Re: MD Sophocles not Socrates

From: Elizaphanian (Elizaphanian@members.v21.co.uk)
Date: Sat Nov 09 2002 - 09:48:25 GMT

  • Next message: Steve Peterson: "Re: MD levels (Down with Types of Value, Up with Types of Patterns)"

    Hi Wim,

    Thank you for your - as ever - stimulating feedback. I can't claim to be
    changing as many nappies as I used to - perhaps I really am a Victorian
    patriarch wannabe ;-)

    On the question of the 'rituals' - I do very much want to have a thorough
    discussion of those, but I'd rather put the 'campaign' to bed before
    starting up something else. Although it does seem grandiose to use the term
    'campaign'; perhaps you're right that it is foolish to expend energy on
    trying to change the terminology. Yet I can't help feeling that if you
    accept a metaphysical system with 'intellect' as its highest (static,
    knowable) value, then, at whatever level, you are signing up for something
    which is ultimately destructive. Which is to say, intellectual values are
    not my highest values; they have instrumental Quality, not ultimate quality
    for me. I suspect that my fate is to become a MoQ-dissident, which is not at
    all where I expected to end up. However, you - wisely as ever - are much
    more interested in questions of 'my MoQ' and 'your MoQ' - which is, I feel,
    where the value of these discussions lie. So on with that.

    > Behind this re-naming is an interesting discussion about the 'essence' of
    > the 4th level of course. I do feel sympathy for your argumentation that
    > 'individuals' or rather their defining characteristic,
    > independent/discriminating judgement, have/has an essential role in the
    4th
    > level (are/is 'distinct to the 4th level'). An important question to me
    > seems: do 'individuals' in this sense create the 4th level or do the
    > patterns of values constituting the 4th level enable people to become
    > 'individuals' in this sense? The last feels most 'MoQish' to me. (Cf.
    > 'Quality has Lila' instead of 'Lila has Quality'.)

    This is a deeply intriguing line of thought. I would tend to agree with you
    that the fourth level is what _enables_ people to exist on the fourth
    level, ie that the construction of patterns which constitute the 'mature' or
    adult self is a response to pressures or opportunities that are present at
    the fourth level. This does, of course, tie in with classic Christian
    teaching, especially Augustine, whereby 'self' is a gift of grace.

    > That raises the question
    > what characterizes these 4th level patterns of values (not 'individuality'
    > or 'independent/discriminating/conscious judgement', because that is only
    > enabled by these patterns).

    My central claim is that the fourth level is characterised by 'eudaimonic'
    values, of which intellect is one part. This is a movement on from where I
    started, as discussed in previous posts. I agree that individuality is
    enabled by the fourth level. I hadn't thought of things like that before,
    but it sounds right. Not so sure about judgement though: I see that as the
    'threshold' or 'machine language interface' equivalent. But we'll come on to
    that.

    > You wrote:
    > 'a full explanation of a judgement reaches a natural terminus in a
    > description of an individual character (and the virtues they are committed
    > to), not in the social context within which that individual is embedded.'
    > and
    > 'I'm not sure that "dependence" is the word I would choose to describe the
    > relationship of an individual to the fourth level'.
    > For me a full explanation of a judgement does NOT reach a natural terminus
    > in a description of an individual character. You CAN go on: by describing
    > the 4th level patterns of values of which that individual character is an
    > element and an unique combination. That is partly expressed in the first
    > lines of the poem I quoted twice before on this list:
    > '"I" is just some other people's quotes,
    > a bundle of memories, cravings and hopes.'
    > Nearly all of my and your thoughts can only be expressed because others
    have
    > thought them before; the repetition of those thoughts 'in' different
    people
    > is the intellectual pattern of values. The same is true for a lot of your
    > and my emotions, intuitions and sensations (and for all of your and my
    > observations, reasons, empathy and -paradoxically- revelations).

