.
I will sketch an alternative proposal as a tool for discussion:
"A subject-object metaphysics is a would-be explanation of reality,
which takes some subject-object split as a tacit presumption.
By 'some subject-object split' we understand the splitting of experience
into the experienced (object) and the experiencing (subject). This
splitting of experience allows for self-reflective experience, the
subject experiencing itself as an object.
By 'tacit presumption' here, we mean something which is taken as
necessarily fundamental and not to be transgressed. Taking something as
fundamental, which by nature is a split, forces a subject-object
metaphysics towards one of the two extremes, in search for a single
coherent explanation of reality. One extreme takes the experiencing
subject as primary, the other takes the experienced object as primary. "
There are several things I would like to pursue here, and I will point
out a few.
My archetype example of the becoming of self-reflective experience is an
experiment with a chimpanzee I saw on TV some years back. The chimpanzee
was introduced to a bodysize mirror for the first time, after having
been given a spot of paint on its forehead under an anaesthetic. After a
while of touching the mirror, looking behind the mirror, etc, the
chimpanzee suddenly realized that it was herself she saw in the mirror,
trying out various grimaces and postures, studying and scratching the
spot in the forehead, etc.
I have not connected the two extremes above directly with idealism and
materialism, because this connection is not so straight forward, and
besides there are many kinds of idealism and materialism. If I were to
name some -ism's of the extremes, I would point to solipsism and some
form of naive realism. I dont want to use the terms 'subjectivism' and
'objectivism', because they have some unwanted connotations of being
subjective or being objective, and, as in the case of logical
positivism/empiricism, these do not always correspond to the extremes of
subject-object metaphysics. I was tempted to use the terms 'subjectism'
and 'objectism' instead, indicating the common subject-object split in
these two extreme positions; but this would be hard to connect to for
most people, and perhaps we are better of not naming the extremes.
Unveiling how different versions of idealism and materialism, and other
ism's, place themselves with respect to Pirsig's metaphysics is a huge
job, and I will not undertake it here.
Regards
Hugo
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Hugo Fjelsted Alroe Denmark alroe@email.dk
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