glove (glove@indianvalley.com)
Tue, 8 Sep 1998 17:17:14 +0100
hi Roger and squad
Roger, its nice to meet you! i must say, you have quite a commute! welcome
to the discussion.
you wrote:
I don't see a computer virus as a biological pattern of value. It resembles
a
biological virus in that it uses an existing PoV to spread and replicate
itself......and aren't even 'biological' viruses technically inorganic? The
virus in my floppy replicates itself in the static & dynamic patterns of
Information Technology. The other kind replicates in biological hosts.
Both have the static ability to continue and copy themselves and the
dynamic ability to adapt to improve their replicative ability or to
counteract
anti-viral initiatives of the host.
Sometimes these 4 levels restrict my ability to think. I can keep labeling
and
segmenting to some kind of reductionist's hell. Are emotions biological?
Intellectual? Probably a combination of both with the other two levels
thrown
in for good measure. Is a computer program/floppy/internet sysem an InorgPoV
or an IntelPoV? Again it is both, with clear connectedness with biological
and
social patterns as well. The very act of labeling can be both clarifying and
limiting.
Pirsig was brilliantly successful at revealing the connections and
discontinuities between levels of value.Dynamic quantum events combine into
static InorgPoV's,which then recombine into biological, social and
intellectual patterns. We can then define new patterns that emerge from
combinations across levels(such as a city). If I was to suggest a 5th level
I
would have cut it between quantum and the mechanistic Inorganic
patterns.......but I won't make such a suggestion because I think all the
levels are somewhat arbitrary. There is only value.
Roger, i am not familar enough with a computer virus, or with a regular
virus for that matter, to say how closely one resembles the other. i have
seen a regular virus magnified and it looked like a bucky-ball (named for
Buckminster Fuller). is there such a thing as a magnified image of a
computer virus? i would tend to think not, but i have been mistaken before.
i assume we call it a computer 'virus' because of the way it affects the
programs like a regular virus inflitrates its host and re writes code. but i
would have to agree with you and say the computer virus is not a biological
life form by any stretch of the imagination. again, i would say its the
Dynamic Quality it contains that makes it appear to be alive to us.
there was a time when ancient humans believed forces of nature were
'alive'...the wind, rain, lightning, the planets. that belief is really not
so far removed from our everyday reality; witness the daily astrology column
in every newspaper. personally, i think it is the subject projecting his/her
own self-life onto the objectivity of the universe, and this projecting will
continue as long as the subject thinks in terms of a separate self.
i think you have correctly intuited the high moral value of the MOQ and
where it lies, between the static quality of the four levels, existing as
the five morality conflicts Pirsig talks about. you ask, are emotions
biological? i would agree with you and say emotions, like everything else,
are composed of static quality in the form of the four layers, as well as an
undefinable Dynamic Quality. an emotion cannot exist independently in the
universe. it must be felt, and to be felt the emotion needs all four layers
working together, along with DQ. otherwise, the emotion is just a
'something' that we cannot really put a name on.
lets look at it this way...in Lila, a native american is asked, 'what kind
of dog is that?' and after giving the question some thought, he replys
"thats a 'good' dog!" just what was he expressing by that statement? and why
did Pirsig feel the incident important enough that he remembered it many
years later? the questioner was only concerned with the biological nature of
the dog, but the native american was stating a much larger truth. i am sure
his answer failed to satisfy the narrow biological question of 'what kind of
dog it was', but he obviously heard a question of a deeper meaning and was
answering accordingly. so to answer your emotion question, its a 'good'
emotion! :)
the four layers are of a secondary moral value to the DQ/sq realization
outlined in Lila, and yet they are an intergal part of the static MOQ, the
only part we can perceive in actuality. still, the real meat and potatoes of
the MOQ lies in the Dynamic Quality aspect it entails, the Conceptual
Unknown. i think Pirsig has only outlined the four layers very briefly and
what we are doing now is attempting to fill in the spaces, and its very
difficult to do! for it entails a whole new point of view. but i cannot help
but feel if more layers are added, we are losing something of much value
within the MOQ, namely, the accounting for everything, whether it has value
or not.
it seems to me that once a firm static latch is formed with the MOQ, its
clear that it cannot be extended, its already complete!
best wishes to all,
glove
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