    I don't agree with you here (although I would now be happy to use
    'dependence' to describe the relationship of an individual to the fourth
    level, I think). When you say that 'you CAN go on: by describing the fourth
    level patterns of values of which that individual character is an element
    and an unique combination' I would want to say that a property of the
    'unique'ness - in this instance - is that the composite patterns which form
    the 'self' have no outside replication or reproduction; put differently,
    they are a DQ innovation. I think this is what distinguishes the third level
    'self' from the fourth level 'self'. Are you arguing for a form of
    determinism here? (leaving aside DQ questions for a moment)

    >
    > You asked whether I 'have any views on the "problem #2" that' you
    > 'articulated' [being the possibly logically coherent objection to your
    view
    > that:] 'Human flourishing (eudaimonia) is just a high quality static latch
    > within the social level; eudaimonic qualities just refer to high quality
    > social units; eudaimonic values are simply particular types of social
    value.
    > The intellect is still at a level above all this.

    I wasn't clear. Problem #2 is about the 'choosing unit' - but you come on to
    that. I think that the answer #2 which you deal with here is the most
    promising way to preserve Pirsig's original account, so I'm glad you take it
    up.

    > 'If you define the social
    > level in such a way that it includes the highest
    > available static patterns of quality up to (not including) Sophocles
    'human
    > flourishing' may well have been a high quality social value (contrary to
    > your reasoning).

    Agreed. That was my point in articulating it.

    > Even if they were not able to describe it in an easily
    > recognizable way for us (account for it in a way comparable to Aristotle's
    > writings) even the shamans of old expressed it in their actions (and
    > accounted for it in the hero myths they created). Their ability to express
    > independent judgement and to detach themselves a bit from normal social
    > roles was exactly what gave them their special position in society. It was
    > the 'machine language type interface' between social patterns of values
    and
    > higher level values.

    Here I would want to be a little more cautious, and in fact this will no
    doubt form a central part of a discussion on rituals. I agree that this is
    where the fourth level may have its origin - that is, this is where human
    nature may first have become aware of the fourth level.

    > If you define the social level in the way I do it (by its latch on
    > unconsciously copied behavior) 'human flourishing' is definitely a 4th
    level
    > static value. It needs conscious copying of motivations for action to be
    > passed on and maintained. Whether it is the best way to define and name
    the
    > 4th level is a wholly different question... I don't think so.

    Are you content with 'intellectual' as the 'best way to define and name the
    4th level' then? Or is it just that you think it is fruitless to try and
    change the name? Your understanding of 'intellect' is certainly broader than
    Pirsig's.

    > You were also 'wondering how [I] would describe the nature of the
    "choosing
    > unit" at the fourth level'.
    > I utterly dislike the idea of 'choosing units' at any level. It
    presupposes
    > Subject Object Metaphysics. Thinking about 'choosing units' implies
    thinking
    > about subjects that choose between (courses of action that more or less
    > accurately reflect) values reified into objects. The experience of
    > 'independence', of 'discrimination' and of 'judgement' comes first and
    > subjects (choosing units) and objects (courses of action and values) are
    > deduced from or created by this 4th level static quality experience.
    > Behavior comes first. People calling each other to account for their
    > behavior, demanding convincing motivations, create the experience of
    > 'choice' from options. Action is behavior that is motivated in retrospect.
    > The need to convince others 'values' copying motives from others and forms
    > patterns of people motivating their behavior in ways that are recognizably
    > similar. (E.g. 'God' was created because people developed a habit of
    > motivating their behavior with 'God told me to ...' in order to get away
    > with non-conformist behavior.)

    Let us abandon (for the sake of argument) the notion of 'choosing units' as
    a scalable concept (although you do agree that individual discrimination is
    one key to the fourth level). You've spent much time considering the levels.
    How would you describe what these things have in common (ie what would be an
    accurate and scalable concept to describe them?): the carbon (or hydrogen?)
    atom, DNA, a member of the species homo sapiens, a mature individual? My
    language here may be imprecise, but I think that is because of an inherent
    weakness in standard MoQ language. I am trying to pick out in each case the
    equivalent of the 'machine language' interface, ie something which is
    perceptible to each of two levels, and which therefore is the vehicle for
    evolutionary development at the higher level. Pirsig is very clear that DNA
    (or a virus) is the threshold between the inorganic and the biological
    levels. I am not presently aware that he is equally clear about what the
    thresholds are between level 2 and level 3, or between level 3 and level 4.
    Hence my 'problem #2' - I think that a mature individual in the sense
    described can function in the way needed, but I don't think that an
    'intellect' can. (Put differently, I think 'intellect' in the sense Pirsig
    uses it is either something common to levels 2, 3 and 4, ie reasoning
    ability, or it is something exclusive to developments _within_ level 4, and
    can therefore not be the 'machine language' interface. I don't think that
    Pirsig is coherent here.)

