LS Re: Free Will/Determinism


diana@hongkong.com
Sat, 12 Sep 1998 06:17:31 +0100


Platt and squad,

Platt Holden wrote:
>
> Hi Diana and LS:
>
> On Sep. 7 Diana wrote:
>
> >The very notion of free will is inseparable from the notion of
> >subjects and objects. To even speak of it is to show that you’ve
> >swallowed the subject-object metaphysics whole. It is the subject
> >that has free will after all. You cannot be Dynamic and have a fully
> >fledged subject concept at the same time. “Man makes choices” is
> >pure SOM. Who makes choices? The little ghostly “me”s that live
> >inside our heads apparently. Lose the idea of subjects, on the
> >other hand, and the question evaporates; there's nothing left to
> >have a will.
>
> Looks to me like Diana has fallen into the same trap I fell into not
> long ago when I posed the question, “Who is the I that knows me?”
> In a similar construction, Diana asks. “Who has will if not I the
> subject?”

No, Diana asked "Who has FREE will if not I the subject?"

> ... consider that those who claim all is determined
> make a choice between free will and determinism, thus contradicting
> their own assertion.

So how would you explain that Chinese people are more likely to believe
in determinism than British people? Is the decision made by the subject
or the cultural patterns? If you believe it was the subject then we call
it free will. If it was the culture it would be determinism, or object
will.

An abstract notion of will, sans subject, could be equated with meaning,
purpose, Quality even, in which case it wouldn't be too much of a
stretch to say the will exists before the subject and object. But what
we are dicussing now is FREE will. This is a specific metaphysical
viewpoint that says that the subject is the cause of her own choices.
Actually free will is a misnomer because it is not any abstract
will-concept that the SOM says is free, it's the subject that is free.
Free subject or even SUBJECT WILL would be a more accurate term.
 

> Anyway, Diana's argument could just as well apply to experience
> which, Pirsig says, is Quality. Substitute the word “experience” for
> “free will” in Diana’s passage above and the argument shows that
> experience is subjective and inseparable from the notion of subjects
> and objects. Who has experiences? The little ghostly “me”s that live
> inside our heads. Thus, the whole idea of Quality is merely
> subjective.

To apply this reasoning to experience you should use "subjective
experience", not "experience".

And it's not the idea of will (purpose, meaning) that evaporates, it's
the idea of a subject will, ie free will, that evaporates.

Ditto for experience.

I realize that this is not what Pirsig says, but he kind of fudges his
answer. He says that to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality
one's behaviour is free. But is having free behaviour the same as having
subjective will? Free here means free from static patterns. Maybe the
pure will/Quality is free, but that's not the same as saying that the
subject is free. It's a language trap. I suggest that in future we say
subject-will instead of free will to avoid confusion.

Diana

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