From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sat Jan 01 2005 - 20:47:18 GMT
Paul:
I'm not even done reading this thread, but want to pause just long enough to
say, you rock! Bravo! You tip-toed through a mine field here. I have a
strong suspicion that I shall be quoting you this weekend. Please keep 'em
coming.
dmb
-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Turner [mailto: ]
Sent: Saturday, January 01, 2005 5:35 AM
To:
Subject: RE: MD "Is there anything out there?"
Hi Ham
Paul:
> I am using the term sense data for the generalised 'something' which
is
> sensed. It can also be called sense experience or just experience. I
> don't mean anything subjective/objective or mental/physical. Those
> distinctions are applied later and are nowhere to be found in the
front
> edge of the experience itself.
Ham said:
You appear to be using sense data as both the source and the sensibility
of
the 'something'.
Paul:
I am using pure sense data to refer to the 'something' that is the
source of everything else.
Ham said:
If both 'out there' and 'in
here' are sense data (which I maintain must be differentiated), you have
a
differentiated source without an observer or 'agent'.
Paul:
The observer or agent i.e., the subject, emerges in static patterns
along with the 'observed'. I maintain that sense data is not necessarily
differentiated.
Ham said:
> Data of any kind are specific, like any kind of being.
Paul responded::
> I disagree, perhaps sense data has too much SOM baggage but I am using
> it as a simple reference to something sensed. Once differentiated, it
is
> this or that and not just pure sense data. It is then intellectualised
> sense data with properties and so on i.e. intellectualised into
objects
> of some kind.
Ham said:
This is still fuzzy metaphysics.
Paul:
The proposition is that there is something there, Northrop calls it a
continuum, and it is ultimately without stable differentiation but
sensed nonetheless. This is reality, it is where it all begins for
everyone. It is what is returned to on enlightenment.
Ham said:
To me, data is some specific kind of
intelligence that can be made sensible. Can you give me an example of
sense
data that is not differentiated?
Paul:
It's always right here, Ham. Any example I give is not it. However, this
from Northrop may begin to explain what I am talking about:
"[Berkeley and Hume] tended to regard the continuum as nothing but an
aggregation of secondary and tertiary qualities. That this is false, an
examination of what one immediately apprehends will indicate. We
directly inspect not merely the white and the noise but also these in a
field. The field is as immediately given as any specific quality,
whether secondary or tertiary, within it. Moreover, most of the directly
experienced field is vague and indefinite. Only at what William James
termed its center is there specificity and definiteness. Thus it is
evident that the indefinite, indeterminate, aesthetic continuum is as
immediately apprehended as are the specific differentiations within it."
[Northrop, Logic of the Sciences and Humanities p.97]
Ham said:
It would appear that your "pure undifferentiated value" defines Dynamic
Quality. If it has no precursor, it is logically the 'uncreated source'
of
experienced reality. Do I understand this correctly?
Paul:
It is not so much that it is the *source of* experience, rather that it
*is* pure experience. I see that you find it necessary to postulate
something that exists apart from experience. This is what is causing our
disagreement. You replace the reality that is known through mystical
experience with a hypothetical source of which there is no experience.
You are placing logical necessity over empirical experience because you
seem to reject the credibility of undifferentiated (i.e. mystic)
experience and its place in metaphysics. This is precisely the problem
with western metaphysics that the MOQ is trying to overcome and that
many eastern philosophies have resolved.
Paul then says:
> The differentiation of otherwise undifferentiated sense experience is
> made on the basis of Quality. The differentiations are static patterns
> in an otherwise undifferentiated Quality. The undifferentiated
Quality,
> i.e. minus static patterns, is referred to as Dynamic Quality.
Ham said:
Your use of the term "otherwise undifferentiated" when referring to a
pure,
unified source is an equivocation. If patterns exist in Value (DQ),
then it
is differentiated.
Paul:
What I am saying is that Quality has a patterned aspect and an
unpatterned aspect. The unpatterned aspect is called Dynamic and the
patterned aspect is called static.
If you are pointing out that DQ is different from SQ and is therefore
differentiated then we share the same problem. One cannot speak of
something undifferentiated in conjunction with anything else without
falling into this trap. Your pure absolute unified source is
differentiated from your experiential reality and is therefore not
really unified at all.
Ham said:
Logically, there must be a cause for this pattern
differentiation. What is lacking here is a mechanism whereby
differentiation occurs.
Paul:
That mechanism is static latching. At each level, the latching produces
differentiations of a distinct kind. Latching at the intellectual level
creates conceptual distinctions. This is where 'external reality' and
'self' begin.
Ham said:
This begs the question of "otherness", which you
will deny. The challenge of metaphysics, it seems to me, is to provide
a
reasonable hypothesis for the division of Oneness into 'self' and
'other'.
Paul:
I think the challenge of metaphysics is to include as much of experience
as it can within an intellectual framework to understand and study the
world through dependent disciplines.
Ham said:
Since your philosophy rejects the self/other dualism of classical
metaphysics, I don't see MOQ as having met that challenge.
Paul:
The self/other dualism is contained within static quality where it is no
longer considered fundamental to the structure of reality/experience.
Ham said:
You can't posit
Dynamic Quality as undifferentiated value and define it as a patterned
entity,
Paul:
Correct. I don't.
Ham said:
whether the patterns are dynamic or static. Clearly, without an
'agent' to effect this differentiation, the theory is inadequate.
Paul:
The division of oneness into self and other is a part of the creation of
static patterns from undifferentiated value by the process of static
latching. Static latching is proposed as an evolutionary process driven
by the tension between the 'betterness' of freedom and the 'betterness'
of stability. This is the proposed nature of the universe. Why must
there be an agent?
Ham then asked:
> Why isn't Value itself the experiential source?
Paul replied:
> You make a distinction between experiential reality and
non-experiential
> reality which I deny. Also, rather than being the source of
experience,
> value is postulated as pure experience itself.
Ham said:
Metaphysical reality must be greater than what the finite mind grasps of
it.
Paul:
Well, I think reality is simply whatever we experience, but I agree that
it cannot be completely defined. There is no infinite mind to contrast
with a finite mind.
Hams said:
The essentialist view is that there is an Absolute Source which is not
dependent on causality or the conditions of finitude. (This 'uncreated'
Source would represent what you've called "non-experiential reality".)
I've
hypothesized an ontology whereby differentiation arises without altering
the
Absolute Source. MOQ does not appear to be supported by an ontology.
Paul:
DQ is not altered by static differentiations, it remains pure value. The
MOQ ontology is four levels of static quality ordered in an evolutionary
relationship and pure value itself.
Ham also asked:
> Inasmuch as all experience is differentiated, how can either data or
> sensation(s) qualifiy as the undifferentiated Source?
Paul answered:
> Because not all experience is differentiated, although almost all of
it
> is.
Ham said:
Again, Paul, can you provide an example of undifferentiated experience?
Paul:
Satori.
Regards
Paul
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