    > Given your/Pirsig's description of the intellectual level in your 31/10
    > 15:55 -0000 post:
    > 'The intellectual level is the level of symbolic social learning, the same
    > as mind. It is the collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the
    > brain, that stand for patterns of experience.',
    > why don't you propose to rename the 'intellectual level' into 'symbolic
    > level'?
    > I guess I'll have to wait for the post in which you are going to present
    > your alternative to what you consider to be the 'standard account' of the
    > MoQ.

    There won't be anything substantially new in that post (it might end up
    being an essay to be posted on the forum. I probably won't write it up till
    after Christmas, once things have settled in my mind). I've said pretty much
    everything I have to say, it just needs to be organised and rendered more
    clearly. Briefly: the fourth level should be thought of as the 'eudaimonic'
    level. The scale of values are those which allow for individual human
    flourishing. The equivalent to the 'machine language' interface is the
    individual capable of mature discrimination and judgement. Human rights are
    a fourth level shaping of the third level which allow eudaimonic evolution,
    ie, the exploration of all the different forms in which human beings can
    express themselves. Intellectual flourishing is one form of eudaimonic
    flourishing, but it is neither the only form of fourth level flourishing,
    nor is it the most important.

    It's possible that there is a 'fifth' level which is 'symbolic' - but I see
    that as part of the Platonic tendency in the MoQ (which was absent in ZMM).
    I don't think 'symbolic' - or 'intellect' - has any content as a 'scale of
    values'. Put differently, I think that logic is sterile - it is a tool (a
    high quality intellectual pattern) which is put to use according to a
    different scale of values, which determines how to use logic and indeed
    whether to use logic at all. If 'intellect' is the fourth level then 'logic'
    has a paradigmatic status which I don't think is healthy.

    > You asked:
    > 'is there a deeper objection to "historical investigation as a means of
    > discerning philosophical truth" here?'
    > History can't be investigated. It can only be rewritten. The story we
    create
    > from the results of our investigation of the present all too easily gets
    > colored by our need to create heroes, individuals 'with whom it all
    began'.
    > I distrust such stories. Contrary to what Platt loves to repeat 'Societies
    > [do NOT] only change one person at a time and someone has to be first'.
    > Social change is not located in individuals, but in the relations between
    a
    > lot of them... Relational patterns change gradually. New patterns need
    time
    > to crystallize, to change from exceptions on former patterns that only
    > 'prove past rules' to recognizable new ones. In retrospect -for those that
    > were there- there is never a specific place and moment in time at which a
    > pattern of values began, but at best a specific place and moment in time
    at
    > which they recognized it -a different place and a different time for
    > everyone involved-.

    So you reject the 'great man' theory of history? Fair enough. I'm not sure
    that I agree wholly with 'History can't be investigated. It can only be
    rewritten.' though. In what ways would you distinguish 'history' from
    'collective memory'? Are they distinct? How, for example, would you analyse
    the twentieth century discovery of archaeological evidence for the existence
    of Troy? That would seem to suggest that history can be investigated, even
    if the 'take up' of whatever conclusions are reached by that investigation
    are then governed by the priorities and values which shape the collective
    memory (eg reassessments of Churchill - he was clearly a drunken
    reactionary, but he also made a difference, and he will remain a British
    hero no matter what evidence is brought out. Perhaps you would say he didn't
    make a difference? That might be worth teasing out.)

    >
    > I will not comment on your 'standard account of the MoQ'. I'm interested
    in
    > YOUR account (YOUR MoQ) in order to compare it with mine. The MoQ will
    never
    > be a fixed, standard account. It is a pattern we recognize (or not) in the
    > different accounts of everyone on this list (with Pirsig's account in
    'Lila'
    > becoming less and less important while the cumulative volume of this list
    > grows).

    I would be interested in a summary statement of YOUR MoQ!

    > With friendly greetings,

    And to you.

    Sam
    www.elizaphanian.v-2-1.net/home.html

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